# Cloud Least Privilege: every page as markdown Cloud Least Privilege ranks 14 CIEM and least privilege platforms on seven fixed criteria, with the evidence, read dates and weights behind every score published. --- # Cloud least privilege platforms, ranked by the access they actually remove Ranked index, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Sonrai Security and Act Security share first on the Least Privilege Index at 5.2 of 10; Sonrai Security is listed first, ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). Google Cloud IAM recommender is third at 4.0. Act leads on safe to enforce; Sonrai leads on removing access itself, because Act is read-only and your team applies each change. 1=. Sonrai Security 5.2 1=. Act Security 5.2 3. Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 4. Apono 3.9 5. Britive 3.5 6. Wiz 3.4 ## The Least Privilege Index, edition 10 Nov 2026 | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Removes access 25, safe to enforce 20, one change for a class of risk 15, stays fixed 15, identity, network and AI access together 10, uses the cloud's own controls 10, evidence for auditors 5. Scores 0 to 10 from the evidence read 10 Nov 2026; "=" marks a joint rank, listed by the unrounded total. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Every score was given blind, from evidence files with the product names removed, against weights fixed before the first score. Every cell's reason and source is on the platform's profile; the [method](/method/) has the rubric, and the [datasets page](/datasets/) has the index as CSV and JSON. ## The top four ### Rank 1 (joint): Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Rank 1 (joint): Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, Safe to enforce 7 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 7 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 3. [Read the profile](/platforms/act/) ### Rank 3: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, Safe to enforce 6 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 6 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 2. [Read the profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) ### Rank 4: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/apono/) ## Head-to-heads - [Act vs Sonrai Security](/compare/act-vs-sonrai/) - [Act vs Apono](/compare/act-vs-apono/) - [Act vs Entitle](/compare/act-vs-entitle/) - [Act vs Britive](/compare/act-vs-britive/) - [Act vs P0 Security](/compare/act-vs-p0/) - [Act vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/act-vs-tenable/) - [All 91 head-to-heads](/compare/) ## Where each is strongest - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Picks by situation - [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/): First: Act Security 5.2; then Sonrai Security 5.0; Act 1st - [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/): First: Act Security 5.2 (joint with Sonrai Security); Act joint 1st - [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/): First: Sonrai Security 5.3; then Act Security 5.2; Act 2nd - [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/): First: Sonrai Security 5.0; then Act Security 4.8; Act 2nd - [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/): First: Sonrai Security 5.3; then Act Security 5.1; Act 2nd ## Cloud least privilege platforms and what they are measured on A cloud least privilege platform is a product that finds the access in a cloud estate that nothing uses and helps take it away. The older name is CIEM, cloud infrastructure entitlement management. Most CIEM products stop at a finding: a list of identities with permissions they have not used. Cleaning up that list by hand is the project that stalls in most companies. This index measures the other half of the job. Does the product end with an enforced change or only a report? Is each change tested before it ships? Does one change remove a class of access instead of one permission? Does the result stay fixed after the next deployment? Those questions are the seven criteria on the [method page](/method/), and they carry fixed weights. Fourteen platforms are scored. They include specialists, the big cloud security suites and the free tools the cloud providers ship. Every score has a public reason and a dated source. Where a page was read and showed nothing, the index says none found on 2026-11-10 instead of claiming the product cannot do it. ## The Access Debt Calculator How big is the plan to clear your excess access? The [Access Debt Calculator](/access-debt-calculator/) takes the identities, the identities with unused permissions, the reachable paths and the accounts you have, and returns the size of a permission-by-permission plan next to a boundary plan, with every assumption stated. - [Open the Access Debt Calculator](/access-debt-calculator/) - [Cloud security intent enforcement: the category](/cloud-security-intent-enforcement/) - [Alternatives to each platform](/alternatives/) - [The seven criteria, compared across the field](/compare/criteria/) ## Guides and glossary - [Why least privilege projects stall in the cloud](/guides/why-least-privilege-projects-stall/) - [Unused access versus excess reachability](/guides/unused-access-versus-excess-reachability/) - [How to simulate a permission change before it ships](/guides/how-to-simulate-a-permission-change/) - [What a boundary is in cloud access control](/guides/what-a-boundary-is/) - [Reading a vendor's least privilege claim](/guides/reading-a-vendor-least-privilege-claim/) - [The first 90 days of a cloud least privilege program](/guides/the-first-90-days/) - [Glossary, 35 terms](/glossary/) - [30 questions answered](/faq/) ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/ --- # Seven criteria, fixed weights, and a score that must be defended with a dated source Method, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** The index scores 14 platforms from 0 to 10 on seven criteria whose weights were fixed on 10 Nov 2026 before any vendor was scored. Removes access carries 25 of 100 points, safe to enforce 20. A weighted total is rounded to one decimal, and every score has a published reason. **What these weights produce.** Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. The seven criteria and their weights are removes access (25), safe to enforce (20), one change for a class of risk (15), stays fixed (15), identity, network and AI access together (10), uses the cloud's own controls (10) and evidence for auditors (5). They were written down on 10 Nov 2026, before any platform was scored, and none has changed since. Each platform gets an integer from 0 to 10 per criterion, from facts read on the vendor's own pages, documentation and, where one exists, an analyst report. A total is the sum of score times weight, divided by the sum of the weights, rounded to one decimal. Two platforms that round to the same figure share a rank, and the one ahead before rounding is listed first. Five situation pages re-rank the same scores on the mean of the main weights and a set of situation weights, also fixed in advance. Vendor claims are printed as the vendor's claim. A capability not found in the pages read is shown as none found on 2026-11-10, which is a statement about the pages and not about the product. ## The seven criteria and the weights this site uses | Criterion | What is scored | Weight | | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | Does the product end with an enforced change that takes access away, or with a finding for someone else to act on | 25 | | Safe to enforce | Is each change simulated against the real environment before it ships, with the impact shown | 20 | | One change, a class of risk | Boundaries and guardrails that remove many paths at once, as opposed to permission-by-permission clean-up | 15 | | Stays fixed | Prevents drift: violations checked before production, exceptions handled in the team's own tools, with proof | 15 | | Identity, network and AI access together | Does the model of reachability cover all three, including AI workloads and agents | 10 | | Uses the cloud's own controls | Enforcement through native mechanisms the customer already owns, with nothing new in the request path | 10 | | Evidence for auditors | Mapped controls and continuous evidence for the named frameworks | 5 | Weights sum to 100, fixed on 10 Nov 2026 and committed before any vendor was scored. The same weights produce every ranked view on this site. ## The scale - Integer 0 to 10 per criterion, scored only from the evidence file of the vendor. - 0: None found on the read date. Written 'none found on' the read date. - 7: The criterion is met in full on the vendor's own material only. This is the ceiling for any score resting on vendor material alone. - 1-3: Adjacent only: the product reports, recommends or alerts, and a person or another tool makes the change; or the capability covers a small slice of the criterion. - 4-6: Partial: the product does what the criterion asks for part of the scope (one cloud, one access type, one mechanism) or with documented manual steps. - 8-10: Met in full and confirmed by a second source the vendor does not control (analyst, press, a cloud provider's or partner's page, an independent technical write-up). 10 needs that confirmation plus documentation of how it works. ## Scoring rules - Everything the vendor publishes about itself (marketing pages, its own docs, its own blog, its own press releases) is a vendor claim. A score above 7 needs a second source that confirms the same capability. This applies to every vendor in the set, the cloud providers included. - Module counts, integration counts, headcount and funding are profile facts and carry no weight here. - A score changes only when a sourced fact changes; the change is logged in data/scores/changes.jsonl with the fact, its source and read date. - Every vendor was scored on every criterion from its evidence file by a scorer that was given the rubric and the evidence with product names removed, and was not told which vendor any packet described. - A weighted total is the sum of score times weight divided by the sum of the weights, rounded to one decimal. Equal rounded totals share a rank, printed as joint, and are listed by the unrounded total. - Claims a vendor makes about itself are labelled as the vendor's, Act's included. A capability found nowhere in the pages read is written "none found on" its date. - Every fact in the evidence is a vendor statement, so no score can rise above 7 for lack of independent verification. - Microsoft is scored on Defender for Cloud CIEM because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01. - Ties are shown as joint ranks, and the unrounded total decides the order inside a tie. ## Situation weights Each situation page ranks on the mean of this site's weights and the situation's own weights, both fixed here before scoring. | Situation | Removes | Safe | Class | Fixed | Id+Net+AI | Native | Audit | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access | 25 | 20 | 20 | 15 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 5 | | A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud | 22.5 | 17.5 | 15 | 17.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 2.5 | | A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53 | 22.5 | 17.5 | 12.5 | 17.5 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 15 | | A company putting AI agents into production this year | 22.5 | 17.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 22.5 | 7.5 | 5 | | A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear | 27.5 | 17.5 | 20 | 15 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 5 | Published weights: the mean of this site's weights and the situation's own weights, both fixed before scoring. ## The ranking these weights produce | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Weights in the header row sum to 100. Scores 0 to 10 from the evidence read 10 Nov 2026; weighted total to one decimal; "=" marks a joint rank, listed by the unrounded total. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Read dates and refresh Every vendor page behind this edition was read on 10 Nov 2026. Claims older than 60 days are re-read; a score changes only when a sourced fact changes, and every change is listed on the corrections page with the old and new values. ## Sources - Act platform page (read for the client facts, scored like every other vendor): https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/method/ --- # The 14 platforms on the Least Privilege Index, in rank order Platforms, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Fourteen platforms ranked on seven weighted criteria. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2, Sonrai listed first because it is ahead before rounding. Google Cloud IAM recommender is third at 4.0, Apono fourth at 3.9. Each profile shows scores, reasons and quotes. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Weights in the header row sum to 100. Scores 0 to 10 from the evidence read 10 Nov 2026; weighted total to one decimal; "=" marks a joint rank, listed by the unrounded total. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Every platform page - [1=. Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/): Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - [1=. Act Security](/platforms/act/): Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - [3. Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/): The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. - [4. Apono](/platforms/apono/): Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - [5. Britive](/platforms/britive/): Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - [6. Wiz](/platforms/wiz/): Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. - [7. Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/): Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - [8. P0 Security](/platforms/p0/): Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - [9. AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/): IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. - [10. CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/): CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. - [11=. Entitle](/platforms/entitle/): Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - [11=. Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/): Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. - [13. Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/): Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. - [14. Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/): Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/ --- # Sonrai Security: joint 1st on the Least Privilege Index at 5.2 Company profile, joint 1st of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Sonrai Security is joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 5.2 of 10. Its best score is 7 on one change, a class of risk; its weakest weighted criterion is evidence for auditors at 4. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Rank 1 (joint) of 14, score 5.2 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Sonrai Security's Cloud Permissions Firewall watches how permissions are actually used and, once the customer deploys it, blocks unused privileges with cloud-native, organization-level policies. Sonrai's documentation says it also quarantines dormant identities, blocks unused services and regions, and blocks future third-party access by default, across AWS, Azure and Google Cloud. Sonrai applies the change itself, which is what separates it from the read-only tools. Sonrai says it needs only read-only access to discover, exempts anything in use before a policy is written and shows the exemption list first. When a blocked identity tries to use a permission, Sonrai opens a Slack request and updates the policy on approval. Its 5 on removes is the top removes score in the index, shared with Apono, Entitle, Britive, P0 Security and Tenable. ## The seven scores for Sonrai Security | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | Blocked attempts open Slack requests, and changes are recorded in ITSM. There is no pre-production check, and the workflow starts only after the restriction is applied. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | Identities, including AI agent identities, are enforced at the IAM layer. No network reachability model is described. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. | Weighted total 5.2 (5.20 before rounding), joint 1st of 14. ## What Sonrai says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 5 - "The Cloud Permissions Firewall continuously analyzes real permission usage across all identities and automatically blocks unused privileges using cloud-native, org-level policies." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/platform)) - "Unused permissions are restricted, dormant identities are quarantined, and risky services or regions are blocked" (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/platform)) - Limit: "Nothing enforces until you deploy." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com)) ### Safe to enforce: 5 - "Policies are built from your usage data. Anything in use is exempted before it’s written. You see the exemption list first." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com)) - "All reversible and logged." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com)) - "The Cloud Permissions Firewall only blocks permissions that are unused, while allowing actively used privileges to remain available, avoiding downtime and operational disruption." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/platform)) ### One change, a class of risk: 7 - "Global default deny is applied with one click, while actively used permissions remain available." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege)) - "Automatically block future third-party access through default deny policies" (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/platform)) - "Automatically block unused or unwanted services and regions across your cloud using centralized policies driven by real usage analytics." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/platform)) ### Stays fixed: 4 - "Blocked usage attempts open a request, routes it in Slack, and updates the policy for you." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com)) - "Request and approval processes live in the chat tools you already use today and all access changes are recorded in your ITSM." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege)) - "Request and approval processes live in the chat tools you already use today and all access changes are recorded in your ITSM." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 4 - "Sonrai monitors how permissions are actually used across humans, machines, roles, and AI agents" (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege)) - "Sonrai identifies each agent identity's permissions, compares them against actual usage, and enforces least-privilege policies using cloud-native IAM controls." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security)) - "The agent's role is scoped to only what it needs, and any action outside that scope is blocked at the cloud API level." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 7 - Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, and the vendor states there is no proxy or broker. (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com)) - Limit: "When the allocated time is over, access is automatically revoked." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com)) - "Sonrai eliminates the need for jump boxes, bastion hosts, or connectors by enforcing access using native controls." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/just-in-time-access)) ### Evidence for auditors: 4 - "Every session is logged with detailed activity summaries for audit and compliance" (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/just-in-time-access)) - Limit: "Sonrai is a SOC2 Type-2 compliant organization with rigorous internal security controls, training, and monitoring." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/pricing)) - "can help address several ISO 27002 controls, particularly around Information Security Policies, Organization of Information Security, Human Resource Security, Access Control, and Information Security Incident Management." (Sonrai's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://sonraisecurity.com/resource/iso27002/)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read (About names Brendan Hannigan CEO & Co-Founder and Sandy Bird CTO & Co-Founder) ([vendor page](https://sonraisecurity.com/about)) - **Headquarters:** Offices in New York and New Brunswick, Canada ([vendor page](https://sonraisecurity.com/about)) - **Ownership:** none found on 10 Nov 2026; no parent or acquirer named in pages read ([vendor page](https://sonraisecurity.com/about)) - **Funding:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 (About says Backed by Seasoned Cybersecurity Investors; no amounts) ([vendor page](https://sonraisecurity.com/about)) - **Clouds:** AWS, Azure and Google Cloud ([vendor page](https://sonraisecurity.com/about)) - **Pricing:** Published: Startup $15k / year minimum for 10-50 accounts; $150 / account / month for 50+ accounts; Enterprise custom; 14-day free trial ([vendor page](https://sonraisecurity.com/pricing)) - **Deployment:** SaaS; onboarded at AWS, Azure or GCP org level with a read-only role; no agents installed in the customer cloud ([vendor page](https://sonraisecurity.com/pricing)) - **Other:** Docs: `sonraisecurity.com/docs` returned the marketing 404 page and `docs.sonraisecurity.com` returned HTTP 400; no public docs site found. Wikipedia page: 404. GitHub org sonraisecurity has public repos including gcp-permission-mappings ([vendor page](https://github.com/sonraisecurity)) ## Sonrai in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 1st | 5.3 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | joint 1st | 5.2 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | 1st | 5.0 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | 2nd | 5.0 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 1st | 5.3 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Sonrai Security sits in the top three for 5 of the five situations. ## Sonrai against each other platform - [Sonrai vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-sonrai/): 5.2 against 5.2 - [Sonrai vs Apono](/compare/sonrai-vs-apono/): 5.2 against 3.9 - [Sonrai vs Entitle](/compare/sonrai-vs-entitle/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Sonrai vs Britive](/compare/sonrai-vs-britive/): 5.2 against 3.5 - [Sonrai vs P0 Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-p0/): 5.2 against 3.1 - [Sonrai vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-tenable/): 5.2 against 3.2 - [Sonrai vs Wiz](/compare/sonrai-vs-wiz/): 5.2 against 3.4 - [Sonrai vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/sonrai-vs-prisma/): 5.2 against 2.6 - [Sonrai vs Sysdig](/compare/sonrai-vs-sysdig/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Sonrai vs CrowdStrike](/compare/sonrai-vs-crowdstrike/): 5.2 against 2.9 - [Sonrai vs Microsoft](/compare/sonrai-vs-microsoft/): 5.2 against 1.8 - [Sonrai vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/sonrai-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 5.2 against 3.0 - [Sonrai vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/sonrai-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 5.2 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Sonrai Security](/alternatives/sonrai/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. ([source](https://sonraisecurity.com/platform)) ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/just-in-time-access: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/pricing: https://sonraisecurity.com/pricing (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/third-party-access: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/third-party-access/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/firewall-slack-integration: https://sonraisecurity.com/firewall-slack-integration/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/comparisons/wiz: https://sonraisecurity.com/comparisons/wiz/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/resource/iso27002: https://sonraisecurity.com/resource/iso27002/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/sonrai/ --- # Act Security: joint 1st on the Least Privilege Index at 5.2 Company profile, joint 1st of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Act Security is joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 5.2 of 10. Its best score is 7 on safe to enforce; its weakest weighted criterion is evidence for auditors at 3. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Rank 1 (joint) of 14, score 5.2 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Act Security sells a platform that builds one model of effective access across identity, network, resource and organization controls, then proposes boundaries that remove whole classes of access at once. Act says it simulates each change against a digital twin of the customer's cloud before it ships, and its main moves are broad explicit-deny guardrails and explicit-allow ring-fences around crown-jewel workloads. Act is read-only. Act's own material says it operates with read-only access and routes changes through Terraform, coding agents, tickets and existing DevOps workflows, so the customer applies each change. That is why Act scores 3 on removes against 5 for Sonrai Security. After a change ships, Act describes violation handling and time-bound waivers as roadmap, so what keeps the estate fixed is still the customer's own pipeline. ## The seven scores for Act Security | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. | Weighted total 5.2 (5.15 before rounding), joint 1st of 14. ## What Act says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 3 - "Simulate each policy change first to validate its impact before it reaches production, then apply it through your own cloud-native controls." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "Native enforcement : Deploy directly as pull requests to your existing Infrastructure-as-Code (Terraform, CloudFormation) using the cloud-native controls you already own." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - Limit: "Every insight becomes a clear, owned access change your team can make" (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) ### Safe to enforce: 7 - "Simulation: Test changes against a digital twin to see their exact impact before enforcing, ensuring nothing breaks." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "Audit mode : Run changes in audit mode as long as needed to confirm no legitimate access is revoked." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "Act simulates every access change against your real environment before it goes live" (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) ### One change, a class of risk: 7 - "Broad explicit-deny policies that block entire attack categories, including unauthorized cross-environment movement, data exfiltration, and external overexposure" (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "Least privilege, explicitly-allow policies, applied selectively to crown jewel applications and sensitive data." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "Use guided, structured campaigns to eliminate thousands of access paths and protect your crown jewels with a single policy change." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) ### Stays fixed: 4 - "CI/CD integration: Block risk from shipping in CI/CD, with no downtime or disruption to operations." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "let users request blocked access directly within their existing tools, so security can approve or deny in one click." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - Exceptions and violations are handled in the customer's own tools, with proof attached. (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 6 - "Identity, network, and AI access are analyzed and enforced as a single model, closing gaps that siloed tools cannot structurally reach." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "Contain endpoint AI agents, govern the infrastructure they run on, and ring-fence cloud AI agents so they can't reach beyond their intended scope." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "The platform combines identity, network, resource, and organizational controls into a single model of effective access." (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 6 - "Act enforces boundaries through your cloud's own native controls, using Infrastructure-as-Code. No agents and no new infrastructure to maintain." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - "Act’s differentiation is therefore less about a unique enforcement mechanism, as it relies on the cloud’s native controls" (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) - "Security Groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, guardrails, private endpoints etc." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/resources/network-and-identity-each-see-half-your-cloud-your-attacker-sees-both?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) ### Evidence for auditors: 3 - "Enforce the access and data boundaries required by NIST 800-53, PCI DSS, HIPAA, and more." (Act's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://act.security/?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** Founded in 2025 ([vendor page](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) - **Headquarters:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://act.security/about?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - **Ownership:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read (About page says leadership includes people from Medigate, acquired by Claroty) ([vendor page](https://act.security/about?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - **Funding:** Act has raised $60 million (SACR report; news item dated July 28, 2026 says $60 million across two rounds) ([vendor page](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) - **Clouds:** Listed on AWS Marketplace and Azure Marketplace; no complete cloud list read ([vendor page](https://act.security/?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - **Clouds:** Terraform provider README says it manages Act deployments for AWS, Azure and GCP; GCP is listed there. Free Amphi tools (IAM Simulate, IAM Collect) are AWS only ([vendor page](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/act-security/terraform-provider-act/main/README.md)) - **Pricing:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 (`act.security/pricing` returned 404; free assessment offered, demo by booking) ([vendor page](https://act.security/free-assessment?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - **Pricing:** none found on 10 Nov 2026. Checked: `act.security/pricing` (404), `act.security/sitemap.xml` (no pricing page listed), `act.security/platform`, `act.security/free-assessment`, AWS Marketplace search page, Azure Marketplace search page (no price shown), `act.security/sla` ([vendor page](https://act.security/sitemap.xml?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - **Deployment:** No agents and no new infrastructure; free assessment is read-only and deployed in under 5 minutes ([vendor page](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) - **Other:** Workload or vulnerability scanning: none found as an Act product function. SACR says Act is complementary to CNAPP, which provides visibility and attack-path analysis; free assessment is described as an access attack simulation ([vendor page](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) ## Act in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 2nd | 5.2 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | joint 1st | 5.2 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | 2nd | 4.8 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | 1st | 5.2 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 2nd | 5.1 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Act Security sits in the top three for 5 of the five situations. ## Act against each other platform - [Act vs Sonrai Security](/compare/act-vs-sonrai/): 5.2 against 5.2 - [Act vs Apono](/compare/act-vs-apono/): 5.2 against 3.9 - [Act vs Entitle](/compare/act-vs-entitle/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Act vs Britive](/compare/act-vs-britive/): 5.2 against 3.5 - [Act vs P0 Security](/compare/act-vs-p0/): 5.2 against 3.1 - [Act vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/act-vs-tenable/): 5.2 against 3.2 - [Act vs Wiz](/compare/act-vs-wiz/): 5.2 against 3.4 - [Act vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/act-vs-prisma/): 5.2 against 2.6 - [Act vs Sysdig](/compare/act-vs-sysdig/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Act vs CrowdStrike](/compare/act-vs-crowdstrike/): 5.2 against 2.9 - [Act vs Microsoft](/compare/act-vs-microsoft/): 5.2 against 1.8 - [Act vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/act-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 5.2 against 3.0 - [Act vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/act-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 5.2 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Act Security](/alternatives/act/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. ([source](https://act.security/platform?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=platform)) ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/zero-trust-ai-agents: https://act.security/resources/zero-trust-ai-agents (read 10 Nov 2026) - raw.githubusercontent.com/act-security/terraform-provider-act/main/README.md: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/act-security/terraform-provider-act/main/README.