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Cloud Least Privilege

Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026

Act Security vs P0 Security: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.1

Act profileP0 profile

Ahead on the index

5.2

Act Security

Access hardening platformahead on 5 of 7

Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding).

Act profile

Behind on the index

3.1

P0 Security

Just-in-time accessahead on 1 of 7

8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding).

P0 profile

Where Act is behind

Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap.

P0 Security grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, the command line or the web, and scores 5 on removes against Act's 3. It totals 3.1 against Act's 5.2. P0 suits a team that wants production access to be requested, approved and expired, with enforcement inside AWS and Google Cloud. Act suits a team that needs standing access cut with changes tested first and applied through its own pipeline. No pre-change simulation was found for P0 on 2026-11-10, so it scores 0 on safe.

The seven criteria side by side

Act Security 5.2 (5.15), P0 Security 3.1 (3.05) on the index weights.
CriterionWeightActP0Ahead
Removes access, not only reports it2535P0
Safe to enforce2070Act
One change, a class of risk1572Act
Stays fixed1543Act
Identity, network and AI access together1064Act
Uses the cloud's own controls1065Act
Evidence for auditors533level

Why each scores what it scores

  • Removes access. Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only.
  • Safe to enforce. Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages.
  • One change, a class of risk. Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary.
  • Stays fixed. Act 4: Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described.
  • Identity, network and AI. Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. P0 4: Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed.
  • Cloud's own controls. Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access.

Verdict by situation

Strongest, in one sentence each

Act Security
Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls.
P0 Security
Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents.

Sources

  1. act.security, read 10 Nov 2026
  2. act.security/platform, read 10 Nov 2026
  3. softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement, read 10 Nov 2026
  4. act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain, read 10 Nov 2026
  5. p0.dev/platform, read 10 Nov 2026
  6. docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md, read 10 Nov 2026
  7. docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md, read 10 Nov 2026
  8. docs.p0.dev/llms.txt, read 10 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026.