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/network-and-identity-each-see-half-your-cloud-your-attack: https://act.security/resources/network-and-identity-each-see-half-your-cloud-your-attacker-sees-both (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/act/ --- # Google Cloud IAM recommender: 3rd on the Least Privilege Index at 4.0 Company profile, 3rd of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Google Cloud IAM recommender is 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 4.0 of 10. Its best score is 6 on safe to enforce; its weakest weighted criterion is evidence for auditors at 2. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Rank 3 of 14, score 4.0 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Google Cloud's IAM recommender, part of Policy Intelligence, suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used. Google's documentation says the IAM recommender does not apply recommendations automatically: a person reviews each one and applies or dismisses it, and applying removes a member from the native IAM binding. Each apply or dismiss action creates a log entry. The IAM recommender is paired with Policy Simulator, which shows how a change to an allow policy affects a principal's access, and lists resources that would violate a proposed organization policy, before it is enforced. Each simulator evaluates one policy type and only Google Cloud, so the IAM recommender scores 6 on safe and 4 on removes but 2 on stays fixed. ## The seven scores for Google Cloud IAM recommender | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 4 | A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 6 | Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 2 | Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | Identity role recommendations and a VPC Service Controls troubleshooter are provided. No AI workloads are covered. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 2 | Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. | Weighted total 4.0 (3.95 before rounding), 3rd of 14. ## What IAM recommender says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 4 - Limit: "The IAM recommender does not apply recommendations automatically. Instead, you must review your recommendations and decide whether to apply or dismiss them." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview)) - "You can apply recommendations to replace or remove roles, or dismiss recommendations that you don't want to apply." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview)) - Limit: "Each organization policy recommendation suggests that you set a particular organization policy to improve the security of your Google Cloud resources." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview)) ### Safe to enforce: 6 - "Policy Simulator for Identity and Access Management allow policies lets you see how a change to an allow policy might affect a principal's access before you commit to making the change." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview)) - "Policy Simulator provides a list of resources that violate the proposed policy before it is enforced, allowing you to reconfigure those resources, request exceptions, or change the scope of your organization policy" (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) - Limit: "Each simulator only evaluates one policy type" (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) ### One change, a class of risk: 3 - "Policy Simulator for deny policies Policy Simulator for Principal Access Boundary policies" (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) - "It analyzes existing organization policy configurations and generates recommendations for which organization policies to enforce." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview)) - Limit: "Each role recommendation suggests that you remove or replace an IAM role that gives your principals excess permissions." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) ### Stays fixed: 2 - "gcloud beta terraform vet lets you validate your terraform plan JSON against your organization's POLICY_LIBRARY_REPO ." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/docs/terraform/policy-validation/validate-policies)) - Limit: "You can mark a recommendation as dismissed to indicate that you don't intend to apply the recommended changes to the associated resource or that you don't want to continue to see the recommendation." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/recommender/docs/using-api)) - Limit: "If you choose to apply recommendations without human review, ensure that you have set up a rollback process before making any changes." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/recommender/docs/using-api)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 4 - "Role recommendations help you enforce the principle of least privilege by ensuring that principals have only the permissions that they actually need." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) - "Policy Troubleshooter for Identity and Access Management VPC Service Controls troubleshooter Policy Troubleshooter for Chrome Enterprise Premium" (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 5 - "action : remove , path : /iamPolicy/bindings//members/" (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview)) ### Evidence for auditors: 2 - "When you apply or dismiss a recommendation, the IAM recommender creates a log entry." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview)) - "You can also use Policy Analyzer for audit-related and compliance-related tasks." (IAM recommender's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) ## Company facts, as published - **Clouds:** Google Cloud (the pages describe Google Cloud policies and resources only). ([vendor page](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) - **Pricing:** Role recommendations for basic roles are free; other recommendation types and policy insights need the Premium or Enterprise tier of Security Command Center. Page quote: "Project-level, folder-level, and organization-level role recommendations for basic roles are available at no charge." ([vendor page](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview)) - **Deployment:** Google Cloud managed service in the Policy Intelligence documentation; no install is described. ([vendor page](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview)) - **Other:** Part of Google Cloud; recommendations use an IAM access history of the past 90 days. No founding, funding or headquarters facts were read on these pages. ([vendor page](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview)) ## IAM recommender in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 3rd | 3.9 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | joint 3rd | 3.9 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | joint 4th | 3.7 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | 3rd | 4.0 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | joint 3rd | 3.8 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Google Cloud IAM recommender sits in the top three for 3 of the five situations. ## IAM recommender against each other platform - [IAM recommender vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 5.2 - [IAM recommender vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 5.2 - [IAM recommender vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.9 - [IAM recommender vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 2.8 - [IAM recommender vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.5 - [IAM recommender vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.1 - [IAM recommender vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.2 - [IAM recommender vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.4 - [IAM recommender vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 2.6 - [IAM recommender vs Sysdig](/compare/sysdig-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 2.8 - [IAM recommender vs CrowdStrike](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 2.9 - [IAM recommender vs Microsoft](/compare/microsoft-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 1.8 - [IAM recommender vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/aws-iam-access-analyzer-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.0 - [Alternatives to Google Cloud IAM recommender](/alternatives/google-iam-recommender/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ([source](https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview)) ## Sources - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/docs/terraform/policy-validation/validate-policies: https://cloud.google.com/docs/terraform/policy-validation/validate-policies (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/recommender/docs/using-api: https://cloud.google.com/recommender/docs/using-api (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/recommender/docs/bq-export/export-recommendations-to-bq: https://cloud.google.com/recommender/docs/bq-export/export-recommendations-to-bq (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/google-iam-recommender/ --- # Apono: 4th on the Least Privilege Index at 3.9 Company profile, 4th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Apono is 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 3.9 of 10. Its best score is 5 on removes access; its weakest weighted criterion is evidence for auditors at 4. Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. Rank 4 of 14, score 3.9 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Apono, now part of 1Password since the announcement of 15 June 2026, grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents. Apono says it writes the role or policy at request time in each cloud's native policy language and revokes it automatically, so access is created for the task instead of left standing. For cleaning up standing access, Apono's documentation describes two actions. Apono's documentation shows a quarantine action that restricts a principal with an AWS permission boundary, and a deny rule built from detected unused actions that the user creates. Apono previews who receives what access before a flow is saved, but no simulation of remediation actions was found on 2026-11-10, which is why Apono scores 3 on safe. ## The seven scores for Apono | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | Identity and AI agents are governed together, with runtime intent checks. No network reachability model is described. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. | Weighted total 3.9 (3.85 before rounding), 4th of 14. ## What Apono says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 5 - "Apono's permissions are just-in-time and also ephemeral. Access is automatically revoked when no longer needed." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono)) - "Apono creates IAM roles, permissions, and access policies on the fly at request time, scoped to the exact need and in the native policy language of your cloud platform." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.apono.io)) ### Safe to enforce: 3 - "Previews the proposed change. Apono applies only changes that have been previewed. The preview summarizes who receives what access, for how long, and who approves it. It also warns if the change expands access." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md)) - Limit: "On the Quarantine Principal tab, click Remediate to limit access within the dedicated access flow." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery/investigate-and-resolve-overprivileged-access.md)) - Limit: "Run the code in your AWS CLI to remove the principal from your AWS account." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery/investigate-and-resolve-overprivileged-access.md)) ### One change, a class of risk: 3 - "This approach uses an Automatic Access Flow to restrict a principal's access using an AWS Permission Boundary until it can be reviewed or safely deleted." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery/investigate-and-resolve-overprivileged-access.md)) - Limit: "In your AWS environment, create a deny rule using the Apono-provided JSON. This rule will prevent the principal from using the unused actions detected in its policy." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery/investigate-and-resolve-overprivileged-access.md)) - Limit: "Remove the unused resources, inactive users, or unused permissions from the access flow." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/access-flows/manage-access-flows/right-sizing.md)) ### Stays fixed: 3 - "Engineers request and receive access through Slack, the CLI, service workflows, or Apono Assist, wherever they already work." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.apono.io)) - "Create Access Flows with our declarative UI or in Terraform, and your developers can use Slack, Teams or CLI to request and approve access." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 4 - "Apono governs engineers, automation pipelines, copilots, and autonomous agents on one cloud-native platform" (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.apono.io)) - "checks what an agent declares it will do against what it actually does at runtime" (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.apono.io)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 5 - "Apono creates permissions at request time in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, and your databases." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.apono.io)) - Limit: "Connectors are the components that mediate between Apono and your resources to sync data from cloud applications and grant and revoke access permissions." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started)) - Limit: "Apono Agentic Gateway" (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started)) ### Evidence for auditors: 4 - "AI-generated session summaries turn review into readable evidence that helps teams produce evidence for SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR, PCI DSS, and related compliance programs." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.apono.io)) - "Apono logs every request, approval, grant, and revocation with business context." (Apono's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.apono.io)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://www.apono.io/blog/apono-raises-34m-series-b)) - **Headquarters:** New York (dateline of the November 18, 2025 Series B release) ([vendor page](https://www.apono.io/blog/apono-raises-34m-series-b)) - **Ownership:** Part of 1Password since June 15, 2026 ([vendor page](https://1password.com/blog/1password-acquires-apono)) - **Funding:** $34M Series B (November 18, 2025) led by USVP; total funding more than $54 million; Series A of $15.5M listed on the blog ([vendor page](https://www.apono.io/blog/apono-raises-34m-series-b)) - **Clouds:** AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases ([vendor page](https://www.apono.io)) - **Pricing:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 (`www.apono.io/pricing` returned the home page; demo by booking) ([vendor page](https://www.apono.io/pricing)) - **Deployment:** Web app plus a connector installed in the customer's environment (AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes) ([vendor page](https://docs.apono.io/docs/security-and-architecture)) **Name and ownership.** Acquired by 1Password; announced June 15, 2026 ([source](https://www.apono.io/blog/apono-joins-1password)) ## Apono in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 4th | 3.8 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | joint 3rd | 3.9 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | 3rd | 3.8 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | 4th | 3.9 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | joint 3rd | 3.8 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Apono sits in the top three for 2 of the five situations. ## Apono against each other platform - [Apono vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-apono/): 3.9 against 5.2 - [Apono vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-apono/): 3.9 against 5.2 - [Apono vs Entitle](/compare/apono-vs-entitle/): 3.9 against 2.8 - [Apono vs Britive](/compare/apono-vs-britive/): 3.9 against 3.5 - [Apono vs P0 Security](/compare/apono-vs-p0/): 3.9 against 3.1 - [Apono vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/apono-vs-tenable/): 3.9 against 3.2 - [Apono vs Wiz](/compare/apono-vs-wiz/): 3.9 against 3.4 - [Apono vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/apono-vs-prisma/): 3.9 against 2.6 - [Apono vs Sysdig](/compare/apono-vs-sysdig/): 3.9 against 2.8 - [Apono vs CrowdStrike](/compare/apono-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.9 against 2.9 - [Apono vs Microsoft](/compare/apono-vs-microsoft/): 3.9 against 1.8 - [Apono vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/apono-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.9 against 3.0 - [Apono vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/apono-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.9 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Apono](/alternatives/apono/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. ([source](https://www.apono.io)) ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery/investigate-and-resolve-over: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery/investigate-and-resolve-overprivileged-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/access-flows/manage-access-flows/right-sizing.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/access-flows/manage-access-flows/right-sizing.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/apono/ --- # Britive: 5th on the Least Privilege Index at 3.5 Company profile, 5th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Britive is 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 3.5 of 10. Its best score is 5 on removes access; its weakest weighted criterion is safe to enforce at 1. Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. Rank 5 of 14, score 3.5 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Britive creates privileged access at the moment of need and removes it when the task ends, across AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and OCI. Britive says the same model covers humans, non-human identities and AI agents, with requests and approvals in Slack and Teams and an MCP Gateway that authorizes each agent tool call at runtime. Britive's lens is runtime privilege, not clean-up of what already exists. Britive maps identities and the privileges they reach, validates policy JSON before saving it, and its documentation notes limits such as one role per AWS profile. No simulation of a change against the live environment was found on 2026-11-10 for Britive, so it scores 1 on safe and 5 on removes. ## The seven scores for Britive | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | Britive maps human, agentic AI and non-human identities and their privileges. No network reachability model is described. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. | Weighted total 3.5 (3.45 before rounding), 5th of 14. ## What Britive says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 5 - "Privileged access is created at the moment it's needed and removed when the task ends, automatically, across AWS, Azure, GCP, and OCI." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com)) - "Granular least-privilege provisioned at runtime, removed automatically." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com)) ### Safe to enforce: 1 - "Enter the Name and the Policy code in JSON format in the Create Policy page. Click Validate to validate the policy details." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.britive.com/docs/profilemgmt-managing-profiles.md)) - "Britive validates the profile policy data and prompts the user for confirmation before skipping the erroneous policies." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.britive.com/docs/profilemgmt-managing-profiles.md)) - Limit: "This discrepancy is resolved during the next profile checkout." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.britive.com/docs/managed-permissions.md)) ### One change, a class of risk: 3 - "One way is to select an organization unit or an account, or a group of organization units or accounts, under Associations in Profiles." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.britive.com/docs/britive-profile-management-for-aws.md)) - Limit: "for AWS, the user can add only one role per profile" (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.britive.com/docs/profilemgmt-managing-profiles.md)) ### Stays fixed: 3 - "Request, approve, and check in privileged access from Slack and Microsoft Teams, under the same Britive policies, approvals, and expiry as the console." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com/use-cases)) - The platform integrates with CI/CD pipelines and automation tools. (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com/platform)) - "Integrate Britive with ITSM Systems" (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.britive.com)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 4 - "Map every identity: human, agentic AI, and NHI, and every privilege it can reach, across cloud, SaaS, DaaS, on-prem, and AI workflows." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 5 - "The decision lands natively at the resource itself." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com)) - "Britive's agentless, proxyless architecture breaks that model." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com/company/britive-advantages)) - Limit: "The Britive MCP Gateway authorizes every agent tool call at runtime before it reaches your MCP servers, and provisions only the access that call requires." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com/platform)) ### Evidence for auditors: 4 - "SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS Part 500, HIPAA. The audit trail is always queryable." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com/company/britive-advantages)) - "Every decision, grant, scope, and expiry is recorded as access happens." (Britive's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.britive.com)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://www.britive.com/company/about-us)) - **Headquarters:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://www.britive.com/company/about-us)) - **Ownership:** Britive, Inc.; no parent named in pages read ([vendor page](https://www.britive.com/platform)) - **Funding:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 (About says Backed by industry-leading venture capital firms; no amounts) ([vendor page](https://www.britive.com/company/about-us)) - **Clouds:** AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI ([vendor page](https://www.britive.com)) - **Pricing:** none published (site offers Request Pricing) ([vendor page](https://www.britive.com/platform)) - **Deployment:** SaaS platform with agentless, proxyless architecture; proxyless connector for private cloud and on-prem ([vendor page](https://www.britive.com/company/britive-advantages)) ## Britive in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 5th | 3.4 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | 5th | 3.5 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | joint 6th | 3.5 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | joint 6th | 3.5 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 5th | 3.5 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Britive is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## Britive against each other platform - [Britive vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-britive/): 3.5 against 5.2 - [Britive vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-britive/): 3.5 against 5.2 - [Britive vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-britive/): 3.5 against 3.9 - [Britive vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-britive/): 3.5 against 2.8 - [Britive vs P0 Security](/compare/britive-vs-p0/): 3.5 against 3.1 - [Britive vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/britive-vs-tenable/): 3.5 against 3.2 - [Britive vs Wiz](/compare/britive-vs-wiz/): 3.5 against 3.4 - [Britive vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/britive-vs-prisma/): 3.5 against 2.6 - [Britive vs Sysdig](/compare/britive-vs-sysdig/): 3.5 against 2.8 - [Britive vs CrowdStrike](/compare/britive-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.5 against 2.9 - [Britive vs Microsoft](/compare/britive-vs-microsoft/): 3.5 against 1.8 - [Britive vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/britive-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.5 against 3.0 - [Britive vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/britive-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.5 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Britive](/alternatives/britive/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. ([source](https://www.britive.com)) ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/company/britive-advantages: https://www.britive.com/company/britive-advantages (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com/docs/profilemgmt-managing-profiles.md: https://docs.britive.com/docs/profilemgmt-managing-profiles.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com/docs/managed-permissions.md: https://docs.britive.com/docs/managed-permissions.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com/docs/britive-profile-management-for-aws.md: https://docs.britive.com/docs/britive-profile-management-for-aws.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/britive/ --- # Wiz: 6th on the Least Privilege Index at 3.4 Company profile, 6th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Wiz is 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 3.4 of 10. Its best score is 6 on identity, network and AI; its weakest weighted criterion is one change, a class of risk at 1. Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. Rank 6 of 14, score 3.4 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Wiz, now part of Google Cloud (Google completed the acquisition on 11 March 2026), connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph. Wiz says it analyzes entitlements, auto-generates least privilege policies and sends fixes to code owners as pull requests, Jira tickets or a plan handed to a coding agent. The analyst report read for the index says a generated fix is not an applied control until it reaches the customer's own deployment process. Wiz judges disruption from historical activity, which the report says cannot establish rare or future dependencies. That keeps Wiz at 3 on removes and 4 on safe, though its graph and audit reporting score 6 on coverage and 6 on audit. ## The seven scores for Wiz | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | Policies across the IDE, pull requests and CI/CD can block unsafe changes, and Jira tickets are created. Exceptions, drift and paths outside the pipeline lack evidence. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. | Weighted total 3.4 (3.40 before rounding), 6th of 14. ## What Wiz says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 3 - "Automatically generate actionable plans, assign ownership, and execute fixes to drive your teams toward zero critical risk." (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io)) - Limit: "Wiz analyzes cloud entitlements and auto-generates least privilege policies across your cloud, to help teams visualize, detect, prioritize, and remediate identity (IAM) risks." (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem)) - Limit: "Generates direct code & infra fixes to code owner" (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io)) ### Safe to enforce: 4 - "The Green Agent can use Security Graph context and historical activity to evaluate whether a proposed remediation could disrupt an underlying application." (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) - Limit: "although historical usage cannot establish every infrequent or future dependency." (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) - Limit: "attack-path validation is not the same as simulating the operational consequences of every proposed IAM, network, resource-policy, or organizational-policy change." (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) ### One change, a class of risk: 1 - Limit: "SACR has not yet validated equivalent translation and enforcement depth across each provider, so this should be evaluated at the individual control and service level." (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) ### Stays fixed: 4 - Wiz generates a pull request with a fix in the version control system. (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io/platform)) - "Apply consistent security policies across coding assistants, IDEs, version control, pull requests, and CI/CD pipelines, so developers catch issues early without changing how they work." (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code)) - "The Green Agent creates a Jira ticket with the full description, attack path analysis, and remediation steps already populated." (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 6 - "We connect code, cloud, identities, network, and runtime to model:" (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io)) - "Discover every technology running in your code and cloud including AI models, agents, and services across PaaS platforms, custom deployments, and SaaS AI applications using multiple detection methods." (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io/platform)) - "Wiz can identify how identities, permissions, exposures, workloads, and data combine into reachable attack paths" (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 2 - Limit: "whether the resulting control prevents the prohibited state or remediates it after creation." (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) - "Wiz described an approach centered on abstracting common security requirements from the underlying provider-specific technology." (softwareanalyst.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) ### Evidence for auditors: 6 - "Maintain automated compliance against industry standard regulations and benchmarks like PCI, GDPR, HIPAA, and more, as well as custom frameworks." (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io/solutions/compliance)) - "create reports for auditors in the click of a button." (Wiz's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-cloud)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** January 2020. ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiz,_Inc.)) - **Headquarters:** New York City. ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiz,_Inc.)) - **Ownership:** Part of Google Cloud (Alphabet) since March 2026; $32 billion deal. ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiz,_Inc.)) - **Ownership:** Google completed its acquisition of Wiz in March 2026; Wiz retained its brand and operates as a multicloud security platform within Google Cloud (SACR report) ([vendor page](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement)) - **Funding:** Raised a total of $1.9 billion before the acquisition (Wikipedia). ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiz,_Inc.)) - **Clouds:** Wiz says it works across all major clouds. ([vendor page](https://www.wiz.io/about)) - **Pricing:** No published price; page titled get a custom quote, with Wiz One, Wiz Go and A la Carte options. ([vendor page](https://www.wiz.io/pricing)) - **Deployment:** Connects via API (agentless) with an optional runtime Sensor. ([vendor page](https://www.wiz.io/platform)) **Name and ownership.** Acquired by Alphabet; Wikipedia says Google completed the acquisition on 11 March 2026 and Wiz is part of Google Cloud. Wiz's own site shows Now part of Google Cloud. ([source](https://www.wiz.io/about)) ## Wiz in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 6th | 3.3 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | 6th | 3.4 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | joint 4th | 3.7 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | 5th | 3.8 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 6th | 3.2 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Wiz is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## Wiz against each other platform - [Wiz vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 5.2 - [Wiz vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 5.2 - [Wiz vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 3.9 - [Wiz vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 2.8 - [Wiz vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 3.5 - [Wiz vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 3.1 - [Wiz vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 3.2 - [Wiz vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/wiz-vs-prisma/): 3.4 against 2.6 - [Wiz vs Sysdig](/compare/wiz-vs-sysdig/): 3.4 against 2.8 - [Wiz vs CrowdStrike](/compare/wiz-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.4 against 2.9 - [Wiz vs Microsoft](/compare/wiz-vs-microsoft/): 3.4 against 1.8 - [Wiz vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/wiz-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.4 against 3.0 - [Wiz vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/wiz-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.4 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Wiz](/alternatives/wiz/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. ([source](https://www.wiz.io)) ## Sources - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/compliance: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/compliance (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-cloud: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-cloud (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/blog/introducing-azure-least-privilege-enforce-least-privilege-access-for: https://www.wiz.io/blog/introducing-azure-least-privilege-enforce-least-privilege-access-for-azure (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/wiz/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security: 7th on the Least Privilege Index at 3.2 Company profile, 7th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Tenable Cloud Security is 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 3.2 of 10. Its best score is 5 on removes access; its weakest weighted criterion is one change, a class of risk at 0. Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. Rank 7 of 14, score 3.2 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Tenable's product page that once described Ermetic, acquired in 2023, is now titled Tenable One Cloud Exposure. Tenable says its CIEM engine finds excessive or toxic entitlements, generates right-sized resource-level policies that show the exact difference from the current policy, and adds just-in-time access to remove standing privilege. Tenable describes this as part of one cloud exposure platform. Tenable places that identity work inside a CNAPP with posture management, infrastructure-as-code scanning and attack paths. Tenable's pages describe automated remediation workflows and access requests in Slack and Teams. The policies are applied by the customer, and no boundary or guardrail enforcement was found on 2026-11-10, so Tenable scores 0 on class and 0 on native while scoring 5 on removes and 5 on audit. ## The seven scores for Tenable Cloud Security | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | Infrastructure-as-code template scanning is offered, with tickets and approvals in Jira, Slack and Teams. No exception or drift handling is described. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. | Weighted total 3.2 (3.20 before rounding), 7th of 14. ## What Tenable says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 5 - "Use the Tenable cloud infrastructure and entitlements management (CIEM) engine to identify excessive or toxic entitlements and enforce least-privilege policies." (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) - "Automated remediation workflows help security teams right-size permissions at scale without disrupting development velocity." (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) - "Use just-in-time (JIT) access to eliminate standing privileges and grant time-limited permissions to stop lateral movement across your hybrid cloud." (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security)) ### Safe to enforce: 3 - Tenable's blog says the product generates right-sized policies the user can apply and shows the exact difference between the generated policy and the current policy. The page does not describe a simulation against the environment. (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools)) ### One change, a class of risk: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for Tenable Cloud Security. ### Stays fixed: 4 - IaC templates (Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes manifests) are scanned for misconfigurations and policy violations. (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) - "utilize standard communication tools such as Jira, Slack, Microsoft Teams, and email integration tools to scale the tool within your organization." (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) - "Access requests and approvals can be managed directly within messaging platforms, such as Slack or Microsoft Teams" (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 5 - "continuously analyzes entitlements across AWS, Azure, and GCP." (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) - "Identify overprivileged AI identities and exposed training buckets." (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security)) - "Exposure context: Is the affected resource publicly accessible, over-privileged, or linked to other weaknesses that create a toxic combination?" (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for Tenable Cloud Security. ### Evidence for auditors: 5 - "Continuously detect misconfigurations across multi-cloud and align with frameworks like CIS , NIST , and PCI DSS ." (Tenable's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** Tenable founded September 2002 (Wikipedia). Ermetic founding date not found on pages read. ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenable,_Inc.)) - **Headquarters:** Tenable: Columbia, Maryland. ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenable,_Inc.)) - **Ownership:** Part of Tenable Holdings, Inc. (Nasdaq: TENB), which closed its acquisition of Ermetic, Ltd. ([vendor page](https://www.tenable.com/press-releases/tenable-completes-acquisition-of-ermetic)) - **Funding:** Wikipedia cites a SecurityWeek article titled: Tenable to Acquire Cloud Security Firm Ermetic for $240 Million. Ermetic funding rounds not found on pages read. ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenable,_Inc.)) - **Clouds:** AWS, Azure, GCP. ([vendor page](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) - **Pricing:** No published price; pricing page offers Request a quote. ([vendor page](https://www.tenable.com/pricing)) - **Deployment:** Sold standalone or as part of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform. ([vendor page](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security)) **Name and ownership.** Tenable closed its acquisition of Ermetic in 2023 (press release). The product page at the tenable-cloud-security URL is now titled Tenable One Cloud Exposure. ([source](https://www.tenable.com/press-releases/tenable-completes-acquisition-of-ermetic)) ## Tenable in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 7th | 3.1 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | 8th | 3.1 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | joint 6th | 3.5 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | joint 6th | 3.5 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | joint 7th | 3.1 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Tenable Cloud Security is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## Tenable against each other platform - [Tenable vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 5.2 - [Tenable vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 5.2 - [Tenable vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 3.9 - [Tenable vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 2.8 - [Tenable vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 3.5 - [Tenable vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 3.1 - [Tenable vs Wiz](/compare/tenable-vs-wiz/): 3.2 against 3.4 - [Tenable vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/tenable-vs-prisma/): 3.2 against 2.6 - [Tenable vs Sysdig](/compare/tenable-vs-sysdig/): 3.2 against 2.8 - [Tenable vs CrowdStrike](/compare/tenable-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.2 against 2.9 - [Tenable vs Microsoft](/compare/tenable-vs-microsoft/): 3.2 against 1.8 - [Tenable vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/tenable-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.2 against 3.0 - [Tenable vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/tenable-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.2 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Tenable Cloud Security](/alternatives/tenable/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. ([source](https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security)) ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/tenable/ --- # P0 Security: 8th on the Least Privilege Index at 3.1 Company profile, 8th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** P0 Security is 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 3.1 of 10. Its best score is 5 on removes access; its weakest weighted criterion is safe to enforce at 0. Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. Rank 8 of 14, score 3.1 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. P0 Security's Runtime Access platform grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, the command line or the web, with approvals and an audit trail that P0 can export to a SIEM. P0 says its default access paths are agentless and driven by the cloud provider's own IAM, with enforcement inside AWS and Google Cloud. P0 also publishes an access inventory across AWS, Google Cloud, Kubernetes, Okta and Azure (beta), and a Terraform provider for its policies. P0's documentation says P0 files findings in Jira and supplies cloud shell commands to resolve them, so the standing-access fix is run by the customer. No pre-change simulation was found on 2026-11-10 for P0, which is why it scores 0 on safe. ## The seven scores for P0 Security | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. | Weighted total 3.1 (3.05 before rounding), 8th of 14. ## What P0 says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 5 - "Provision only the privilege required for the task, then remove it when the work is done." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.p0.dev/platform)) - "Access requests, together with their justifications, approval, grant, and revocation histories are recorded by P0, and can be exported to your SIEM." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md)) - Limit: "Provides automated remediation suggestions and lets users document acceptable risks" (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md)) ### Safe to enforce: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for P0 Security. ### One change, a class of risk: 2 - "Production (account `333333333333`): P0 denies all requests. No one can request access through P0." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/policy-studio/policy-studio/configure-your-first-access-policy.md)) ### Stays fixed: 3 - "any member of your organization can request access by typing `/p0 request` in Slack." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md)) - "Install P0's Jira findings tracker for a Jira Cloud site, so P0 files findings as Jira issues as an Atlassian service account." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt)) - "Use the P0 Terraform provider to manage access policies, RBAC role assignments, and just-in-time access settings as code" (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 4 - "Discover production assets, identities, and access risks across AWS, Google Cloud, Kubernetes, Okta, Google Workspace, and Microsoft Azure (beta) with P0's access inventory." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/access-inventory.md)) - "P0 verifies the originator and the agent behind every MCP tool call, evaluates policy before each action through the self-hosted P0 AI Gateway" (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev)) - Limit: "Not a fix for network reachability. You bring your own network path to the target host" (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/connectors.md)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 5 - "P0's default access paths are agentless and driven entirely by your cloud provider's native IAM." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/connectors.md)) - "when P0 has an IAM integration with the upstream service (AWS and GCP today), enforcement happens inside that service via a session-bound temporary user, role, or policy" (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/agentic-control-plane.md)) - Limit: "Sits in the data path between your agents and your MCP servers. Intercepts every tool call, verifies identity, enforces policy and writes to the audit log." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/agentic-control-plane.md)) ### Evidence for auditors: 3 - "Connect the person or system that initiated the task, any agents involved, the identity used, the action attempted, the target resource, the policy decision and the final outcome." (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.p0.dev/platform)) - "CommonLit uses P0 Security to balance developer autonomy and SOC 2 compliance" (P0's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.p0.dev/customers)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** Not stated on the pages read. ([vendor page](https://www.p0.dev/about)) - **Headquarters:** Not stated on the pages read. ([vendor page](https://www.p0.dev/about)) - **Ownership:** Site footer reads: (c) 2026 P0 Security, Inc. No parent or acquirer named on pages read. ([vendor page](https://www.p0.dev)) - **Funding:** Blog listing: P0 Security has secured $15 million in Series A funding, totaling $20 ... ; and P0 raises $5 million in seed funding led by Lightspeed Venture Partners. ([vendor page](https://www.p0.dev/blog)) - **Clouds:** Access inventory: AWS, Google Cloud, Kubernetes, Okta, Google Workspace, and Microsoft Azure (beta). ([vendor page](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/access-inventory.md)) - **Pricing:** No published pricing found on the pages read (`www.p0.dev/pricing` returned 404); docs show a Sign up for Free link. ([vendor page](https://docs.p0.dev)) - **Deployment:** SaaS control plane; connectors deployed in the customer's own cloud account; AI Gateway and Auth Server self-hosted by the customer (Helm chart). ([vendor page](https://docs.p0.dev/readme/agentic-control-plane.md)) ## P0 in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | joint 8th | 2.9 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | 7th | 3.2 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | joint 10th | 3.0 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | 8th | 3.2 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | joint 7th | 3.1 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | P0 Security is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## P0 against each other platform - [P0 vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 5.2 - [P0 vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 5.2 - [P0 vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 3.9 - [P0 vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 2.8 - [P0 vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 3.5 - [P0 vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/p0-vs-tenable/): 3.1 against 3.2 - [P0 vs Wiz](/compare/p0-vs-wiz/): 3.1 against 3.4 - [P0 vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/p0-vs-prisma/): 3.1 against 2.6 - [P0 vs Sysdig](/compare/p0-vs-sysdig/): 3.1 against 2.8 - [P0 vs CrowdStrike](/compare/p0-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.1 against 2.9 - [P0 vs Microsoft](/compare/p0-vs-microsoft/): 3.1 against 1.8 - [P0 vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/p0-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.1 against 3.0 - [P0 vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/p0-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.1 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to P0 Security](/alternatives/p0/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. ([source](https://docs.p0.dev)) ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/access-inventory.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/access-inventory.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev: https://docs.p0.dev (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/connectors.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/connectors.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/agentic-control-plane.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/agentic-control-plane.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/customers: https://www.p0.dev/customers (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/policy-studio/policy-studio/configure-your-first-access-policy.md: https://docs.p0.dev/policy-studio/policy-studio/configure-your-first-access-policy.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/blog/snowflake-least: https://p0.dev/blog/snowflake-least/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/posture/finding-details.md: https://docs.p0.dev/posture/finding-details.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/p0/ --- # AWS IAM Access Analyzer: 9th on the Least Privilege Index at 3.0 Company profile, 9th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** AWS IAM Access Analyzer is 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 3.0 of 10. Its best score is 4 on safe to enforce; its weakest weighted criterion is evidence for auditors at 2. IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. Rank 9 of 14, score 3.0 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. AWS IAM Access Analyzer is the free AWS service that finds unused roles, access keys and passwords, reviews unused permissions and recommends a refined policy. AWS says IAM Access Analyzer generates a policy from CloudTrail activity, and that IAM Access Analyzer also checks whether a policy update grants new access before deployment, so the service covers both clean-up and review. AWS IAM Access Analyzer stops at the finding and the draft policy: the customer attaches the policy or deletes the unused item. AWS documents limits, for example that generated policies do not include action-level data events such as S3 data events. Custom policy checks can run in CI/CD and start approval workflows. IAM Access Analyzer scores 3 on removes and 2 on coverage because it works in AWS only. ## The seven scores for AWS IAM Access Analyzer | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | Custom policy checks run before deployment in CI/CD and can trigger approval workflows. No drift or exception handling was found. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 2 | Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 4 | It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 2 | A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. | Weighted total 3.0 (3.00 before rounding), 9th of 14. ## What Access Analyzer says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 3 - "For unused roles, access keys, or passwords, IAM Access Analyzer provides quick links in the console to help you delete them." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/)) - Limit: "For unused permissions, IAM Access Analyzer reviews your existing policies and recommends a refined policy that is tailored to your access activity." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/)) - Limit: "entity's permissions by attaching it to an IAM user or role." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html)) ### Safe to enforce: 4 - "policy affects public and cross-account access to your resource before deploying resource" (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html)) - "You can check whether the updated policy grants new access compared to the existing version." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html)) - Limit: "IAM Access Analyzer does not identify action-level activity for data events, such as Amazon S3 data events, in generated policies." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html)) ### One change, a class of risk: 1 - Limit: "Changes to a resource control policy (RCP) without a change to the bucket policy do not trigger a rescan of the bucket reported in the finding." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-resources.html)) - Limit: "Identify external, internal, and unused access to your AWS resources." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://aws.amazon.com/iam/features/analyze-access/)) ### Stays fixed: 4 - "Automate policy reviews before deployments by configuring custom policy checks in your development lifecycle." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/)) - "The findings generated using IAM Access Analyzer's custom policy checks in our CI/CD pipeline triggers approval process workflows automatically." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 2 - "The findings highlight unused roles, unused access keys for IAM users, and unused passwords for IAM users." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html)) - Limit: "It only analyzes resource-based policies." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-resources.html)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 4 - "IAM Access Analyzer generates IAM policies based on access activity in your AWS CloudTrail logs." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html)) ### Evidence for auditors: 2 - "Related requirements: CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v5.0.0/1.19, CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v3.0.0/1.20, CRI Profile v2.2/PR.AA-01.02, CRI Profile v2.2/PR.AA-05.01, CRI Profile v2.2/PR.AA-05.04" (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/iam-controls.html)) - Limit: "This control checks whether an AWS account has an IAM Access Analyzer external access analyzer enabled." (Access Analyzer's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/iam-controls.html)) ## Company facts, as published - **Ownership:** Amazon Web Services ([vendor page](https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/)) - **Clouds:** AWS only (analyzes AWS IAM and AWS resources) ([vendor page](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html)) - **Pricing:** Unused access: $0.20 per IAM role or user analyzed per month; internal access: $9.00 per AWS resource analyzed per month; custom policy checks charged per check ([vendor page](https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/pricing/)) - **Deployment:** Analyzer created for an organization or account (zone of trust); no agent described ([vendor page](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html)) ## Access Analyzer in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | joint 8th | 2.9 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | 9th | 3.0 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | joint 10th | 3.0 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | joint 12th | 2.9 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 9th | 2.9 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | AWS IAM Access Analyzer is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## Access Analyzer against each other platform - [Access Analyzer vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 5.2 - [Access Analyzer vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 5.2 - [Access Analyzer vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.9 - [Access Analyzer vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 2.8 - [Access Analyzer vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.5 - [Access Analyzer vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.1 - [Access Analyzer vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.2 - [Access Analyzer vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.4 - [Access Analyzer vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 2.6 - [Access Analyzer vs Sysdig](/compare/sysdig-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 2.8 - [Access Analyzer vs CrowdStrike](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 2.9 - [Access Analyzer vs Microsoft](/compare/microsoft-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 1.8 - [Access Analyzer vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/aws-iam-access-analyzer-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.0 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/alternatives/aws-iam-access-analyzer/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html)) ## Sources - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-resources.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-resources.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/features/analyze-access: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/features/analyze-access/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/iam-controls.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/iam-controls.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # CrowdStrike: 10th on the Least Privilege Index at 2.9 Company profile, 10th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CrowdStrike is 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 2.9 of 10. Its best score is 6 on evidence for auditors; its weakest weighted criterion is one change, a class of risk at 0. CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. Rank 10 of 14, score 2.9 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. CrowdStrike's Falcon Cloud Security analyzes cloud permissions, generates least-privilege access policies and monitors excess permissions and suspicious escalations. CrowdStrike says its graph connects misconfigurations, vulnerabilities and excess permissions into attack paths, that Falcon Cloud Security scans infrastructure as code in CI/CD, IDEs and MCP workflows, and that Kubernetes admission controls block affected images. CrowdStrike's strength for this index is audit and testing. Falcon Cloud Security offers a dry run of a remediation before deployment, and reports map to CIS, NIST, PCI DSS and other frameworks, for 6 on audit. The access fix itself is a recommendation the customer carries out, and no native boundary enforcement was found on 2026-11-10 for CrowdStrike, so native scores 0. ## The seven scores for CrowdStrike | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | Infrastructure-as-code scanning runs in CI/CD, the IDE and MCP, and Kubernetes admission can block. No exception or drift handling was found. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | Identity entitlements and AI security posture management across named AI services are covered. Attack paths do not name network reachability. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. | Weighted total 2.9 (2.85 before rounding), 10th of 14. ## What CrowdStrike says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 3 - "Analyze cloud permissions and generate least-privilege access policies to prevent lateral movement." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/)) - Limit: "generate remediation recommendations" (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/)) - "Shut down user risks with precise resource-based policies." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/)) ### Safe to enforce: 4 - "One-click remediation testing: Simulate remediation tactics to understand outcomes and ensure confidence by performing a dry run prior to deployment." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-extends-ciem-capabilities/)) ### One change, a class of risk: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for CrowdStrike. ### Stays fixed: 4 - "Scan infrastructure as code in CI/CD, IDEs, and MCP workflows so developers stop misconfigurations before deployment." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/)) - "Kubernetes admission controls block affected images before they reach production." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 4 - "Monitor excess permissions, identify suspicious escalations, and conduct thorough reviews of permitted actions for each entity" (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/)) - "Graph-based analysis connects misconfigurations, vulnerabilities, and excess permissions into potential attack paths." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/)) - "Falcon Cloud Security delivers agentless visibility across OpenAI, Amazon Bedrock, Amazon SageMaker, and Vertex AI." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ai-spm/)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for CrowdStrike. ### Evidence for auditors: 6 - "covered across all key security frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK®, CIS, NIST, ISO, and sector-specific regulations like GDPR for financial institutions, FedRAMP for government, and HIPAA for healthcare." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cloud-compliance/)) - "Stay audit-ready against CIS, NIST, PCI DSS, and custom frameworks, and trace assets back to the source." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/)) - "Schedule reports or receive them on-demand, and see where you stand in simple, layman terms." (CrowdStrike's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cloud-compliance/)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** 2011 (co-founded by George Kurtz, Dmitri Alperovitch, Gregg Marston) ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CrowdStrike)) - **Headquarters:** Austin, Texas ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CrowdStrike)) - **Ownership:** Public company, Nasdaq: CRWD (Class A) ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CrowdStrike)) - **Funding:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CrowdStrike)) - **Clouds:** AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and Kubernetes (CDR); OCI also listed under providers ([vendor page](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/)) - **Pricing:** No Falcon Cloud Security price found; the /pricing page read lists per-device endpoint plans. ([vendor page](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/pricing/)) - **Deployment:** Unified agent and agentless protection ([vendor page](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/)) ## CrowdStrike in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 10th | 2.8 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | joint 12th | 2.7 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | 8th | 3.3 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | 9th | 3.1 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 11th | 2.7 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | CrowdStrike is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## CrowdStrike against each other platform - [CrowdStrike vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 5.2 - [CrowdStrike vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 5.2 - [CrowdStrike vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.9 - [CrowdStrike vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 2.8 - [CrowdStrike vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.5 - [CrowdStrike vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.1 - [CrowdStrike vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.2 - [CrowdStrike vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.4 - [CrowdStrike vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 2.6 - [CrowdStrike vs Sysdig](/compare/sysdig-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 2.8 - [CrowdStrike vs Microsoft](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-microsoft/): 2.9 against 1.8 - [CrowdStrike vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.9 against 3.0 - [CrowdStrike vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.9 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to CrowdStrike](/alternatives/crowdstrike/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ([source](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/)) ## Sources - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ai-spm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ai-spm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cloud-compliance: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cloud-compliance/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-extends-ciem-capabilities: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-extends-ciem-capabilities/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/crowdstrike/ --- # Entitle: joint 11th on the Least Privilege Index at 2.8 Company profile, joint 11th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Entitle is joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 2.8 of 10. Its best score is 5 on removes access; its weakest weighted criterion is safe to enforce at 0. Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. Rank 11 (joint) of 14, score 2.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Entitle, sold as BeyondTrust Entitle after BeyondTrust announced its acquisition on 16 April 2024, provides self-service privileged access that is revoked after a set time, ticket resolution or on-call rotation. Entitle approvals run in Slack and Teams, Entitle reports support bulk access reviews across cloud and SaaS, and Entitle offers manual fulfillment through a ticketing system. Entitle's model is request and approve, not find and remove. Entitle's documentation describes birthright policies and rules that apply across many roles at once, plus a Terraform provider. No simulation of a proposed change was found on 2026-11-10 in the Entitle pages read, so Entitle scores 0 on safe and 2 on class. It scores 5 on removes because standing grants expire. ## The seven scores for Entitle | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | Identity access is covered, along with a statement that AI agent functions need a human check for sensitive resources. No network model is described. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. | Weighted total 2.8 (2.75 before rounding), joint 11th of 14. ## What Entitle says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 5 - "Enable controlled, self-serving privileged access that is auto revoked after a set duration, ticket resolution, or on-call rotation." (entitle.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.entitle.io)) - "Reports are automatically generated so you can review entitlements and take bulk actions on identities across your IaaS and SaaS environments." (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle)) ### Safe to enforce: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for Entitle. ### One change, a class of risk: 2 - "Add rules to apply a policy across many resources or roles at once, and keep new resources and roles governed automatically as they appear" (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/rules)) - Limit: "Apply an approval workflow to resources or roles automatically Set an owner or maintainer for resources Make resources or roles requestable" (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/rules)) - "Entitle birthright policies are sets of rules that automatically manage employees’ birthright permissions, allowing a group of employees to be entitled to a set of birthright permissions." (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/birthright-policies)) ### Stays fixed: 3 - "Third, we offer manual fulfillment through a ticketing system where approved access requests are processed by your IT service team." (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle)) - "Customize to fit your exact needs using REST APIs and a Terraform Provider." (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle)) - "Automate access request resolution and provide concise context for approvers." (entitle.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.entitle.io)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 4 - "ensuring Agentic AI functions can’t access sensitive resources without human review." (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 2 - "First, you install an agent on your virtual private cloud (VPC) using Terraform and Helms Charts." (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle)) - Limit: "The Entitle agent requires outbound network access to function." (Entitle's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements)) - Limit: "API sidecar model" (entitle.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.entitle.io)) ### Evidence for auditors: 3 - "Fill in compliance reports faster by automatically collecting evidence and delegating reviews to business managers." (entitle.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.entitle.io)) - Limit: "SOC 2 Type 2 Compliant" (entitle.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.entitle.io/security)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://www.entitle.io/about)) - **Headquarters:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 for Entitle; parent BeyondTrust press release is datelined Atlanta, GA ([vendor page](https://www.beyondtrust.com/press/beyondtrust-acquires-entitle)) - **Ownership:** BeyondTrust (acquisition announced April 16, 2024) ([vendor page](https://www.beyondtrust.com/press/beyondtrust-acquires-entitle)) - **Funding:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://www.entitle.io)) - **Clouds:** AWS, Azure and Google Cloud Platform listed among integrations, plus SaaS applications ([vendor page](https://www.entitle.io/integrations)) - **Pricing:** none published; BeyondTrust says contact sales for pricing and custom quote ([vendor page](https://www.beyondtrust.com/pricing)) - **Deployment:** SaaS with an agent installed in the customer VPC using Terraform and Helm charts; keys held in customer VPC or Entitle KMS ([vendor page](https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle)) **Name and ownership.** Acquired by BeyondTrust; definitive agreement announced April 16, 2024 ([source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/press/beyondtrust-acquires-entitle)) ## Entitle in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 11th | 2.7 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | joint 10th | 2.8 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | 13th | 2.8 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | joint 10th | 3.0 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 10th | 2.8 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Entitle is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## Entitle against each other platform - [Entitle vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-entitle/): 2.8 against 5.2 - [Entitle vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-entitle/): 2.8 against 5.2 - [Entitle vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-entitle/): 2.8 against 3.9 - [Entitle vs Britive](/compare/entitle-vs-britive/): 2.8 against 3.5 - [Entitle vs P0 Security](/compare/entitle-vs-p0/): 2.8 against 3.1 - [Entitle vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/entitle-vs-tenable/): 2.8 against 3.2 - [Entitle vs Wiz](/compare/entitle-vs-wiz/): 2.8 against 3.4 - [Entitle vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/entitle-vs-prisma/): 2.8 against 2.6 - [Entitle vs Sysdig](/compare/entitle-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 2.8 - [Entitle vs CrowdStrike](/compare/entitle-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.8 against 2.9 - [Entitle vs Microsoft](/compare/entitle-vs-microsoft/): 2.8 against 1.8 - [Entitle vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/entitle-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.8 against 3.0 - [Entitle vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/entitle-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.8 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Entitle](/alternatives/entitle/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. ([source](https://www.entitle.io)) ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/rules: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/rules (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/birthright-policies: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/birthright-policies (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/entitle/ --- # Sysdig: joint 11th on the Least Privilege Index at 2.8 Company profile, joint 11th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Sysdig is joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 2.8 of 10. Its best score is 6 on evidence for auditors; its weakest weighted criterion is one change, a class of risk at 0. Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. Rank 11 (joint) of 14, score 2.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Sysdig Secure uses runtime data and cloud audit logs to show which permissions are in use, and generates access policies limited to that use. Sysdig says its recommendations are least-privilege versions of existing policies, and that checks run in commits, pull requests and CI/CD, where critical issues can fail a build. Sysdig's policies begin in alert mode and move to enforcement when the team is ready. Sysdig's own documentation advises validating that a proposed policy covers enough permissions before applying it, because its approach to granting is conservative. The customer applies the policy, and no boundary-level enforcement was found on 2026-11-10 for Sysdig, so it scores 3 on removes and 0 on class. ## The seven scores for Sysdig | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 2 | Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | Infrastructure-as-code scanning at commit, pull request and CI/CD can fail builds. No exception handling in the team's tools and no drift handling were found. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | Identity usage comes from audit logs, and an AI agent inventory is included. Attack paths do not name network reachability. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. | Weighted total 2.8 (2.75 before rounding), joint 11th of 14. ## What Sysdig says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 3 - Limit: "receive suggested least-privilege versions of existing policies, making cleanup fast and low risk." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem)) - "Sysdig analyzes access patterns to identify unused permissions and automatically generate access policies that restrict privileges to precisely what users need to perform their jobs effectively." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem)) - "The first IaC security tool to fix misconfigs automatically via Git pull requests." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/about)) ### Safe to enforce: 2 - "With Sysdig’s careful recommendations, teams can confidently tighten IAM policies without disrupting legitimate activity." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem)) - "Policies begin in alert mode and move to enforcement when a team is ready." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take)) ### One change, a class of risk: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for Sysdig. ### Stays fixed: 4 - "These checks run automatically during commits, pull requests, and CI/CD pipelines, and then the system provides actionable feedback with remediation guidance." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security)) - "It will fail builds when critical issues are detected and provide detailed remediation guidance to developers." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 4 - "Sysdig Secure analyzes cloud audit logs of all executed commands in your accounts and correlates them with users, roles, and policies." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem)) - "Visualize how attackers could move across your environment to exploit vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and excessive permissions." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/products/secure)) - AI coverage: Sysdig AI Defense covers AI agents on endpoints and in the cloud, with inventory of agents, MCP servers, skills and plugins. (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 3 - "It checks every action against the organization’s policy, blocks the ones that break it before they run, and kills the process if one gets past." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take)) - "Optimize permissions with automatically generated policies and total visibility of in-use permissions" (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem)) ### Evidence for auditors: 6 - "Sysdig includes pre-built policies mapped to common compliance frameworks including CIS Benchmarks, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA, and ISO 27001." (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security)) - "Ensure around-the-clock compliance with continuous assessments and automated remediation" (Sysdig's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-security-posture-management-cspm)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** In 2013, Loris Degioanni founded Sysdig ([vendor page](https://www.sysdig.com/about)) - **Headquarters:** San Francisco (dateline of the November 4, 2026 press release) ([vendor page](https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take)) - **Ownership:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://www.sysdig.com/about)) - **Funding:** none found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read ([vendor page](https://www.sysdig.com/about)) - **Clouds:** Cloud log-based detections for AWS, GCP, Azure (also Okta, Github) ([vendor page](https://www.sysdig.com/pricing-secure)) - **Pricing:** No list price published; page offers Request a quote. Licensing is based on the number of hosts in a customer's environment (compute instances for CSPM). ([vendor page](https://www.sysdig.com/pricing-secure)) - **Deployment:** Agent and agentless deployments (SaaS regions listed include US-East, US-West, EU-Central, EU-North and others) ([vendor page](https://www.sysdig.com/products/secure)) ## Sysdig in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 12th | 2.6 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | joint 10th | 2.8 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | 9th | 3.2 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | joint 10th | 3.0 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 12th | 2.6 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Sysdig is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## Sysdig against each other platform - [Sysdig vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 5.2 - [Sysdig vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 5.2 - [Sysdig vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.9 - [Sysdig vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 2.8 - [Sysdig vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.5 - [Sysdig vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.1 - [Sysdig vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.2 - [Sysdig vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.4 - [Sysdig vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 2.6 - [Sysdig vs CrowdStrike](/compare/sysdig-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.8 against 2.9 - [Sysdig vs Microsoft](/compare/sysdig-vs-microsoft/): 2.8 against 1.8 - [Sysdig vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/sysdig-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.8 against 3.0 - [Sysdig vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/sysdig-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.8 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Sysdig](/alternatives/sysdig/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ([source](https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem)) ## Sources - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/products/secure: https://www.sysdig.com/products/secure (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-security-posture-management-cspm: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-security-posture-management-cspm (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/blog/ciem-security-sysdig-secure: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/ciem-security-sysdig-secure (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/sysdig/ --- # Prisma Cloud: 13th on the Least Privilege Index at 2.6 Company profile, 13th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Prisma Cloud is 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 2.6 of 10. Its best score is 5 on identity, network and AI; its weakest weighted criterion is safe to enforce at 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Rank 13 of 14, score 2.6 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Prisma Cloud from Palo Alto Networks computes net effective permissions across clouds, using sources that include AWS service control policies, and suggests corrections to reach least privilege. Palo Alto Networks markets Cortex Cloud as the next version of Prisma Cloud, and Prisma Cloud pages and documentation were still live on 2026-11-10. For IAM alerts, Prisma Cloud's documentation tells the user to copy the AWS, Azure or Google Cloud command line and run it, or to write a script to automate it. It states that automatic remediation for Google Cloud IAM alerts is not supported. Prisma Cloud's strength is breadth: code scanning that fails pull requests, network path analysis and compliance standards, which earn 5 on coverage and 5 on audit. ## The seven scores for Prisma Cloud | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | Pull request scans fail at a threshold, alerts go to ServiceNow and Slack, and requests run through ServiceNow. No drift or exception handling was found. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. | Weighted total 2.6 (2.55 before rounding), 13th of 14. ## What Prisma Cloud says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 3 - Limit: "You can manually remediate the alerts by copying the AWS, Azure, or GCP CLI commands and then run them in your cloud environment or you can configure a custom python script to automate the remediation steps." (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md)) - Limit: "Automatic remediation for GCP IAM alerts is not supported." (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md)) - "Use AI-driven analysis to confidently remove unused entitlements and achieve least privilege without disrupting production or developer workflows." (Prisma Cloud's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management)) ### Safe to enforce: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for Prisma Cloud. ### One change, a class of risk: 1 - Limit: "the algorithm combines various cloud sources such as AWS IAM roles, AWS IAM policies, AWS IAM groups, AWS resource based policies, and AWS service control policies (SCPs) to compute the net effective permissions" (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md)) ### Stays fixed: 4 - "the PR scan will fail, and PR comments will be added." (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md)) - "Send alert notifications to 14 third-party tools, including email, AWS Lambda and Security Hub, PagerDuty®, ServiceNow® and Slack®." (Prisma Cloud's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management)) - "Prisma Cloud CIEM works well with Michaels’ existing tools, like ServiceNow, making it easy for employees to request permissions they need to do their jobs." (Prisma Cloud's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/customers/michaels-adopts-least-privilege-access-strategy-with-prisma-cloud-ciem)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 5 - "Prisma Cloud automatically calculates users' effective permissions across cloud service providers, detects overly permissive access, and suggests corrections to reach least privilege." (Prisma Cloud's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management)) - "Cloud Network Analyzer (CNA) by Prisma Cloud takes a multi-dimensional approach in identifying overly-exposed assets by providing end-to-end network path visibility" (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/network-security/cloud-network-analyzer.md)) - "Govern every identity powering your cloud, from human users to AI agents." (Prisma Cloud's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 3 - Limit: IAM remediation runs CLI commands (or a script) in the customer's own cloud environment; no proxy in the request path was described on pages read. (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md)) ### Evidence for auditors: 5 - "NIST 800-53 Rev5" (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/compliance/compliance-standards.md)) - "HIPAA, ISO 27001:2013" (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/compliance/compliance-standards.md)) - "SOC 2" (docs.prismacloud.io, counted as vendor material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/compliance/compliance-standards.md)) ## Company facts, as published - **Founded:** Palo Alto Networks founded March 2005; Prisma Cloud division created by the March 2018 Evident.io acquisition (Wikipedia). ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palo_Alto_Networks)) - **Headquarters:** Palo Alto Networks: Santa Clara, California. ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palo_Alto_Networks)) - **Ownership:** Product of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palo_Alto_Networks)) - **Funding:** Not applicable on pages read (division of a public company). ([source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palo_Alto_Networks)) - **Clouds:** AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and OCI for effective permissions (Cortex Cloud CIEM page). ([vendor page](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management)) - **Pricing:** No published price found (pricing URL returned 404); FAQ says credit-based licensing. ([vendor page](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud)) - **Deployment:** SaaS (Prisma Cloud Enterprise Edition) and self-hosted (Compute Edition). ([vendor page](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud)) **Name and ownership.** Palo Alto Networks pages describe Cortex Cloud as bringing together CDR with the next version of Prisma Cloud's CNAPP. Prisma Cloud pages and docs (June 2026 release) were still live on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management)) ## Prisma Cloud in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 13th | 2.4 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | joint 12th | 2.7 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | 12th | 2.9 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | joint 12th | 2.9 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 13th | 2.5 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Prisma Cloud is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## Prisma Cloud against each other platform - [Prisma Cloud vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 5.2 - [Prisma Cloud vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 5.2 - [Prisma Cloud vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.9 - [Prisma Cloud vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 2.8 - [Prisma Cloud vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.5 - [Prisma Cloud vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.1 - [Prisma Cloud vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.2 - [Prisma Cloud vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.4 - [Prisma Cloud vs Sysdig](/compare/prisma-vs-sysdig/): 2.6 against 2.8 - [Prisma Cloud vs CrowdStrike](/compare/prisma-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.6 against 2.9 - [Prisma Cloud vs Microsoft](/compare/prisma-vs-microsoft/): 2.6 against 1.8 - [Prisma Cloud vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/prisma-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.6 against 3.0 - [Prisma Cloud vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/prisma-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.6 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Prisma Cloud](/alternatives/prisma/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ([source](https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md)) ## Sources - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/network-security/cloud-ne: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/network-security/cloud-network-analyzer.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/compliance/compliance-standards.md: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/compliance/compliance-standards.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/customers/michaels-adopts-least-privilege-access-strategy-w: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/customers/michaels-adopts-least-privilege-access-strategy-with-prisma-cloud-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/prisma/ --- # Microsoft: 14th on the Least Privilege Index at 1.8 Company profile, 14th of 14, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Microsoft is 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index at 1.8 of 10. Its best score is 6 on identity, network and AI; its weakest weighted criterion is safe to enforce at 0. Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. Rank 14 of 14, score 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Microsoft Entra Permissions Management is retired: it stopped being sold on 1 April 2025 and was due to be retired on 1 November 2025. The index scores Microsoft on CIEM in Microsoft Defender for Cloud, which evaluates effective permissions across Azure, AWS and Google Cloud and gives recommendations for inactive identities and overprovisioned permissions. Microsoft's pages say Defender for Cloud will stop publishing unused permission action details from 6 August 2026, and that ITSM integration is on the roadmap. Azure Policy is a separate service that Microsoft documents for assignment to management groups. Microsoft scores 6 on coverage for its security graph and 2 on removes, and no pre-change simulation was found for Microsoft on 2026-11-10. ## The seven scores for Microsoft | Criterion | Weight | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 2 | Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. | | Stays fixed | 15 | 2 | Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. | Weighted total 1.8 (1.80 before rounding), 14th of 14. ## What Microsoft says, criterion by criterion ### Removes access, not only reports it: 2 - Limit: "Right-sizing permissions for overprovisioned identities based on actual usage" (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management)) - Limit: "The built-in recommendations provide guidance for remediating inactive identities, overprovisioned permissions, and insecure identity settings." (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management)) - Limit: "Starting August 6, 2026, to improve performance and scalability, Microsoft Defender for Cloud will no longer publish unused permission action details" (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-permissions-management)) ### Safe to enforce: 0 - Limit: "Select Mode , and then, if you want recommendations to be generated and applied manually, select On-Demand ." (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/how-to-create-rule)) ### One change, a class of risk: 1 - Limit: "Role Last Used On Is : Select the duration in days when the role was last used." (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/how-to-create-rule)) - "the policy definition or initiative is assigned to any scope of resources that Azure supports. For example, management groups" (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/policy/overview)) ### Stays fixed: 2 - Limit: "Integration with ITSM tools, such as ServiceNow, is in the future roadmap." (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs)) - "DevOps security findings, such as Infrastructure as Code (IaC) misconfigurations and exposed secrets, can then be correlated with other contextual cloud security insights to prioritize remediation" (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction)) ### Identity, network and AI access together: 6 - "Google Cloud IAM users, groups, and service accounts" (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management)) - "lateral movement possibilities, internet exposure, permissions, network connections, vulnerabilities, and more." (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path)) - "unmanaged application programming interfaces (APIs), and artificial intelligence (AI) agents." (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path)) ### Uses the cloud's own controls: 0 None found on 10 Nov 2026 in the pages read for Microsoft. ### Evidence for auditors: 5 - "Microsoft Defender for Cloud helps you to meet regulatory compliance requirements by continuously assessing resources against compliance controls" (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/regulatory-compliance-dashboard)) - Compliance data can be exported continuously and integrates with Purview Compliance Manager. (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/regulatory-compliance-dashboard)) - Limit: "You can add more non-default compliance standards when at least one paid plan is enabled in Defender for Cloud." (Microsoft's own material, [read 10 Nov 2026](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/regulatory-compliance-dashboard)) ## Company facts, as published - **Ownership:** Microsoft ([vendor page](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/)) - **Clouds:** Azure, AWS, and GCP ([vendor page](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/)) - **Pricing:** Entra Permissions Management: $125 per resource/year ($10.40 per resource/month), no longer for purchase. Defender CSPM price shown as a placeholder on the pricing page read; Foundational CSPM is free. ([vendor page](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs)) - **Deployment:** CIEM in Defender for Cloud is an extension of the Defender CSPM plan, enabled per subscription, AWS account or GCP project. ([vendor page](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-permissions-management)) - **Other:** Microsoft states: the deprecation of Entra Permissions Management does not affect existing CIEM capabilities in Microsoft Defender for Cloud. ([vendor page](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management)) - **Other:** Entra Permissions Management: sold per resource; onboarded to a Microsoft Entra tenant, then AWS accounts, GCP projects and Azure subscriptions. ([vendor page](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs)) **Name and ownership.** Microsoft's page: effective April 1, 2025, Entra Permissions Management no longer available for purchase; on November 1, 2025 the product was to be retired and support discontinued. ([source](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/overview)) ## Microsoft in the five situations | Situation | Position | Score | Leader | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/) | 14th | 1.7 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | | [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/) | 14th | 1.8 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/) | 14th | 2.1 | Sonrai Security 5.0 | | [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/) | 14th | 2.4 | Act Security 5.2 | | [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/) | 14th | 1.8 | Sonrai Security 5.3 | Microsoft is outside the top three in all five situations on these weights. ## Microsoft against each other platform - [Microsoft vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 5.2 - [Microsoft vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 5.2 - [Microsoft vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.9 - [Microsoft vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 2.8 - [Microsoft vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.5 - [Microsoft vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.1 - [Microsoft vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.2 - [Microsoft vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.4 - [Microsoft vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 2.6 - [Microsoft vs Sysdig](/compare/sysdig-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 2.8 - [Microsoft vs CrowdStrike](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 2.9 - [Microsoft vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/microsoft-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 1.8 against 3.0 - [Microsoft vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/microsoft-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 1.8 against 4.0 - [Alternatives to Microsoft](/alternatives/microsoft/): the other 13 in index order ## Strongest, in one sentence Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ([source](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management)) ## Sources - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/regulatory-compliance-dashboa: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/regulatory-compliance-dashboard (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/policy/overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/policy/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/platforms/microsoft/ --- # Five situations, five re-weighted rankings Picks by situation, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Five buyer situations re-rank the same scores: AWS at scale, multi-cloud, regulated, AI agents and small team. Sonrai Security leads three, Act leads AI agents, and the two are exactly equal on multi-cloud. Each page prints the weights it used. - [A company putting AI agents into production this year](/best-for/ai-agents/): First: Act Security 5.2; then Sonrai Security 5.0; Act 1st - [A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud](/best-for/multi-cloud/): First: Act Security 5.2 (joint with Sonrai Security); Act joint 1st - [An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access](/best-for/aws-scale/): First: Sonrai Security 5.3; then Act Security 5.2; Act 2nd - [A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53](/best-for/regulated/): First: Sonrai Security 5.0; then Act Security 4.8; Act 2nd - [A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear](/best-for/small-team/): First: Sonrai Security 5.3; then Act Security 5.1; Act 2nd **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/best-for/ --- # For a company putting AI agents into production, Act leads and Sonrai Security is second Picks by situation, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** For a company putting AI agents into production this year, the top three on this situation's weights are Act Security (5.2), Sonrai Security (5.0) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). An agent's reach is the sum of identity, network and AI-service access; a model that misses one misses the path. Act is first at 5.2, ahead of Sonrai Security at 5.0. An agent's reach is the sum of its identity, network and AI-service access, so a model that misses one misses the path. Identity, network and AI coverage weighs 22.5 here, and removes 22.5. Act totals 5.2, Sonrai Security 5.0, and Google Cloud IAM recommender is third at 4.0. The weights were fixed before scoring. Act leads because it models identity, network and AI access as one (6 on coverage against Sonrai Security's 4) and says it tests each change first (7 on safe). Sonrai Security still leads on removes, because it applies the change itself and Act is read-only: the customer applies Act's pull requests and tickets. The analyst report read for the index says customer evidence for Act's AI boundaries is less mature than for its core access control. ## The top three for this situation ### Rank 1: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, Safe to enforce 7 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 7 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 3. [Read the profile](/platforms/act/) ### Rank 2: Sonrai Security (5.0) Cloud permissions firewall, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Rank 3: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, Safe to enforce 6 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 6 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 2. [Read the profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) ## The full order under these weights | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (22.5) | Safe (17.5) | Class (12.5) | Fixed (12.5) | Id+Net+AI (22.5) | Native (7.5) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 2 | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.0 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.8 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 6= | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6= | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.5 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.2 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 3.1 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 3.0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 3.0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12= | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.9 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 12= | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 2.4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Published weights for this situation, the mean of this site's weights and the situation's own (id+net+ai 35, removes 20, safe 15, class 10, fixed 10, native 5, audit 5), fixed before scoring. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/best-for/ai-agents/ --- # For a multi-cloud enterprise, Act and Sonrai Security are exactly equal at 5.2 Picks by situation, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** For a multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud, the top three on this situation's weights are Act Security (5.2), Sonrai Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (3.9). Act is joint 1st at 5.2. Separate teams per cloud need changes enforced through each cloud's own controls and exceptions handled in each team's tools. Act and Sonrai Security share first at 5.2; Act Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.22 against 5.22). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.60 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Separate teams per cloud need changes enforced through each cloud's own controls and exceptions handled in each team's tools. This page weights removes 22.5, stays fixed 17.5, and gives identity, network and AI coverage and native controls 12.5 each. Act and Sonrai Security each total 5.225 before rounding, so the page shows them as joint first. The tie has a plain reason. Sonrai Security applies the change itself and leads on removes (5 against 3) and native controls (7 against 6). Act is read-only and the customer applies each change, but it leads on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and on identity, network and AI coverage (6 against 4). Google Cloud IAM recommender is third at 3.9. ## The top three for this situation ### Rank 1 (joint): Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, Safe to enforce 7 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 7 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 3. [Read the profile](/platforms/act/) ### Rank 1 (joint): Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Rank 3 (joint): Google Cloud IAM recommender (3.9) Provider tool, Safe to enforce 6 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 6 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 2. [Read the profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) ## The full order under these weights | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (22.5) | Safe (17.5) | Class (15) | Fixed (17.5) | Id+Net+AI (12.5) | Native (12.5) | Audit (2.5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 3= | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 3.9 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 3= | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.2 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.1 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12= | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.7 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 12= | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.7 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Published weights for this situation, the mean of this site's weights and the situation's own (removes 20, safe 15, class 15, fixed 20, id+net+ai 15, native 15, audit 0), fixed before scoring. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/best-for/multi-cloud/ --- # For an AWS estate of hundreds of accounts, Sonrai Security leads and Act is second Picks by situation, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** For an AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access, the top three on this situation's weights are Sonrai Security (5.3), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (3.9). Act is 2nd at 5.2. Hundreds of accounts make permission-by-permission clean-up impossible; one change must remove a class of paths, safely. Sonrai Security is first at 5.3 and Act is 2nd at 5.2. What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.63 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.55. Hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access make permission-by-permission clean-up impossible, so this page weights one change that removes a class of paths, safely. On the published weights, removes counts 25, safe to enforce 20, one change for a class of risk 20 and stays fixed 15. Sonrai Security scores 5.3 and Act 5.2, with Google Cloud IAM recommender third. Sonrai Security leads because it applies the change itself. Its policies block unused access once deployed, and it scores 5 on removes. Act is read-only: it delivers each change as a pull request or ticket and the customer applies it, which scores 3 on removes. Act's lead on safe to enforce (7, the only 7) wins back most of the gap, but not all of it. ## The top three for this situation ### Rank 1: Sonrai Security (5.3) Cloud permissions firewall, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Rank 2: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, Safe to enforce 7 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 7 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 3. [Read the profile](/platforms/act/) ### Rank 3: Google Cloud IAM recommender (3.9) Provider tool, Safe to enforce 6 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 6 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 2. [Read the profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) ## The full order under these weights | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (20) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (7.5) | Native (7.5) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.3 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 2 | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 3.9 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.8 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.4 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.1 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8= | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 2.9 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8= | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.8 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 11 | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.7 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 12 | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.6 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.4 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.7 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Published weights for this situation, the mean of this site's weights and the situation's own (removes 25, safe 20, class 25, fixed 15, id+net+ai 5, native 5, audit 5), fixed before scoring. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/best-for/aws-scale/ --- # For a company that must prove its access boundaries, Sonrai Security leads and Act is second Picks by situation, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** For a regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53, the top three on this situation's weights are Sonrai Security (5.0), Act Security (4.8) and Apono (3.8). Act is 2nd at 4.8. An auditor asks for the boundary and the continuous evidence that it held. Sonrai Security is first at 5.0 and Act is 2nd at 4.8. What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), evidence for auditors (4 against 3) and cloud's own controls (7 against 6), worth 0.67 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.50. A regulated company is asked for the boundary and the continuous evidence that it held, for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53. Audit weighs 15 on this page, three times its main weight, with removes 22.5 and stays fixed 17.5. Sonrai Security totals 5.0, Act 4.8, and Apono is third at 3.8. Neither leader is strong on audit. Sonrai Security scores 4 and Act scores 3, and Sonrai Security's lead comes from removes (5 against 3), native controls and audit. Sonrai Security applies the change itself; Act is read-only and the customer applies it. Act's lead on safe to enforce and coverage is worth 0.50, short of Sonrai's 0.675 on the heavier criteria. ## The top three for this situation ### Rank 1: Sonrai Security (5.0) Cloud permissions firewall, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Rank 2: Act Security (4.8) Access hardening platform, Safe to enforce 7 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 7 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 3. [Read the profile](/platforms/act/) ### Rank 3: Apono (3.8) Just-in-time access, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/apono/) ## The full order under these weights | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (22.5) | Safe (17.5) | Class (12.5) | Fixed (17.5) | Id+Net+AI (7.5) | Native (7.5) | Audit (15) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.0 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 2 | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 4.8 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.8 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 4= | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.7 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 4= | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 3.7 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 6= | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6= | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.5 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 3.3 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 9 | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 3.2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 10= | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 10= | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.9 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 2.1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Published weights for this situation, the mean of this site's weights and the situation's own (audit 25, fixed 20, removes 20, safe 15, class 10, id+net+ai 5, native 5), fixed before scoring. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/best-for/regulated/ --- # For a small team buried in posture findings, Sonrai Security leads and Act is second Picks by situation, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** For a small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear, the top three on this situation's weights are Sonrai Security (5.3), Act Security (5.1) and Apono (3.8). Act is 2nd at 5.1. A team that cannot clear findings needs the product to make the change, many paths at a time, and keep it fixed. Sonrai Security is first at 5.3 and Act is 2nd at 5.1. What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.68 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.50. A small team that cannot clear findings needs the product to make the change, many paths at a time, and keep it fixed. Removes weighs 27.5 here and one change for a class of risk 20. Sonrai Security totals 5.3, Act 5.1, and Apono is third at 3.8. The weights were fixed before scoring. The reason is the same as elsewhere, and here it counts most. Sonrai Security applies the change itself, so its 5 on removes against Act's 3 is worth 0.55 at this weight. Act is read-only and the customer applies each change as a pull request or ticket, which costs a small team the hours it is short of. Act's lead on safe to enforce is 0.35. ## The top three for this situation ### Rank 1: Sonrai Security (5.3) Cloud permissions firewall, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Rank 2: Act Security (5.1) Access hardening platform, Safe to enforce 7 Highest weighted score: safe to enforce, 7 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 3. [Read the profile](/platforms/act/) ### Rank 3 (joint): Apono (3.8) Just-in-time access, Removes access 5 Highest weighted score: removes access, 5 of 10. Lowest: evidence for auditors, 4. [Read the profile](/platforms/apono/) ## The full order under these weights | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (27.5) | Safe (17.5) | Class (20) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (7.5) | Native (7.5) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.3 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 2 | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.1 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3= | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.8 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 3= | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 3.8 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7= | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.1 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 7= | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 11 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.7 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 12 | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.6 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.5 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Published weights for this situation, the mean of this site's weights and the situation's own (removes 30, class 25, safe 15, fixed 15, native 5, id+net+ai 5, audit 5), fixed before scoring. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/best-for/small-team/ --- # Ten guides to getting a cloud estate to least privilege Guides, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Guides on reaching and keeping least privilege in AWS, Azure and Google Cloud, written from the same pages read for the index. Each guide lists its sources with the date it was read, and each uses the index's seven criteria as its test of what counts as progress. - [Why least privilege projects stall in the cloud](/guides/why-least-privilege-projects-stall/): The four points where cloud access clean-up stops, and what the documentation says about each. - [Unused access versus excess reachability](/guides/unused-access-versus-excess-reachability/): Two measures of excess, what each finds, and why a program needs both. - [How to simulate a permission change before it ships](/guides/how-to-simulate-a-permission-change/): What a simulation compares, what the provider tools document as their limits, and a short procedure. - [What a boundary is in cloud access control](/guides/what-a-boundary-is/): Grants, boundaries and the difference between cleaning one permission and removing a class. - [Reading a vendor's least privilege claim](/guides/reading-a-vendor-least-privilege-claim/): Five questions that turn a marketing sentence into a checkable statement. - [The first 90 days of a cloud least privilege program](/guides/the-first-90-days/): A three-month plan built around the 90-day usage windows the provider tools document. - [Attack path analysis: what it finds and what it leaves](/guides/attack-path-analysis/): What the graph contains, what a path means, and why a finding is not yet a fix. - [The principle of least privilege in the cloud](/guides/principle-of-least-privilege-in-the-cloud/): What NIST AC-6 requires, what AWS and Google advise, and how the cloud case differs from the data center. - [Microsoft Entra Permissions Management is retired](/guides/entra-permissions-management-retired/): The retirement dates, where Microsoft points customers, and the alternatives in index order. - [CIEM tools explained: four categories on this index](/guides/ciem-tools-explained/): What CIEM means, and the four kinds of product the index ranks under it. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/ --- # Least privilege projects stall because removing access carries more risk than granting it Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Cloud least privilege projects stall at four points: nobody can show a removal is safe, usage data covers too short a window, clean-up happens one permission at a time, and the report ends in a ticket. Provider documentation and vendor evidence describe a fix for each of the four. ## Granting is cheap and removal has an owner who fears the outage AWS documents the pattern in its own IAM guidance: you might start with broad permissions while you explore what a workload needs, and as the use case matures you work to reduce them. The first half of that sentence happens on every project. The second half needs someone to decide that a removal is safe, and that person carries the outage if the decision is wrong. That asymmetry is the first reason projects stall. A broad grant costs nothing to approve and a failed deploy is visible within minutes. A removal that breaks a quarterly job is visible three months later, with the engineer who approved it as the named cause. Teams respond by freezing the clean-up queue. The fix is evidence per change: a record of what the change would have blocked, before it ships. ## The usage window decides what looks unused Usage-based tools compare what is granted with what was used in a window. Google documents that the IAM recommender compares a principal's permissions with those used in the last 90 days, and that by default it does not generate recommendations until it has 90 days of data. For project-level recommendations the minimum can be set to 30 or 60 days, and Google says accuracy might be affected. AWS lets policy generation read up to 90 days of CloudTrail events. A role used once a year for failover, or a job that runs at quarter close, can sit outside any 90-day window. Removing its permissions because they look unused is the exact mistake that makes the next removal harder to approve. Treat the window as a stated limit of the data, and list the identities whose duties run on longer cycles before any removal. ## Permission-by-permission clean-up does not scale Google's role recommendations each suggest that you remove or replace a role for a principal. That is the right unit for a review and the wrong unit for an estate of hundreds of accounts. If every finding is a ticket, the queue grows at the rate that engineers create roles, which is faster than anyone closes tickets. Role-level review is also slow for a human, since each recommendation needs someone who knows what the principal does. Some vendors describe a different unit. Sonrai says unused services are locked down in a single global action, and Act says its campaigns remove thousands of access paths with one policy change. Both are vendor claims. The test for either is whether the change can be simulated first and who applies it, which is why this index weights "One change, a class of risk" at 15 percent. See [the method](/method/) for the weights. ## A finding ends the tool's work and starts the team's AWS Access Analyzer recommends a refined policy for unused permissions and the user attaches it. Google states that the IAM recommender does not apply recommendations automatically, and that you apply or dismiss each one. Both are sound designs for a provider tool, and both leave the removal to a human with a backlog. Neither provider presents this as a gap. A recommendation service recommends, and the remaining work is staffing: someone must read each result, test it and ship it. This index gives the largest single weight, 25 percent, to whether a product ends with an enforced change or with a finding. [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) applies the change through cloud policies the customer deploys. [Act](/platforms/act/) is read-only and delivers each change as a pull request or ticket for the customer to apply. The difference decides who owns the last step. The practical effect is that whoever owns the last step also owns the risk of the change, so the tool's own work is not the whole project. ## New access arrives faster than old access leaves Even a clean estate decays. Act's engineering blog makes the point that workloads and identities spin up and tear down by the hour, so the map drawn this morning is stale by afternoon. A one-time clean-up is a snapshot, and the next deploy can re-grant what was just removed. Act's post adds that the boundaries to handle this already exist in the cloud, among them security groups, SCPs, RCPs and private endpoints, so the missing piece is keeping them current. The durable answer is a check before production: a policy test in the pipeline, with exceptions handled in the team's own tools. Act says it blocks risk from shipping in CI/CD. Google documents a separate Terraform plan check against an organization policy library. Whatever the tool, a project that has no check before production is cleaning a floor while the tap runs. ## Sources - AWS IAM best practices, apply least-privilege permissions: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, overview of role recommendations: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS IAM Access Analyzer policy generation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS, what is IAM Access Analyzer: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Act blog, network and identity each see half your cloud: https://act.security/resources/network-and-identity-each-see-half-your-cloud-your-attacker-sees-both (read 10 Nov 2026) - Sonrai Security, least privilege use case: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, validate Terraform plans against policies: https://cloud.google.com/docs/terraform/policy-validation/validate-policies (read 10 Nov 2026) - Act Security, platform page: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/why-least-privilege-projects-stall/ --- # Unused access is a count of grants; excess reachability is a count of paths, and they need different fixes Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Unused access compares what an identity is granted with what it used. Excess reachability asks what an identity, or a compromised workload, can actually get to once network and IAM are combined. A clean-up that measures only the first can leave the second untouched. ## Unused access measures the gap between granted and used Most CIEM tools start here because the data is available. Google documents that the IAM recommender compares a principal's permissions with those it used in the last 90 days and recommends removing or replacing the role. AWS documents that IAM Access Analyzer unused access findings highlight unused roles, unused access keys and unused passwords, and for active roles show unused services and actions. Microsoft's retired Entra Permissions Management summarized the same idea as a number: its Permission Creep Index compared permissions granted with permissions exercised. The method is simple and defensible, since a permission nobody has used in the window is a candidate for removal. Its limit is that it tells you nothing about which of the used permissions are dangerous. A count of this kind says how much was granted and went unused. It says little about how much damage the used part could do. ## Excess reachability measures what can be reached Reachability is a different question. Act's engineering blog states it as two tests that every cloud action must pass at once: the network must let the caller reach the resource, and IAM must permit the action. Act argues the two checks are run by separate teams in separate tools, so nobody computes what a compromised workload can reach with both fused. That is Act's framing. Microsoft Defender for Cloud describes the same shape from the attacker side. Its documentation defines an attack path as a series of steps that starts at an external entry point, such as an internet-exposed vulnerable resource, and follows lateral movement through attached identities with permissions to other resources. The unit is a path, and a path has several links. Each link in such a path is ordinary on its own, and the chain is what an attacker follows. ## The two measures disagree in both directions An unused permission on an identity nothing can reach is low risk and still counts against a usage metric. A permission used daily by a workload that is exposed to the internet, through a role that can read a production database, never appears as unused and is the one an attacker wants. Wiz's CIEM guidance reaches a similar view in its own words: effective permissions are the reliable signal, and CIEM should prioritize identity-based attack paths over raw permissions. Neither measure replaces the other. Usage data answers what can be removed with little argument. Reachability answers which removals matter first and which boundary removes the most paths in one change. Run the usage review first because it is quick and its results are easy to defend. Then use reachability to order the larger changes that follow, so the cheap work does not crowd out the work that lowers risk. ## The fixes differ too Unused access is removed grant by grant: delete the role, shrink the policy to the generated template, rotate out the key. AWS describes policy generation from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity for that purpose. The change is small, local and easy to simulate against the same logs. One engineer can usually run that clean-up in an afternoon, and the same engineer can check the result against the logs. Excess reachability is usually removed at a layer above the grant: a network rule, a trust condition, or an organization-level policy that denies a class of movement. Act describes guardrails that deny whole classes of cross-environment movement and ring-fencing, with explicit allow, around crown-jewel workloads. Sonrai describes organization-level policies that block unused privileges. These are vendor claims; [the method](/method/) shows how this index scores them. ## A program should track both and say which one it is moving Report the two numbers separately. Unused grants removed per month shows hygiene progress and is cheap to produce. Paths removed, or the reach of the top ten crown-jewel resources, shows risk progress. Reachability needs a model that joins network and identity, which is a larger purchase and a larger project than a usage report, so most teams begin with the first number and grow into the second. When a vendor says it measures least privilege, ask which of the two it means. A tool built on usage will show a falling count of unused permissions while the reach of a compromised role is unchanged. See [reading a vendor least privilege claim](/guides/reading-a-vendor-least-privilege-claim/) for the questions to put to each vendor. Keep the vendor's answers beside its platform profile, with the date. ## Sources - Google Cloud, overview of role recommendations: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS, what is IAM Access Analyzer: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, Entra Permissions Management FAQ: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - Act blog, network and identity each see half your cloud: https://act.security/resources/network-and-identity-each-see-half-your-cloud-your-attacker-sees-both (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, attack paths in Defender for Cloud: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) - Wiz Academy, how to choose a CIEM vendor: https://www.wiz.io/academy/cloud-security/how-to-choose-a-ciem-vendor (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS IAM Access Analyzer policy generation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/unused-access-versus-excess-reachability/ --- # Simulate a permission change against real access logs, then read what the simulator cannot see Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** A permission change can be tested before it ships by replaying past access attempts under the proposed policy. Google Policy Simulator does this with 90 days of logs, AWS offers a policy simulator, and Act describes a digital twin. Each has stated limits that decide how far to trust it. ## A simulation compares outcomes, not policy text Diffing two policy files shows what changed in the text. It does not show who loses access. A useful simulation takes real or representative requests and evaluates each under the current and the proposed policy, then reports the requests whose result differs. Those differences are the people and workloads you would break. Any simulator worth using reports exactly this list, whether a provider ships it or a vendor builds it. Google documents this method for allow policies. Policy Simulator retrieves access logs from the last 90 days, replays the access attempts under the current policy, replays them again under the proposed policy, and reports the differences as a list of access changes. Because it replays under the current policy first, it reports only changes caused by your proposal. Those two replays are what separate a simulation from a comparison of policy documents. Simulation is also what lets a team say yes to a removal. Without it the choice is between guessing and waiting, and waiting is what stalled the project in the first place. With it, each change comes with a list of the access it would have changed, which is the evidence a reviewer needs. The reviewer's job becomes reading differences, which is faster and safer than reading policy text. ## The provider tools state their limits Read the limits before you trust a result. Google documents that Policy Simulator for allow policies fails if there are more than 5,000 access logs to replay for the project or organization, and that it lists permissions on unsupported resource types as ones it could not simulate. Each Google simulator evaluates one policy type and does not account for the others. AWS documents that its IAM policy simulator tests identity-based policies, permissions boundaries, service control policies and resource-based policies that you provide, without sending a real request. AWS also warns that results can differ from your live environment and recommends checking against the live environment afterward. A simulator that tests supplied policies is checking logic, and the logs are still yours to bring. ## Policy checks catch a different failure A simulation tells you what a change blocks. A policy check tells you what a change grants. AWS describes IAM Access Analyzer custom policy checks as a way to compare an updated policy against the existing version and detect new access, and says they can be configured in the development lifecycle to review policies before deployment. That is a statement about logic and supplied inputs, and it makes no claim to know your live traffic. Run both on a change. The simulation protects availability by showing the legitimate access you would cut. The check protects the boundary by showing access you would add by accident. A pull request that passes only one of them is half reviewed. Teams that run only one of the two checks tend to learn about the other failure in production, from a user who lost access or an auditor who found new access. ## A procedure that fits a change window The sequence below works with any of the tools above and with the vendors on this index. Write the proposed policy as code in a branch. Simulate it against the longest log window the tool allows. Review every changed outcome and name an owner for each one. Run the policy check for new access. Deploy in an audit or log-only mode where the cloud offers one, watch for blocked attempts for a full business cycle, then enforce. Keep the previous policy version ready to restore. Record the result with the change: the simulated outcomes, the reviewer and the date. - Propose the change as code. - Simulate against at least 90 days of logs where available. - Assign an owner to each changed outcome. - Run a new-access check on the same change. - Run in audit mode through one business cycle, then enforce. ## Vendors add a model of the environment Act says it tests each recommended change against what it calls a digital twin to show what it would block, and that changes can run in audit mode to confirm that no legitimate access is revoked. Act is read-only, so the customer applies the change through a pull request. Sonrai says policies are built from observed usage, that in-use permissions are exempted first and that the exemption list is shown before deployment. Ask each vendor what its simulation runs against: cloud configuration, audit-log events, or both. Ask what it cannot cover, such as rarely used or undocumented dependencies. [Act](/platforms/act/) and [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) each have a profile page with the sources read. The two differ in where the last step sits: Sonrai's policies block access once the customer deploys them, and Act opens pull requests the customer merges. ## Sources - Google Cloud, Policy Simulator for allow policies: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS, IAM policy testing with the policy simulator: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_testing-policies.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS, IAM Access Analyzer custom policy checks: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, Policy Intelligence overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - Act Security, platform page: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - Sonrai Security, home page: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/how-to-simulate-a-permission-change/ --- # A boundary is a limit set above the grants, so one change can remove a class of access Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** A boundary is a rule that caps what grants below it can do, whatever those grants say. AWS, Google Cloud and Azure each document one: a ceiling on a role, a limit on the resources a principal may reach, or a deny that overrides assignments. One boundary can remove many paths at once. ## A grant gives access and a boundary limits it A grant says an identity may do something. A boundary says what no grant beneath it can allow. The two are evaluated together, and the effective result is what both permit. That is why a boundary can remove access without touching the grants: the broad role stays in place and the boundary makes parts of it inert. The same shape appears in every cloud, even though the names and the evaluation rules differ in each one. This site uses the word in the general sense. The exact policy types, their evaluation rules and the traps in each are the subject of dedicated references outside this site, and this guide names one example per cloud only to show the shape. A reader should not expect the three examples below to behave alike, since each cloud evaluates its own policy types in its own order. ## Each cloud documents its own version AWS documents a permissions boundary as an advanced feature that uses a managed policy to set the maximum permissions an identity-based policy can grant to an IAM user or role. The entity can perform only the actions allowed by both its identity-based policies and its boundary. It is a ceiling on one identity and does not grant anything itself. AWS also lists permissions boundaries as a way to delegate permissions management within an account. Google Cloud documents Principal Access Boundary policies as policies that define the resources principals can access. They attach to principal sets, in contrast to allow and deny policies, which attach to resources. Google gives the example of preventing principals from accessing resources in other organizations, which can help prevent phishing attacks or data exfiltration. Google notes that by default principals are eligible to access any Google Cloud resource, so the boundary narrows an otherwise open default. Microsoft documents deny assignments in Azure RBAC as attaching a set of deny actions to a user, group or service principal at a scope, blocking those actions even if a role assignment grants them. The effect is a block that holds regardless of the grants beneath it, at the scope where it is attached. The page covers listing them, which is the first step in learning which denies already exist in your tenant. ## Why a boundary removes a class and a clean-up removes an item A permission-by-permission clean-up deletes one grant per change and has to be repeated for every identity. A boundary applied at an organization, folder or account level acts on every identity beneath it at once. If the boundary denies a service nobody uses, a region nobody runs in, or access from outside the organization, thousands of grants become irrelevant in one change. The comparison is between ten thousand edits and one reviewed policy. This is what the criterion "One change, a class of risk" scores on this index, at 15 percent of the total. Sonrai says it applies global default deny in one action across an organization while used permissions stay available. Act says its guardrail campaigns use broad explicit-deny policies for whole attack categories, with built-in exceptions. Both are vendor claims; [the method](/method/) describes how they were scored. ## A boundary needs a simulation more than a grant does Because a boundary acts on many identities, its mistakes are wide. A deny that is slightly too broad blocks a deployment role in forty accounts at the same moment. The same reach that makes a boundary efficient makes an untested one dangerous. Release should be gradual for the same reason, starting with the accounts that have the fewest dependencies. Wide reach also means a wide review, since the list of affected principals can run to hundreds and each needs an owner. That is why the index scores safe enforcement at 20 percent, the second-largest weight. The practical rule is to replay recent access under the proposed boundary, list every principal that would change outcome, and release it in audit mode first. [How to simulate a permission change](/guides/how-to-simulate-a-permission-change/) walks through the steps. Google's Policy Intelligence includes simulators for deny policies and Principal Access Boundary policies for this purpose. ## Native boundaries versus a new layer Boundaries can be enforced by the cloud itself or by a product in the request path. This index scores "Uses the cloud's own controls" at 10 percent, on the view that enforcement through mechanisms the customer already owns adds nothing new to fail. Sonrai says its enforcement uses the cloud's own organization-level policies with no proxy or broker, and Act says it deploys through pull requests to the customer's Terraform or CloudFormation using the cloud-native controls the customer already owns. Whichever route a tool takes, the audit question is the same: where is the boundary written down, who can change it, and how would you know that someone did. A boundary stored only in a console is a boundary with no history. Version control is the simplest answer, since a pull request records the author, the reviewer and the date. ## Sources - AWS, permissions boundaries for IAM entities: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, Principal Access Boundary policies: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-access-boundary-policies (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, Azure deny assignments: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/deny-assignments (read 10 Nov 2026) - Sonrai Security, least privilege use case: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - Act Security, platform page: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/what-a-boundary-is/ --- # Read a least privilege claim by asking who applies the change and what it was tested against Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Vendors use "least privilege" for four different outcomes: a report, a recommendation, a policy you apply, or a policy the product enforces. Five questions separate them: who applies the change, what tested it, what data window it used, which access it models, and what proof remains afterward. ## The same phrase covers four outcomes Provider documentation shows the range. AWS documents that IAM Access Analyzer generates a policy template from CloudTrail activity and that you create and attach the policy yourself. Google documents that the IAM recommender does not apply recommendations automatically. Those are recommendations, and both providers say so plainly. The documentation of each provider and vendor is a better guide than the headline claim, and that is where the questions below point. Product pages are less plain. A sentence such as "automatically enforces least privilege" can mean the product blocks access itself, or that it writes a policy for you to deploy. Both can be accurate, and they differ in who owns the last step and the outage risk. Read every claim as a claim by that vendor, and look for the page that describes the mechanics. ## Question one: who applies the change This is the largest weight on the index, 25 percent. Look for the verb on the documentation page, not the home page. Sonrai's platform page says unused privileged permissions are blocked with cloud-native, org-level policies, while another Sonrai page says permissions unused for a time are suggested for removal and not removed automatically. Both statements are Sonrai's. Ask also which party takes the outage if the change is wrong. Act says it simulates a change and the customer applies it through the cloud's native controls. Act has read-only access, and its changes arrive as pull requests to Terraform or CloudFormation, or as tickets. Neither model is wrong. They place the final step with a different party. Rollback belongs to the same question: Act's page says changes can be rolled back, while an analyst report lists rollback among items still under discussion. ## Questions two and three: what tested it, and over what window Ask whether each change is simulated against the real environment and whether the impact is shown. Google documents a replay of up to 90 days of access logs. Act says it tests against a digital twin and offers audit mode. Sonrai says in-use permissions are exempted first and the list is shown before deployment. A vendor that gives the window and the failure cases is giving you what you need to judge the claim. Then ask for the observation window. A tool that sees 30 days will mark a quarterly job's permissions as unused. Google's own documentation warns that shortening the minimum observation period gives recommendations sooner but might affect accuracy. The vendor should state its window as plainly as Google does. Act's materials describe an audit mode for this purpose, and the analyst report says audit mode uses audit-log events observed against the policy. ## Questions four and five: which access it models, and what proof remains Coverage means identity, network and AI access in one model. A usage-based tool covers identity. A tool that joins network and IAM covers reachability. Ask whether AI workloads and agents appear in the model or only in a roadmap slide. An analyst report on Act (SACR) says customer evidence for Act's AI workload model is not yet as mature as for its broader access control. Proof means what an auditor can read afterward: the policy as code, the simulation result, the approval and the date it shipped. Ask how exceptions are handled in the team's own tools and whether violations are caught before production. The same SACR report says Act identifies policy drift and presents violations management and time-bound waiver requests as near-term roadmap. Treat roadmap items as absent until they ship, and date the note. ## A reading worksheet Put each claim in a row and fill the columns from documentation, not from the sales call. A blank cell is a finding: write "none found" with the date you looked. The table below is the worksheet in compact form, with the weak answer for each row. Keep the source next to each row, so a later reader can see which page supported which answer. The platform profiles on this index follow the same rule. Each one lists what the pages read say, what they do not say, and the date they were read. See [the method](/method/) for the seven criteria and [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) or [Act](/platforms/act/) for two worked profiles. Both profiles name their own limits next to their strengths. The scores in the main view are the result of asking these questions of every vendor on the same date. | Question | Where to look | Weak answer | | --- | --- | --- | | Who applies the change | Documentation verb: blocks, recommends, opens a pull request | Only "automates" or "enforces" | | What tested it | Simulation or audit mode page | No test before enforcement | | What window | Observation period setting | Window not stated | | Which access | Identity, network, AI model | Identity only | | What proof | Policy as code, logs, approvals | A dashboard screenshot | ## Sources - AWS IAM Access Analyzer policy generation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, overview of role recommendations: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - Sonrai Security, platform page: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - Sonrai Security, least privilege use case: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - Act Security, platform page: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, Policy Simulator for allow policies: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - SACR, the CISO's guide to cloud security intent enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/reading-a-vendor-least-privilege-claim/ --- # The first 90 days should end with one boundary enforced, not a longer list of findings Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** A first quarter of cloud least privilege work fits the 90-day usage windows the provider tools use. Spend month one on data and ownership, month two on simulation and one chosen boundary, and month three on audit mode, enforcement and a standing review. Finish with one boundary live and proved. ## Plan around the 90-day window The tools that generate removals from usage want about 90 days of history. Google documents a default minimum observation period of 90 days for role recommendations, adjustable to 30 or 60 days for project-level ones. AWS lets Access Analyzer read up to 90 days of CloudTrail events. If logging is not on today, the first job in month one is turning it on, because every later step depends on the data it produces. That makes a 90-day program natural. Month one collects and assigns. Month two chooses and tests. Month three enforces and sets the review that keeps it. A program that tries to enforce in month one is guessing, and one that has no enforcement by month three has produced a report. Both of those are decisions about data, and the platforms on this index differ in how they help with them. ## Month one: inventory, logs and owners Confirm that audit logging covers every account, subscription and project, and that it is retained for at least the window you plan to use. Turn on the provider analyzers in report mode: Access Analyzer unused access, the Google IAM recommender, and Defender for Cloud CIEM if you run Azure. Produce a first list of unused roles, access keys and dormant identities. Assign an owner to each account or project. Removal fails when the person who can approve it cannot be found. NIST SP 800-53 control AC-6 requires organizations to employ the principle of least privilege, and its enhancement AC-6(7) calls for a review of user privileges. Record who performs that review, how often, and where the result is kept. Keep the list short enough to act on, since a first list of two thousand items teaches nothing. ## Month two: choose one class and simulate it Pick one class of access to remove, using the data from month one. Good first candidates are the ones with few legitimate users: unused regions, unused services, access keys unused for the whole window, and roles that trust accounts outside the organization. Choose the one where you can name every principal that currently uses it. Starting small is a choice made on purpose: the first change builds trust in the process before a larger one needs it. Write the change as code. Replay recent access under it using Google Policy Simulator or the AWS policy simulator, or the simulation your vendor provides. [How to simulate a permission change](/guides/how-to-simulate-a-permission-change/) lists the steps. Review each changed outcome with its owner. A change nobody can explain stays in the branch. Keep a record of the principals that used the access during the window, so you can contact each owner before enforcement. ## Month three: audit mode, enforcement and the review Release the change in audit or log-only mode where the cloud offers one, and watch blocked attempts across a full business cycle. Fix or exempt each hit with a recorded reason. Then enforce, and keep the previous version ready to restore. Write the date and the evidence into the change record; an auditor will ask for exactly those two things. Keep the evidence beside the change, so the record survives staff changes. Close the quarter by setting a recurring review. Microsoft documents access reviews in Entra ID as a way to review group memberships, application access and role assignments regularly so that only the right people keep access. Add the new boundary to that cycle, and add a pipeline check so the removed access is not granted again. The check is what keeps a quarter's work from being undone the following week. ## What to measure at day 90 Report four numbers: the share of accounts with logging verified, the count of unused roles and keys removed, the number of principals whose outcome changed under the enforced boundary, and the number of exceptions open past their expiry date. A fifth, if you have a reachability model, is the count of paths removed. These are plain counts that any team can produce without a vendor, and they make a quarter's progress readable by someone outside the team. If you are choosing a platform during the quarter, rank candidates on the situation closest to yours on the index. [The method](/method/) shows the five situations and their published weights. A small team that cannot clear findings should weigh removal and class-level change most heavily. Choose the platform after the first change has shipped, because shipping it shows which of the seven criteria matters most to your team. ## Sources - Google Cloud, overview of role recommendations: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS IAM Access Analyzer policy generation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 catalog, control AC-6: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/usnistgov/oscal-content/main/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/json/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, access reviews in Entra ID: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/access-reviews-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, Policy Simulator for allow policies: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS, IAM policy testing with the policy simulator: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_testing-policies.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/the-first-90-days/ --- # Attack path analysis finds the routes to your assets; removing them is a separate job Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Attack path analysis builds a graph of cloud assets, identities and network links, then searches it for routes from an entry point to a valuable resource. It ranks risks by reachability. The output is a finding, and a finding becomes a fix only when someone changes the policy or the network. ## What attack path analysis is Microsoft's documentation defines an attack path as a series of steps a potential attacker uses to breach an environment and reach its assets. It starts at an external entry point, such as an internet-exposed vulnerable resource, and follows available lateral movement, such as attached identities with permissions to other resources. Microsoft adds that attack path analysis covers storage accounts, containers, serverless environments, unprotected repositories, unmanaged APIs and AI agents. To find these routes, Defender for Cloud builds what Microsoft calls a cloud security graph from asset inventory, connections, lateral movement possibilities, internet exposure, permissions, network connections and vulnerabilities. It then searches the graph for exploitable entry points and the steps from there to critical assets. Other platforms, including Wiz and Tenable, describe comparable graph or path models in their own documentation. Each platform builds its own graph, so the same estate can produce different paths in different tools. ## What it finds that a permission list does not A permission list answers what one identity can do. A path answers how an attacker gets to that identity and what the identity opens next. Microsoft's CIEM page gives an example: an attacker compromises a service principal with excessive rights and moves laterally from a compromised resource to a sensitive database. Each link is ordinary; the chain is the finding. The graph is what lets a tool rank one path above another. Google documents a narrower version for its recommender. Some role recommendations are associated with lateral movement insights, which identify roles that allow service accounts in one project to impersonate service accounts in another. This is attack path thinking applied to a single relationship, and Google shows it next to the recommendation to remove the role. A path analysis shows these links in sequence, so a reader can decide where to cut it. ## Why ranking by path helps a small team Teams drown in findings. Microsoft frames the purpose as helping security teams assess the risk behind each issue and identify the highest-risk issues for immediate resolution. A path that starts at the internet and ends at a data store belongs above a hundred isolated misconfigurations. The ranking works because a path shows a route that exists today, not a rule that might be broken. The ranking is only as good as the graph. A graph with no network model will miss paths that depend on routing and security groups, and a graph with no identity model will miss the hops that matter most. Act argues that network and identity are evaluated by separate teams in separate tools, which is why it models them together. That framing is Act's. Judge any path tool by the parts of the graph it models, and ask what it leaves out. ## A finding is not a fix The Defender documentation says the algorithm exposes attack paths and suggests recommendations to fix issues, breaking the path. The recommendation is a suggestion, and someone must apply it. Wiz, Tenable and Defender for Cloud present paths as prioritized findings. Applying the change is a separate step in a separate team's queue. The distinction is between knowing a route exists and having closed it. This is why the index gives 25 percent of the weight to whether a product ends with an enforced change. A path analysis that ends in a ticket helps with prioritization and leaves the removal to people. [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) removes access through policies the customer deploys, while [Act](/platforms/act/) delivers changes as pull requests. See [the method](/method/) for how the two were scored. The cut can be a policy, a network rule or a trust change, and each is a change that someone has to author, test and ship. ## How to use paths in a program Use the paths to choose boundaries. If twenty paths cross the same trust relationship or the same unused region, one boundary removes all of them. Simulate it, enforce it, then rerun the analysis and check that the paths are gone. The rerun is the proof, and it is the step that findings-only tools leave out. The rerun gives a repeatable measure that does not depend on any one vendor's score. Keep a short list of crown-jewel resources and report the number of paths to each, month by month. A falling number is evidence an auditor can read. A rising number after a quiet quarter is the signal that new access is arriving faster than it is removed. Make the monthly number part of the security review, so the trend is read by someone who can act on it. ## Sources - Microsoft Learn, attack paths in Defender for Cloud: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, CIEM in Defender for Cloud: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, overview of role recommendations: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - Wiz Academy, how to choose a CIEM vendor: https://www.wiz.io/academy/cloud-security/how-to-choose-a-ciem-vendor (read 10 Nov 2026) - Tenable, enforce least privilege across cloud identities: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security/use-cases/enforce-least-privilege-across-cloud-identities (read 10 Nov 2026) - Act blog, network and identity each see half your cloud: https://act.security/resources/network-and-identity-each-see-half-your-cloud-your-attacker-sees-both (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/attack-path-analysis/ --- # In the cloud, least privilege is a standing requirement on every identity, human or machine Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The principle of least privilege gives each entity only the access its function needs. NIST SP 800-53 control AC-6 requires it, and AWS and Google Cloud each publish guidance for applying it. The cloud case differs in scale: identities are created in code, and most of them belong to workloads. ## What the principle says NIST's glossary defines least privilege, citing NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, as the principle that a security architecture is designed so that each entity is granted the minimum system resources and authorizations that the entity needs to perform its function. The older CNSSI definition applies the same idea to users and to processes acting on their behalf. The wording is deliberately general: it covers people, services and processes alike, which matters in the cloud, where most principals are not people. The control that turns the principle into a requirement is AC-6 in NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. Its statement reads: employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users, or processes acting on behalf of users, that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks. The statement is short on purpose, and the guidance paragraph that follows it does the explaining. ## What AC-6 adds beyond the sentence The control's guidance says least privilege is applied to specific duties and systems, and to system processes, so that processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary. It also says organizations consider creating additional processes, roles and accounts as necessary to achieve it. In cloud terms that is the case for narrow roles per workload. An assessment against the control examines documents, configuration and records, so a policy statement alone does not satisfy AC-6. The enhancements name practices that map directly to cloud work, including AC-6(1) authorize access to security functions, AC-6(5) privileged accounts, AC-6(7) review of user privileges and AC-6(9) log use of privileged functions. AWS lists NIST 800-53 AC-6 among the related requirements for several of its Security Hub IAM controls. Assessors also test the mechanisms that implement least privilege, so the proof is in configuration and not only in documents. ## What AWS and Google advise AWS's IAM best practices tell customers to grant only the permissions required to perform a task, by defining the actions allowed on specific resources under specific conditions. They add that starting with AWS managed policies may not give least privilege for your use case, that Access Analyzer can generate a policy from CloudTrail activity, and that you should regularly review and remove unused users, roles, permissions, policies and credentials. The advice is consistent across both providers: begin with the narrowest role that works, then measure and tighten. Google Cloud's guidance on using IAM securely makes the same point about roles: basic roles include thousands of permissions across all services, so in production you should grant the most limited predefined or custom roles that meet your needs. Google's role recommendations then check granted roles against 90 days of use. Google adds that to replace a basic role you can use role recommendations to decide which roles to grant instead, and Policy Simulator to confirm that the change will not affect the principal's access. ## How the cloud case differs In a data center, a privileged account was a person with a ticket. In the cloud, most principals are workloads: roles, service accounts and managed identities created by pipelines, often with broad permissions granted while a developer was exploring. AWS says as much in its own advice, that you might start broad and reduce as the use case matures. Pipelines, containers and functions each carry an identity, and each identity needs its own boundary. Creation is fast and removal is slow, so the gap grows by default. The principle is unchanged, and the work is different: continuous measurement of use against grants, changes tested before they ship, and boundaries that remove whole classes of access. This is the territory of the CIEM tools ranked on this index. Tracking both the grants and the use of each identity over time is the job of the tools ranked here. ## Turning the principle into evidence An auditor reading AC-6 asks for the access control policy, procedures for least privilege, the list of assigned authorizations and system configuration settings and audit records. The assessment objects in the NIST catalog name these items. A program that keeps policies as code, simulation results and approvals produces them as a by-product. Assessors may also ask who reviewed the access and when. The index scores "Evidence for auditors" at 5 percent in the main view and 15 percent in the regulated situation. [The method](/method/) lists the weights. For a program-level plan, see [the first 90 days](/guides/the-first-90-days/). A single audit request is easier to meet when the evidence is collected as the work is done. Regulated buyers should read the regulated situation page, which weights evidence at 15 percent. ## Sources - NIST CSRC glossary, least privilege: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/least_privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 catalog, control AC-6: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/usnistgov/oscal-content/main/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/json/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS IAM best practices: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, using IAM securely: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/using-iam-securely (read 10 Nov 2026) - Google Cloud, overview of role recommendations: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS Security Hub, IAM controls: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/iam-controls.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/principle-of-least-privilege-in-the-cloud/ --- # Entra Permissions Management left sale on April 1, 2025 and was due to retire on November 1, 2025 Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Microsoft's documentation says Entra Permissions Management stopped being available for purchase on April 1, 2025, with retirement and end of support scheduled for November 1, 2025. Microsoft points customers to CIEM in Defender for Cloud. Thirteen other platforms are ranked on this index. ## The dates Microsoft published A note at the top of the Microsoft Learn overview reads: effective April 1, 2025, Microsoft Entra Permissions Management will no longer be available for purchase, and on November 1, 2025, Microsoft will retire and discontinue support of the product. The page was read on 2026-11-10. The separate Learn page for the retirement announcement returned a not-found error when requested, so the dates here rest on the overview page. The product was a CIEM tool. Microsoft described it as detecting, automatically right-sizing and continuously monitoring unused and excessive permissions across Azure, AWS and Google Cloud. Its FAQ gave a price of $125 per resource per year. Its three use cases were discover, remediate and monitor, and Microsoft recommended stepping through the phases in that order, since you cannot act on what you have not discovered. If you ran the product under contract, check the terms you signed. Microsoft's FAQ describes it as sold per resource, with licenses required for workloads, which it defines as any resource that uses compute or memory. The retirement removes the product, and your records of which accounts and projects were onboarded are the starting point for scoping any replacement. Export the findings and role policies you still need, since documentation for a retired product can disappear, as the missing retirement page shows. ## What Microsoft points customers to Microsoft's Defender for Cloud page on CIEM states that the deprecation of Entra Permissions Management does not affect the CIEM capabilities in Defender for Cloud. Those capabilities sit in the Defender CSPM plan and, according to Microsoft, analyze excessive, unused or misconfigured permissions for users, groups, service principals, managed identities and service accounts across Azure, AWS and Google Cloud. The page adds that the capabilities are designed to enforce the principle of least privilege and reduce the attack surface. The Defender route is a cloud posture extension, enabled per subscription, AWS account or GCP project. Microsoft's pages describe recommendations and attack path context. This index scores Microsoft 1.8, last of the 14 platforms in the main view. Read the page for the current scope before planning around it, since the extension sits inside the Defender CSPM plan. The pages read describe recommendations and attack path context for the customer to act on. ## The alternatives, in index order The main view ranks platforms by the access they actually remove. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2, with Sonrai listed first because it is ahead before rounding. The table follows that order and gives each platform's main-view total. The totals come from the seven criteria in the method, and they do not rank the products by size or market share. The right choice depends on the situation. For an AWS estate of hundreds of accounts, Sonrai leads and Act is second. On multi-cloud they are joint first. Google Cloud IAM recommender is third on the main view and is a Google Cloud product, so a team that ran Entra Permissions Management across three clouds will need more than one tool or a different pick. The situation pages change the order. On the regulated situation Sonrai leads at 5.0 and Act is second at 4.8, with Apono third at 3.8. On the AI agents situation Act leads at 5.2, Sonrai is second at 5.0 and Google Cloud IAM recommender is third at 4.0. Choose the situation closest to yours before you shortlist. Each situation applies its own published weights to the same scores, as the method sets out. | Platform | Main view total | Profile | | --- | --- | --- | | Sonrai Security | 5.2 | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | | Act | 5.2 | [Act](/platforms/act/) | | Google Cloud IAM recommender | 4.0 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | | Apono | 3.9 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | | Britive | 3.5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | | Wiz | 3.4 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | | Tenable Cloud Security | 3.2 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | | P0 Security | 3.1 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | | AWS IAM Access Analyzer | 3.0 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | | CrowdStrike | 2.9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | | Entitle | 2.8 | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | | Sysdig | 2.8 | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | | Prisma Cloud | 2.6 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | ## Choosing a replacement Start from what you used Entra Permissions Management for. If it was reporting on unused permissions across three clouds, a CNAPP module or the Defender CIEM extension covers the reporting. If you relied on its automated right-sizing, check which replacements apply a change themselves and which deliver one for your team to apply. [Reading a vendor least privilege claim](/guides/reading-a-vendor-least-privilege-claim/) gives the questions. Check onboarding too. Microsoft's FAQ describes onboarding to a Microsoft Entra tenant, then AWS accounts, GCP projects and Azure subscriptions. Whatever you pick, plan to export your current findings and policies before any remaining access to the product ends. [The method](/method/) explains the seven criteria behind the totals. Treat the move as a migration with an owner and a date, and start by exporting what the old tool recorded about your accounts. ## Sources - Microsoft Learn, what is Entra Permissions Management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, Entra Permissions Management FAQ: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, CIEM in Defender for Cloud: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, enable permissions management in Defender for Cloud: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/entra-permissions-management-retired/ --- # CIEM tools find excess access in four different ways and finish the job in only some of them Guide, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Cloud infrastructure entitlement management tools compare granted access with used access across cloud accounts. On this index they fall into four groups: permissions firewalls, just-in-time access tools, CNAPP modules and provider tools. The groups differ most in who removes the access once it is found. ## What CIEM is Tenable's account of the term is that Gartner introduced cloud infrastructure entitlement management in 2020 to describe the next generation of solutions for managing access and enforcing least privilege in the cloud. Tenable argues that identity governance and privileged access tools were built for human access to enterprise resources and fall short in public cloud, where developers grant broad entitlements to people and infrastructure to keep delivery moving. In practice a CIEM tool inventories identities, entitlements and resources, compares what is granted with what is used, and reports the gap. Wiz describes the output as effective permissions, resolving relationships into a view of what identities can do in reality, not what policy documents say. The categories below differ in what they do next. Pricing, deployment and the clouds covered differ too, so read each platform profile for its sources. ## Permissions firewalls A permissions firewall turns the usage gap into a block. [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) is the example on this index. Sonrai says its Cloud Permissions Firewall blocks unused privileged permissions, quarantines dormant identities and restricts third-party access through organization-level, cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals in Slack, Teams or email. The ChatOps loop matters because a block with no way to ask for access back would push engineers to bypass the control. Sonrai also says enforcement uses the cloud's own policy types with no proxy or broker, and that nothing enforces until the customer deploys the policies. [Act](/platforms/act/) sits near this group by outcome, since the changes it proposes remove classes of access, but it is read-only and delivers changes as pull requests or tickets for the customer to apply. Sonrai's own materials say its Slack workflow starts after a restriction is in place, when an identity tries a restricted permission. ## Just-in-time access tools These tools attack standing access rather than unused access. Apono, Britive, P0 Security and Entitle describe granting access on request for a limited time and removing it afterward, with approvals in tools such as Slack. Britive and Apono each describe zero standing privileges as a goal on their sites, and Apono lists break-glass access among its flows. Entitle describes approvals in Slack and Teams, and P0 Security describes requests through Slack, a CLI or the web. Just-in-time access shrinks what an attacker finds at any moment, and it fits teams whose main exposure is human administrators. It does less for the permanent permissions that workloads hold, where the question is what a role uses, not who asks. The index ranks these tools on the same seven criteria as the others, so a good request workflow does not hide a weak showing on class-level change. Compare each tool on the criteria rather than on the workflow alone. ## CNAPP modules Wiz, Tenable Cloud Security, Prisma Cloud, CrowdStrike and Sysdig include entitlement analysis inside a broader cloud security platform. Their strength is context: the same graph that holds vulnerabilities and exposure also holds identities, so a permission can be ranked by whether the workload is reachable and sensitive. Wiz and Tenable both say their platforms reveal toxic combinations across misconfigurations, identities and data. Sysdig says it uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use. Context is the real contribution of this group, since the entitlement finding arrives with exposure attached. The trade-off is that the entitlement module is one product among many, and the output is typically a prioritized finding. Posture and CNAPP rankings as such are outside this index, which scores these products only on how much access they remove. Compare them on removal and not on the number of findings. Tenable's own description is that it combines CIEM and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths. ## Provider tools AWS IAM Access Analyzer, the Google Cloud IAM recommender and Microsoft's CIEM extension in Defender for Cloud come from the cloud provider. AWS and Google Cloud tools cover their own cloud, and Microsoft's extension also reads AWS and Google Cloud. They are good at the usage gap: unused roles, keys and permissions, and policy templates from logs. Each provider says the user applies the result. Treat their output as the baseline that any paid platform has to improve on. Microsoft's separate Entra Permissions Management was retired, as [the retirement guide](/guides/entra-permissions-management-retired/) explains. Provider tools make a sound first step before a purchase. [The method](/method/) shows how each group scored across removal, safety, class-level change and the other criteria. Microsoft names the Defender CIEM extension as the route for customers of the retired product. ## Match the category to the exposure If the main risk is a handful of human administrators with permanent rights, just-in-time access addresses it directly. If the risk is thousands of workload roles with broad grants, you need usage-based removal and class-level boundaries. If you already run a CNAPP, test its entitlement module before you buy another product. The five situation pages on this index apply different weights to the same scores. Whichever category you pick, write down who will apply the changes. A report with no owner to apply it ends where findings-only tools end, in a queue. The score for removal in [the method](/method/) exists to separate the products that finish the job from those that hand it back. Ask each shortlisted vendor to show one completed removal in an environment like yours. ## Sources - Tenable blog, protect applications and data with CIEM: https://www.tenable.com/blog/protect-applications-and-data-with-cloud-infrastructure-entitlements-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - Wiz Academy, how to choose a CIEM vendor: https://www.wiz.io/academy/cloud-security/how-to-choose-a-ciem-vendor (read 10 Nov 2026) - Sonrai Security, platform page: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - Apono, home page: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - P0 Security documentation: https://docs.p0.dev (read 10 Nov 2026) - Entitle, home page: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - Sysdig, CIEM solution page: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - Britive, about page: https://www.britive.com/company/about-us (read 10 Nov 2026) - Tenable Cloud Security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - AWS, what is IAM Access Analyzer: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Microsoft Learn, CIEM in Defender for Cloud: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/guides/ciem-tools-explained/ --- # 35 terms, each with a sourced example Glossary, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Plain definitions of the terms in this index, from CIEM and effective access to service control policies, permission boundaries and just-in-time access. Each entry has a sourced example from a cloud provider or vendor page read on 10 Nov 2026. - [Access debt](/glossary/access-debt/): Access debt is the accumulated gap between the access an organization has granted over the years and the access it needs now. - [Access path](/glossary/access-path/): An access path is one route by which an identity can reach a resource: a chain of a role, a trust relationship, a network route and a permission. - [Access review](/glossary/access-review/): An access review is a periodic check, by a manager or owner, that each person or group still needs the access it holds. - [Attack path](/glossary/attack-path/): An attack path is a sequence of steps an attacker could use to get from an entry point to a valuable asset, for example from an exposed workload through its attached identity to a database. - [Blast radius](/glossary/blast-radius/): Blast radius is the set of resources an identity, workload or credential could damage or read if it were compromised. - [Break-glass access](/glossary/break-glass-access/): Break-glass access is a pre-arranged, tightly controlled way to get administrative access in an emergency when normal accounts or approvals are unavailable. - [ChatOps approval](/glossary/chatops-approval/): A ChatOps approval is a request and approval for access carried out in a team chat tool such as Slack or Teams. - [CIEM](/glossary/ciem/): CIEM, cloud infrastructure entitlement management, is the category of tools that inventory who holds which permissions across cloud accounts, compare them with what is used, and report or remove the excess. - [Cloud security intent enforcement](/glossary/cloud-security-intent-enforcement/): Cloud security intent enforcement, abbreviated CSIE, is a category name for turning an intended security boundary into a lasting cloud control, with impact analysis, staged rollout and ongoing management. - [Cross-account access](/glossary/cross-account-access/): Cross-account access lets a principal in one account use resources in another. - [Digital twin (Act's term)](/glossary/digital-twin/): Digital twin is the term Act uses for a model of a customer's cloud environment, built from configuration and access data, against which it says it tests a proposed change before enforcement. - [Dormant identity](/glossary/dormant-identity/): A dormant identity is a user, role or workload identity that still exists and holds permissions but has not been used for a defined period. - [Effective permissions](/glossary/effective-permissions/): Effective permissions are what an identity can actually do once every policy that applies to it has been evaluated together: identity policies, resource policies, boundaries and denies. - [Entitlement](/glossary/entitlement/): An entitlement is a single grant of access: a permission, a role assignment or a policy statement that lets an identity perform an action on a resource. - [Excess permission](/glossary/excess-permission/): An excess permission is a permission an identity holds that its work does not require. - [IAM role](/glossary/iam-role/): An IAM role is an AWS identity with permissions that a person, application or service assumes for a session, receiving temporary credentials. - [Infrastructure as code pull request](/glossary/infrastructure-as-code-pull-request/): An infrastructure as code pull request is a proposed change to Terraform, CloudFormation or similar files, submitted for review before it is applied. - [Inline policy](/glossary/inline-policy/): An inline policy is a policy embedded in a single IAM user, group or role, with a strict one-to-one relationship to that identity. - [Just-in-time access](/glossary/just-in-time-access/): Just-in-time access grants a permission only when it is requested and approved, for a limited time, and removes it afterward. - [Least privilege](/glossary/least-privilege/): Least privilege is the security idea that each person, process or workload receives only the access its function needs and nothing more. - [Non-human identity](/glossary/non-human-identity/): A non-human identity is an identity used by software rather than a person: a role, service account, workload identity or key. - [Permission creep](/glossary/permission-creep/): Permission creep is the slow growth of an identity's permissions as new access is added for new tasks and old access is never taken away. - [Policy drift](/glossary/policy-drift/): Policy drift is the divergence between the policy a team intended and the policy actually deployed in the cloud, caused by console edits, emergency changes and unmanaged accounts. - [Policy simulation](/glossary/policy-simulation/): Policy simulation evaluates a proposed access change against past or hypothetical requests to show who would gain or lose access before the change is made. - [Principle of least privilege](/glossary/principle-of-least-privilege/): The principle of least privilege is the rule, written into control AC-6 of NIST SP 800-53, that systems allow only the accesses necessary to accomplish assigned tasks. - [Privilege escalation](/glossary/privilege-escalation/): Privilege escalation is gaining more access than was granted, usually by using one permission to obtain another, such as assuming a more powerful role or editing a policy. - [Reachability](/glossary/reachability/): Reachability is whether one resource or identity can get to another once network paths and IAM permissions are considered together. - [Right-sizing](/glossary/right-sizing/): Right-sizing is reducing an identity's permissions to match what it uses in ordinary operation. - [Service-linked role](/glossary/service-linked-role/): A service-linked role is a predefined IAM role that an AWS service owns and assumes to call other AWS services for you. - [Standing access](/glossary/standing-access/): Standing access is access that is always on: a role assignment, a group membership or a long-lived key that exists whether or not anyone is working. - [Third-party access](/glossary/third-party-access/): Third-party access is access that an outside company, such as a monitoring or cost vendor, holds to your cloud resources, usually through a role the vendor assumes. - [Toxic combination](/glossary/toxic-combination/): A toxic combination is a set of individually modest findings that together create a path to damage, for example an exposed workload, a known vulnerability and a role that can read sensitive data. - [Unused permission](/glossary/unused-permission/): An unused permission is one an identity holds but has not exercised within a stated observation window. - [Wildcard permission](/glossary/wildcard-permission/): A wildcard permission uses a star to match many actions or resources at once, such as every action of a service. - [Zero standing privileges](/glossary/zero-standing-privileges/): Zero standing privileges is a target state in which no identity holds persistent elevated access. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/ --- # Least privilege Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Least privilege is the security idea that each person, process or workload receives only the access its function needs and nothing more. NIST defines it in its glossary, drawing on CNSSI 4009 and SP 800-53. In the cloud it applies to every role, key and service, and it is measured against what an identity actually uses. ## An example, sourced NIST's glossary entry gives several definitions. One, from NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and CNSSI 4009-2022, reads: the principle that a security architecture is designed so that each entity is granted the minimum system resources and authorizations that the entity needs to perform its function. Another, from NIST SP 800-12 Rev. 1, extends the idea to users and to processes acting on behalf of users. ## Why it matters here Every other term here measures a distance from this one. An index of tools that remove access needs a fixed definition of what removal aims at, and the public NIST wording gives auditors and engineers the same target to check a program against. ## Sources - https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/least_privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/least-privilege/ --- # Principle of least privilege Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** The principle of least privilege is the rule, written into control AC-6 of NIST SP 800-53, that systems allow only the accesses necessary to accomplish assigned tasks. It covers users and the processes acting for them, and it asks organizations to create extra roles and accounts where that is what it takes. ## An example, sourced NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control AC-6, titled Least Privilege, states: employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users, or processes acting on behalf of users, that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks. Its guidance adds that organizations consider creating additional processes, roles and accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege, and that it applies to the development, implementation and operation of systems. ## Why it matters here AC-6 is the control a regulated buyer is asked to evidence. A platform that can show the access held, the access used and the change that closed the gap gives an auditor something to read, which is why this index scores evidence for auditors as a criterion. ## Sources - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/usnistgov/oscal-content/main/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/json/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.json (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/principle-of-least-privilege/ --- # CIEM Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** CIEM, cloud infrastructure entitlement management, is the category of tools that inventory who holds which permissions across cloud accounts, compare them with what is used, and report or remove the excess. Gartner introduced the term in 2020. Products differ mainly in whether they stop at the report. ## An example, sourced Tenable's CIEM blog says that in 2020 Gartner introduced the term cloud infrastructure entitlement management to describe the next generation of solutions for managing access and enforcing least privilege in the cloud. Tenable argues that identity governance and privileged access tools were designed for human access to enterprise resources and fall short in public cloud, where developers grant broad entitlements to people and infrastructure. ## Why it matters here This whole index is a ranking of CIEM and adjacent products. The category label hides the difference that matters, which is whether a product ends with a finding for someone else or with an enforced change. Read the profile pages for what each product does after the report. ## Sources - https://www.tenable.com/blog/protect-applications-and-data-with-cloud-infrastructure-entitlements-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/ciem/ --- # Entitlement Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An entitlement is a single grant of access: a permission, a role assignment or a policy statement that lets an identity perform an action on a resource. Cloud estates hold millions of them, spread across identity-based policies, resource policies and group memberships, which is why they are managed as data. ## An example, sourced Tenable's blog quotes Gartner on the scale of the problem: the number of entitlements across cloud infrastructure is growing in size and complexity as more cloud service provider offerings and services are added. Tenable adds that developers can easily spin up environments and generally grant broad entitlements to both people and infrastructure so that security will not slow them down, which leads to permission creep. ## Why it matters here Entitlements are the unit that every tool on this index counts. Counting them is easy. Deciding which ones can go without breaking a workload is the hard part, and it is where the tools differ. Fewer, broader entitlements are easier to count but harder to remove safely, so a good tool shows what each one is used for. ## Sources - https://www.tenable.com/blog/protect-applications-and-data-with-cloud-infrastructure-entitlements-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/entitlement/ --- # Excess permission Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An excess permission is a permission an identity holds that its work does not require. It may be unused, or used rarely, or granted through a broad role that bundles more than the task needs. Removing it lowers what a stolen credential can do without changing what the owner does. ## An example, sourced Google Cloud's documentation says each role recommendation suggests that you remove or replace a role that gives your principals excess permissions, and that at scale these recommendations help you enforce the principle of least privilege by ensuring principals have only the permissions they actually need. Google states that the IAM recommender identifies excess permissions using policy insights, which are ML-based findings about a principal's permission usage. ## Why it matters here Excess permissions are the raw material of every clean-up program. The questions this index asks are who removes them, how the change is tested first, and whether the removal holds after the next deployment. The count is a starting point for the work and not a measure of the risk, which depends on what the permission reaches. ## Sources - https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/excess-permission/ --- # Unused permission Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An unused permission is one an identity holds but has not exercised within a stated observation window. The window decides the result: a permission used once a quarter looks unused in a 30-day view. Usage-based tools remove or flag these first because the evidence is simple and the argument is short. ## An example, sourced Google Cloud documents that policy insights highlight the permissions in a principal's roles that the principal is not using. The IAM recommender generates them by comparing a principal's total number of permissions with the permissions it used in the last 90 days, or since the role was granted if that was less than 90 days ago. Google also says role recommendations are not generated for every role. ## Why it matters here The window is the claim. When a vendor says it removes unused access, ask how many days of logs it reads and how it treats permissions that run on longer cycles, such as quarter-end jobs or disaster recovery roles. Record the window beside every removal so the next reviewer can see what the data could and could not show. ## Sources - https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/unused-permission/ --- # Effective permissions Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Effective permissions are what an identity can actually do once every policy that applies to it has been evaluated together: identity policies, resource policies, boundaries and denies. They differ from the permissions written in any single policy, and they are the number that matters for risk. ## An example, sourced Wiz's guide to choosing a CIEM vendor says that effective permissions are the only reliable signal of identity risk, and that CIEM calculates them by resolving relationships into a practical view of access. In Wiz's words, it shows what identities can do in reality, not what policy documents say they should be able to do. This is Wiz's position, offered in a buyer's guide for its own category. ## Why it matters here A tool that counts policy text overstates some risks and misses others. Ask whether a product computes effective permissions across policy types, and whether it shows how the result was reached. It also explains why two tools reading the same account can report different numbers, since each may include a different set of policy types. ## Sources - https://www.wiz.io/academy/cloud-security/how-to-choose-a-ciem-vendor (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/effective-permissions/ --- # Attack path Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An attack path is a sequence of steps an attacker could use to get from an entry point to a valuable asset, for example from an exposed workload through its attached identity to a database. Each step may be ordinary. The path is a property of the whole chain. ## An example, sourced Microsoft's documentation defines an attack path as a series of steps a potential attacker uses to breach an environment and access its assets. It starts at an external entry point, such as an internet-exposed vulnerable resource, and follows available lateral movement, such as attached identities with permissions to other resources. Defender for Cloud builds a graph of assets, permissions and network connections to find them. ## Why it matters here Paths turn a long list of findings into a ranking. A path finding is still only a finding: the access is removed when someone changes a policy, a network rule or a trust relationship. Use paths to choose which boundary to build first, then rerun the analysis to confirm the paths are gone. ## Sources - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/attack-path/ --- # Reachability Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Reachability is whether one resource or identity can get to another once network paths and IAM permissions are considered together. A resource may be allowed by policy and unreachable by network, or reachable and denied by policy. Access exists only where both tests pass. ## An example, sourced Act's engineering blog says that to do anything in the cloud, an identity attached to a workload has to pass two tests at once: reachability from the network, and permission in IAM. Act argues these checks are evaluated separately, by separate teams using tools with no shared context, so nobody computes what an identity or a compromised workload can truly reach once both halves are fused. This is Act's framing. ## Why it matters here Reachability is the measure that separates unused access from excess access. A permission that nothing can reach is a lower priority than one on an exposed workload, and a usage count cannot tell the two apart. A model that joins the two is the main difference between identity-only tools and the tools that score highest on the coverage criterion. ## Sources - https://act.security/resources/network-and-identity-each-see-half-your-cloud-your-attacker-sees-both (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/reachability/ --- # Blast radius Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Blast radius is the set of resources an identity, workload or credential could damage or read if it were compromised. It is computed from permissions and network reach together, and it shrinks when access is removed. It is used to prioritize which identities to fix first. ## An example, sourced Act's blog on zero trust for AI agents says Act inventories workloads and AI services, identifies the blast radius of each, and shrinks it with hardening campaigns: guardrails that deny whole classes of cross-environment movement and exfiltration, and ring-fencing, with explicit allow, that contains the blast radius around crown-jewel workloads. The same post says Act models effective access across every boundary, cross-analyzing IAM and network as a single access model. These are Act's statements. ## Why it matters here Blast radius gives a buyer a number to track that is closer to risk than a count of findings. Ask each vendor how it computes the radius and what it includes. Reporting the radius of crown-jewel resources month by month gives an auditor a trend that a findings count cannot give. ## Sources - https://act.security/resources/zero-trust-ai-agents (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/blast-radius/ --- # Privilege escalation Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Privilege escalation is gaining more access than was granted, usually by using one permission to obtain another, such as assuming a more powerful role or editing a policy. It is why a modest-looking permission can be dangerous: the real risk is what it can be turned into. ## An example, sourced A Wiz engineering post on protecting a security baseline says the baseline commonly contains IAM roles from vendors, from your own tooling, or for different teams to gain access to the accounts. The aim is to prevent modification or deletion of these roles, and privilege escalation, where even someone with admin privileges in an account could assume the role in order to take actions that a special role is meant to perform. ## Why it matters here Escalation paths are why unused-access counts understate risk. Ask whether a tool follows role assumption and policy-edit permissions, or only lists the permissions as written. Escalation routes are also why wide boundaries around roles, and not only clean-up of single permissions, are part of a serious program. Ask which routes a tool follows. ## Sources - https://www.wiz.io/blog/using-service-control-policies-to-protect-security-baselines (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/privilege-escalation/ --- # Standing access Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Standing access is access that is always on: a role assignment, a group membership or a long-lived key that exists whether or not anyone is working. It is the opposite of access granted for a task and removed afterward. The risk is what exists when the holder is compromised. ## An example, sourced Sonrai's just-in-time access page says its product eliminates standing privileges with time-limited, approval-based access across cloud environments. Users request access without logging into Sonrai, and the request is approved through ChatOps in Slack, Teams or email. Once granted, Sonrai says, access is immediate and expires automatically. This is Sonrai's own description of its feature, and the page presents it as a way to enforce zero standing privileges without disrupting productivity. ## Why it matters here Standing access is the exposure that just-in-time tools target. It does not replace removal of unused permissions, since a workload's role usually must stay on, and the two programs address different parts of the estate. Unused permissions are the exposure that usage-based removal targets. ## Sources - https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/standing-access/ --- # Just-in-time access Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Just-in-time access grants a permission only when it is requested and approved, for a limited time, and removes it afterward. It shrinks the window in which a stolen account is useful. It works best for human administrators and less well for always-on workloads. ## An example, sourced Microsoft's documentation for Privileged Identity Management says it provides time-based and approval-based role activation to mitigate the risks of excessive, unnecessary or misused access permissions on resources you care about. Listed features include just-in-time privileged access to Microsoft Entra ID and Azure resources, and time-bound access assigned using start and end dates. Google Cloud offers a comparable feature in its Privileged Access Manager. ## Why it matters here Just-in-time access is one of the four product categories on this index. A good approval flow does not substitute for removing the permissions that were never needed, so the index scores both on the same criteria. Compare the tools on removal of existing access as well as on the flow. ## Sources - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/just-in-time-access/ --- # Zero standing privileges Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Zero standing privileges is a target state in which no identity holds persistent elevated access. Rights are created for a task and end with it. Vendors abbreviate it ZSP. It extends just-in-time access from single requests to a rule for the whole estate. ## An example, sourced Wiz's Academy page on just-in-time access says JIT access adds a time dimension to least privilege, controlling how long access exists as well as what it allows, and that this shift moves teams toward zero standing privileges. In practice, it says, engineers still get admin rights when they need them, and those rights simply stop existing once the work is done. Britive and Apono also name zero standing privileges on their own sites. ## Why it matters here The target is easy to state and hard to complete, since workloads and break-glass roles need some access that persists. Ask a vendor what remains standing after its product is deployed. Reported progress should be the count of identities with permanent elevated rights, falling over time, with the exceptions listed. ## Sources - https://www.wiz.io/academy/cloud-security/what-is-just-in-time-jit-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/zero-standing-privileges/ --- # Access review Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An access review is a periodic check, by a manager or owner, that each person or group still needs the access it holds. It is a human attestation. Reviews catch stale access but depend on the reviewer understanding what a permission allows, which is often the weak point. ## An example, sourced Microsoft's documentation says access reviews in Microsoft Entra ID enable organizations to manage group memberships, access to enterprise applications and role assignments efficiently. User access can be reviewed regularly, Microsoft says, to make sure only the right people have continued access. This is a workforce identity feature, and the same discipline applies to cloud roles when an owner can be named for each one. ## Why it matters here NIST AC-6(7) calls for a review of user privileges, and auditors ask for review records. Reviews and automated removal complement each other: the review confirms intent and the tool removes the access that nobody claims. Reviews alone also tend to approve what they do not understand, so pair them with usage data that shows what is actually exercised. ## Sources - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/access-reviews-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/access-review/ --- # Dormant identity Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** A dormant identity is a user, role or workload identity that still exists and holds permissions but has not been used for a defined period. It is attack surface with no owner watching. Tools flag these first because the evidence for removal is plain. ## An example, sourced Apono's documentation for access discovery lists, among its functions, tracking whether principals are active or dormant and flagging overprivileged principals for targeted remediation. Sonrai's platform page says dormant identities are quarantined by automatically restricting permissions through global policies while keeping the identities dormant. Both statements describe the vendors' own products. Apono's page frames the output as an assessment of overprivileged and dormant access, and Sonrai's as a control that restricts it. ## Why it matters here Dormant identities are the lowest-argument removals and a good first target. The thresholds differ by tool, so record the number of idle days that each tool uses before it calls an identity dormant. ## Sources - https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/dormant-identity/ --- # Non-human identity Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** A non-human identity is an identity used by software rather than a person: a role, service account, workload identity or key. Such identities run continuously, are created by pipelines, and often keep broad permissions from development. They outnumber human users in most cloud estates. ## An example, sourced Wiz's guide to choosing a CIEM vendor says that sensitive systems such as data platforms, AI training pipelines and inference endpoints are increasingly driven by non-human identities. These identities operate continuously, Wiz says, and often retain broad permissions granted during development that are never revisited. Microsoft's Defender for Cloud documentation likewise says its CIEM capabilities assess human and application identities, including service principals, managed identities and service accounts. ## Why it matters here A program built around human access reviews misses most of the identities. The index scores how a model of access covers workloads and agents, since their permissions are rarely reviewed by anyone. Ask each vendor whether its model includes keys, roles, service accounts and agents, and how those identities are discovered when no one registered them. ## Sources - https://www.wiz.io/academy/cloud-security/how-to-choose-a-ciem-vendor (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/non-human-identity/ --- # Cross-account access Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Cross-account access lets a principal in one account use resources in another. In AWS it needs a permission on both sides. It is how organizations share data and run central tooling, and also how access spreads past the account boundary that teams assume is a limit. ## An example, sourced AWS documents that you can allow a principal in one account to access resources in a second account, which is called cross-account access. The account where the principal exists is the trusted account and the account where the resource exists is the trusting account. To allow it, you attach a resource-based policy to the resource you want to share, and an identity-based policy to the identity that acts as the principal in the request. ## Why it matters here Because both sides must agree, cross-account paths are easy to miss when a tool reads one account at a time. Ask whether a product models trust relationships across the organization. Review it as a path that crosses the organization, because a boundary drawn per account will not show the second half. ## Sources - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_evaluation-logic-cross-account.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/cross-account-access/ --- # Third-party access Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Third-party access is access that an outside company, such as a monitoring or cost vendor, holds to your cloud resources, usually through a role the vendor assumes. It extends your boundary to someone else's controls, so it needs the same scrutiny as an internal identity. ## An example, sourced AWS's documentation on the confused deputy problem describes the case where you hire a third-party company, called Example Corp, to monitor your account and help optimize costs. You use an IAM role to establish a trusted relationship between your account and the Example Corp account. AWS says one important aspect is the external ID, an optional identifier in the role's trust policy that designates who can assume the role. ## Why it matters here Vendors you onboard become part of your attack surface. Sonrai lists third-party access control as a feature of its permissions firewall, and a review of any index entry should say which outside roles the product itself needs. Keep an inventory of outside roles and their trust conditions, and review it on the same schedule as internal access. ## Sources - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/confused-deputy.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/third-party-access/ --- # Toxic combination Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** A toxic combination is a set of individually modest findings that together create a path to damage, for example an exposed workload, a known vulnerability and a role that can read sensitive data. Vendors use the term to rank findings by how they combine, not by severity alone. ## An example, sourced Tenable's cloud security page says its platform can reveal toxic combinations across misconfigurations, vulnerabilities, identities and sensitive data, and that it correlates cloud risks to reveal toxic combinations that lead to breaches. Tenable says it also combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management and attack paths. These are Tenable's descriptions of its own product, read on 2026-11-10. ## Why it matters here The idea explains why CNAPP platforms rank on context. It also shows their limit for this index: a toxic combination is a prioritized finding, and the index scores whether the access is then removed. Compare tools on what happens after the combination is found: a ticket for someone else, or a change that breaks the combination. ## Sources - https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/toxic-combination/ --- # Access debt Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Access debt is the accumulated gap between the access an organization has granted over the years and the access it needs now. Like other debt it grows by default, because granting is quick and removal needs testing, and it is paid down with a plan instead of a single project. ## An example, sourced Act's home page uses the phrase directly: cloud access debt builds up over years of change, and Act says it clears what has accumulated and sets policies so that it does not sprawl back over time. Act's platform page repeats the claim that it helps security teams clear access debt, prevent drift and enforce the boundaries that protect crown jewels. Both are Act's statements about its own product. ## Why it matters here The term describes why one-time clean-ups fail. A program that does not set a check before production, and a review on a schedule, will rebuild the debt it just removed. The index measures it through the criteria on removal, simulation, class-level change and drift, which together decide whether the debt falls or only moves. ## Sources - https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/access-debt/ --- # Permission creep Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Permission creep is the slow growth of an identity's permissions as new access is added for new tasks and old access is never taken away. It is the usual origin of excess permissions, and it is hard to reverse once an application is in production. ## An example, sourced Tenable's blog says developers can easily spin up environments, generally granting broad entitlements to both people and infrastructure so that security will not slow them down, and that this leads to permission creep which is very difficult to eliminate once an application goes to production. Microsoft's retired Entra Permissions Management published a Permission Creep Index, a measure of risk comparing permissions granted with permissions exercised. ## Why it matters here Creep is why measurement has to repeat. A clean estate this quarter shows creep again next quarter unless the pipeline blocks new excess at the point of change. Treat creep as a rate to measure, not a state to fix once, and track how fast excess returns after each clean-up. ## Sources - https://www.tenable.com/blog/protect-applications-and-data-with-cloud-infrastructure-entitlements-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/permission-creep/ --- # Right-sizing Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Right-sizing is reducing an identity's permissions to match what it uses in ordinary operation. The term comes from infrastructure cost work and is used by CIEM vendors for the removal step. Some tools do it for you, and others hand you a proposed policy. ## An example, sourced Microsoft's Entra Permissions Management FAQ says the product lets users right-size excessive permissions and automate least privilege policy enforcement. It continuously analyzes historical permission usage data for each identity, Microsoft says, and lets customers right-size the permissions of that identity to those only being used for day-to-day operations. Microsoft retired the product, with sales ending April 1, 2025 and retirement set for November 1, 2025. ## Why it matters here Right-sizing is where the claims diverge. Look at the verb: whether the tool right-sizes by applying a change, or by recommending a policy that a person attaches. The index's largest weight, 25 percent, goes to that distinction between a tool that applies the change and one that proposes it. ## Sources - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/right-sizing/ --- # Cloud security intent enforcement Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Cloud security intent enforcement, abbreviated CSIE, is a category name for turning an intended security boundary into a lasting cloud control, with impact analysis, staged rollout and ongoing management. The name was put forward by the analyst firm SACR, and Act uses it for its own approach. ## An example, sourced The SACR report The CISO's Guide to Cloud Security Intent Enforcement says CSIE addresses the gap between knowing what should be secure and ensuring it stays that way. It connects cloud context and security intent with impact analysis, preventive enforcement and ongoing control management, to help organizations prevent unsafe conditions from recurring. SACR says CSIE is not CNAPP 2.0 and not a replacement for posture, detection or runtime platforms. ## Why it matters here This is the category the index treats as its own. The criteria for safe enforcement, one change for a class of risk and staying fixed read as a checklist for the loop SACR describes. Read the SACR report together with the profiles, since the report describes the category and the index scores the vendors one by one. ## Sources - https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/cloud-security-intent-enforcement/ --- # Policy simulation Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Policy simulation evaluates a proposed access change against past or hypothetical requests to show who would gain or lose access before the change is made. It tests outcomes and not policy text. The result is only as good as the logs, the supported resource types and the policy types it covers. ## An example, sourced Google Cloud's Policy Simulator for allow policies determines which access attempts from the last 90 days have different results under a proposed allow policy than under the current one, then reports them as a list of access changes. It replays the logged attempts twice, once under each policy, and compares the results. Google documents limits: a simulation fails above 5,000 access logs, and unsupported resource types are listed as not simulated. ## Why it matters here Simulation is what makes removal safe enough to approve, and the index gives it 20 percent of the weight. Ask each vendor what its simulation replays and what it cannot cover. A simulation that passes is evidence for the approver, and the record of what it replayed belongs with the change. ## Sources - https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/policy-simulation/ --- # Policy drift Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Policy drift is the divergence between the policy a team intended and the policy actually deployed in the cloud, caused by console edits, emergency changes and unmanaged accounts. Drift quietly reopens access that a clean-up closed, so tools that hold the intended policy compare it with the live one. ## An example, sourced Act's platform page lists policy drift management among its capabilities: see every policy change with the investigation already done, and roll back if needed. The SACR report on cloud security intent enforcement says Act identifies policy drift and shows the differences between the policies stored in Act and their cloud versions, and presents violations management and time-bound waiver requests as near-term roadmap items. ## Why it matters here Drift is the reason the index scores whether access stays fixed. A removal that holds for a week proves little. Ask how the product learns that a policy changed and who is told. Drift can also be caused by the pipeline itself, so the comparison should cover every source of change and not only console edits. ## Sources - https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/policy-drift/ --- # Digital twin (Act's term) Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Digital twin is the term Act uses for a model of a customer's cloud environment, built from configuration and access data, against which it says it tests a proposed change before enforcement. It is Act's own label and not a standard technical term. ## An example, sourced Act's platform page describes its simulation capability this way: test changes against a digital twin to see their exact impact before enforcing, ensuring nothing breaks. The same page says changes can run in audit mode to confirm that no legitimate access is revoked. The SACR report adds that Act's simulation uses cloud configuration data, while audit mode uses audit-log events observed against the policy. The term is Act's marketing label for this model. ## Why it matters here Treat it as a claim to test. Ask what the twin contains, how fresh it is, and which dependencies it cannot see. SACR lists rarely used or undocumented dependencies as an area still needing validation. Held as a claim, the twin is tested like any other: by comparing its predictions with what happens in audit mode before enforcement. ## Sources - https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/digital-twin/ --- # Break-glass access Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Break-glass access is a pre-arranged, tightly controlled way to get administrative access in an emergency when normal accounts or approvals are unavailable. It is deliberately outside the normal flow, so it is monitored closely and used rarely. It is one of the few places where standing access is justified. ## An example, sourced Microsoft's Entra documentation says to reduce the impact of accidental lack of administrative access by creating two or more emergency access accounts. Use them only for emergency, or break glass, scenarios where normal administrative accounts cannot be used, and restrict their use to the times when it is absolutely necessary. Microsoft notes these accounts hold the Global Administrator role, which has high privileges in the system. ## Why it matters here A least privilege program has to leave room for this route and still account for it. Check that a tool can show the break-glass roles, who can reach them and when they were last used. The roles are small in number and large in power, which is why they belong on the list that a program reviews first. ## Sources - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/break-glass-access/ --- # Access path Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An access path is one route by which an identity can reach a resource: a chain of a role, a trust relationship, a network route and a permission. A resource usually has many. Removing a path requires breaking one link, and one change at the right layer can break many. ## An example, sourced Act's home page says its guided, structured campaigns eliminate thousands of access paths and protect crown jewels with a single policy change. The SACR report on Act describes its Access Map as combining identity, network, resource and organizational controls and as separating configured, effective and observed access. These are the vendor's and the analyst's descriptions, and the counts are not independently checked here. ## Why it matters here Counting paths is how a class-level change is shown to be worth its risk. A claim of thousands of paths should come with the model that counted them and a simulation of the removal. The path view also helps a reviewer decide which link to cut, since the cheapest link is not always the one nearest the resource. ## Sources - https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/access-path/ --- # ChatOps approval Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** A ChatOps approval is a request and approval for access carried out in a team chat tool such as Slack or Teams. The engineer asks for access in a message, an approver accepts or declines in the same place, and the system changes the permission and records the decision. ## An example, sourced Sonrai's platform page says that a restricted privilege can be restored in minutes through automated ChatOps request and approval workflows, and that the workflows handle requests, approvals and policy updates. Sonrai's materials add that the Slack workflow starts when an identity tries a restricted permission, which means after the restriction is in place, and that the Sonrai for Slack integration is free to customers with the Cloud Permissions Firewall. ## Why it matters here Exceptions are where enforcement programs lose the engineers. The index scores whether exceptions are handled in the team's own tools, because a block with no easy way to ask for access invites workarounds. Sonrai and Act both describe request flows in the team's own tools, though Sonrai's starts after a block and Act's materials describe waivers as roadmap. ## Sources - https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/chatops-approval/ --- # Infrastructure as code pull request Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An infrastructure as code pull request is a proposed change to Terraform, CloudFormation or similar files, submitted for review before it is applied. For access control it carries the policy change as text, with a reviewer, a date and a history, and a pipeline applies it after approval. ## An example, sourced Act's platform page lists native enforcement as deploying directly as pull requests to your existing infrastructure as code, Terraform and CloudFormation, using the cloud-native controls you already own. Act says it has read-only access to the cloud, and the SACR report says changes go through Terraform, coding agents, tickets and DevOps workflows. Act also publishes a Terraform provider for managing its deployments as code. ## Why it matters here The pull request puts the last step in the customer's hands. That gives a reviewer and a record, and it also means the removal waits for the customer's merge, which is the difference the removal criterion scores. Compare tools on who merges, and on whether the change was simulated before the request was opened. ## Sources - https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/infrastructure-as-code-pull-request/ --- # IAM role Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An IAM role is an AWS identity with permissions that a person, application or service assumes for a session, receiving temporary credentials. It has no password or long-term keys of its own. Roles are the main place where workload permissions accumulate in AWS. ## An example, sourced AWS documents that an IAM role is an identity you can create in your account with specific permissions. It is similar to an IAM user, but instead of being uniquely associated with one person, a role is intended to be assumable by anyone who needs it. A role carries no standard long-term credentials, such as a password or access keys. When you assume a role, it provides temporary security credentials for the role session. ## Why it matters here Most excess permission in AWS sits in roles that were broad when created. A removal program reads each role's trust policy and permissions together, and checks who can assume it. The trust policy decides who may become the role, and the permissions decide what it can do, so both belong in any least privilege review. ## Sources - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/iam-role/ --- # Wildcard permission Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** A wildcard permission uses a star to match many actions or resources at once, such as every action of a service. It is convenient to write and hard to audit, since it grants whatever the service adds later. Expanding wildcards into the list of actions they cover is a common first step. ## An example, sourced AWS's documentation for the IAM policy Action element says you can use multi-character match wildcards and single-character match wildcards to give access to all the actions a specific AWS product offers. It gives the example of an action value of s3 followed by a colon and a star, and notes that wildcards can also be used as part of the action name, as in an iam action matching any access key operation. ## Why it matters here Wildcards are why reading policy text misstates access. Some tools expand them to show what a policy really grants, and Act publishes a free tool for that, called IAM Expand. Ask whether a vendor expands wildcards before it scores a role, since a star can hide most of the access. ## Sources - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_action.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/wildcard-permission/ --- # Inline policy Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** An inline policy is a policy embedded in a single IAM user, group or role, with a strict one-to-one relationship to that identity. It is deleted when the identity is deleted. Because each copy is separate, inline policies drift apart and are harder to review at scale than shared policies. ## An example, sourced AWS's documentation says an inline policy is a policy created for a single IAM identity, a user, user group or role, that maintains a strict one-to-one relationship between the policy and the identity, and is deleted when the identity is deleted. It adds that if a policy could apply to more than one entity, it is better to use a managed policy. AWS's diagram shows two roles that include the same policy, each with its own copy. ## Why it matters here Inline policies hide excess from tools that scan managed policies only. When a vendor claims coverage, ask whether it reads inline policies and whether it can change them. Record how many inline policies exist, because each one has to be changed on its own. ## Sources - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_managed-vs-inline.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/inline-policy/ --- # Service-linked role Glossary term, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** A service-linked role is a predefined IAM role that an AWS service owns and assumes to call other AWS services for you. The service defines its permissions, and you can view but not edit them. It is an access path that exists by design, and a clean-up must know which ones to leave alone. ## An example, sourced AWS documents that a service-linked role is a unique type of IAM role linked directly to an AWS service. Service-linked roles are predefined by the service and include all the permissions the service requires to call other AWS services on your behalf. The linked service also defines how you create, modify and delete the role. AWS says an IAM administrator can view, but not edit, the permissions for service-linked roles. ## Why it matters here These roles are the usual false positive in a least privilege report. A tool should mark them as service-owned, so an engineer is not asked to trim permissions that cannot be changed. Check how a vendor handles roles it cannot change, since a report that cannot be acted on erodes the team's trust in the rest. ## Sources - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_create-service-linked-role.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/glossary/service-linked-role/ --- # What changed in the last 90 days News, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Dated news that changes the index: acquisitions, retirements, renames and product releases among the 14 platforms, such as Apono joining 1Password in June 2026 and Entra Permissions Management retiring. Each item names its source and the date the page was read. - [Wiz reports abuse of Qubole cross-account IAM roles in customer AWS accounts](/news/wiz-qubole-cross-account-role-abuse/): 9 Nov 2026 - [AWS explains cross-partition role access with IAM outbound federation](/news/aws-cross-partition-iam-outbound-federation/): 9 Nov 2026 - [AWS introduces account access manager for IAM roles and Identity Center](/news/aws-account-access-manager-security-blog/): 5 Nov 2026 - [IAM Roles Anywhere adds automatic certificate revocation checking](/news/iam-roles-anywhere-crl-revocation-checking/): 5 Nov 2026 - [Act research finds Azure object replication can be used to exfiltrate data](/news/act-replicaheist-azure-cross-tenant-replication/): 3 Nov 2026 - [Act Security named to the Fortune Cyber 60 list for 2026](/news/act-fortune-cyber-60-2026/): 1 Nov 2026 - [Google Cloud IAM Admin, Writer and Reader basic roles reach GA](/news/google-iam-admin-writer-reader-basic-roles-ga/): 29 Oct 2026 - [Act publishes The CISO's Guide to Cloud Security Intent Enforcement](/news/act-csie-ciso-guide-software-analyst/): 28 Oct 2026 - [Apono adds just-in-time access for AWS IAM Account Access Manager](/news/apono-just-in-time-aws-iam-account-access-manager/): 14 Oct 2026 - [BeyondTrust and Forcepoint link identity risk to data exposure](/news/beyondtrust-forcepoint-revoke-risky-access/): 8 Oct 2026 - [Apono partners with Databricks on just-in-time access to the lakehouse](/news/apono-databricks-just-in-time-access/): 30 Sep 2026 - [Google Cloud adds Policy Assist API for IAM role suggestions](/news/google-policy-assist-api-iam-role-suggestions/): 9 Sep 2026 - [IAM Policy Autopilot can generate policies from Terraform plan files](/news/iam-policy-autopilot-terraform-plan-files/): 18 Aug 2026 - [AWS IAM role manager sets up service roles automatically](/news/aws-iam-role-manager-generally-available/): 12 Aug 2026 Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/ --- # Wiz reports abuse of Qubole cross-account IAM roles in customer AWS accounts News, 9 Nov 2026 **In short.** Wiz published research on 9 November 2026 saying a threat actor used IAM credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to assume integration roles in customer AWS environments between 14 and 26 October. Wiz describes what it observed and how to hunt for it. Wiz published a blog post dated 9 November 2026, by Zack Morrow, Sean Johnstone and Benjamin Read, on Qubole cross-account access abused in the wild. Working with Sentra and Mandiant, Wiz says it saw a threat actor using IAM credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole between October 14 and October 26, 2026, to assume IAM roles that customers had created to trust that account. Wiz notes that most of the roles assumed were not otherwise in use, and that the trust policies were still in place, so the requests succeeded. The actor enumerated services, looked for credentials and read from S3 buckets the roles could reach. For least privilege reviews, the post is a reminder to audit third-party trust relationships and unused integration roles, which Wiz says it covers in its guidance. ## Sources - https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/wiz-qubole-cross-account-role-abuse/ --- # AWS explains cross-partition role access with IAM outbound federation News, 9 Nov 2026 **In short.** AWS Security Blog said on 9 November 2026 that tokens from IAM outbound federation can now be used to assume roles in other AWS partitions, such as GovCloud, China and the European Sovereign Cloud. Workloads exchange a short-lived JWT for temporary credentials, with no long-term credentials to store or rotate. An AWS Security Blog post dated 9 November 2026 says you can now use tokens from IAM outbound federation to assume roles in other AWS partitions. AWS explains that partitions such as Commercial, China, GovCloud (US) and European Sovereign Cloud are hard isolation boundaries with independent instances of IAM, so direct role assumption with sts:AssumeRole does not work across them. A workload in one partition obtains a short-lived JWT with sts:GetWebIdentityToken and exchanges it for temporary credentials in another partition with sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity, according to the post. The walkthrough uses S3 access as its example and tells readers to consult their compliance team first. It removes one reason teams kept long-term access keys across partitions, which matters for credential reduction. ## Sources - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/simplify-cross-partition-access-with-aws-iam-outbound-identity-federation/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/aws-cross-partition-iam-outbound-federation/ --- # AWS introduces account access manager for IAM roles and Identity Center News, 5 Nov 2026 **In short.** AWS introduced account access manager in an AWS Security Blog post dated 5 November 2026. It assigns existing IAM roles to workforce users and groups through IAM Identity Center, keeps custom trust policies, tags and paths, and attributes each role session to the individual user. The AWS Security Blog post, dated 5 November 2026, says IAM is introducing account access manager, a new way to manage workforce access to AWS accounts. It combines the flexibility of IAM roles with the centralized federation of IAM Identity Center and user-level visibility. Administrators create an entitlement that links a user or group to a specific role in an account. AWS says users can keep attribute-based access control, precise trust policies and role paths, and that each role session carries user context so actions are attributed to the individual. It uses its own account-access API namespace with separate permissions and CloudTrail events. For least privilege work, access becomes assignable per user and role, so tools that request or time-limit access can build on it. ## Sources - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-aws-account-access-manager-iam-role-flexibility-with-centralized-workforce-access/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/aws-account-access-manager-security-blog/ --- # IAM Roles Anywhere adds automatic certificate revocation checking News, 5 Nov 2026 **In short.** AWS announced on 5 November 2026 that IAM Roles Anywhere can check certificate revocation automatically using CRL distribution points. When enabled on a trust anchor, it reads the CDP URLs in certificates, downloads the lists, refreshes them and denies credential requests that use revoked certificates. AWS announced on 5 November 2026 that IAM Roles Anywhere supports automatic revocation checking using certificate revocation list distribution points. When you enable it on a trust anchor, Roles Anywhere reads the CDP URLs embedded in authenticating certificates, downloads the corresponding CRLs, and denies credential requests that use revoked certificates. It works with AWS Private CA or your own PKI if certificates include publicly accessible CDP URLs. Previously you had to import CRLs and re-import them each time your certificate authority published an update. AWS says the new capability refreshes lists periodically, costs nothing extra and is available in all commercial Regions. Roles Anywhere gives workloads outside AWS temporary role credentials, so keeping revoked certificates from obtaining them is part of limiting who holds access. ## Sources - https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2026/11/iam-roles-anywhere-cdp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/iam-roles-anywhere-crl-revocation-checking/ --- # Act research finds Azure object replication can be used to exfiltrate data News, 3 Nov 2026 **In short.** Act Security's research team published ReplicaHeist on 3 November 2026. It reports that Azure object replication, a normal feature for copying blobs between storage accounts, can become a quiet data exfiltration or poisoning channel. The post says one storage account property, allowCrossTenantReplication, is the whole boundary. Act Security's resources list shows ReplicaHeist: Inside Azure's Cross-Tenant Data Exfiltration Technique, by Roy Matan, dated 3 November 2026. Act's research team says Azure object replication, a normal feature for copying blobs between storage accounts, can be turned into a quiet exfiltration or poisoning channel. The post says the copy runs inside Azure's storage backend, so egress firewalls, DLP and proxy logs do not see it. Act's post adds that accounts created before 15 December 2023 default the allowCrossTenantReplication property to null, which Azure treats as true, while newer accounts default to false. It points to that property as the control to check. This is a vendor research finding, and the owner of an Azure environment would need to check their own accounts and Microsoft's documentation. ## Sources - https://act.security/blog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/act-replicaheist-azure-cross-tenant-replication/ --- # Act Security named to the Fortune Cyber 60 list for 2026 News, 1 Nov 2026 **In short.** Act Security announced on 1 November 2026 that it is on the Fortune Cyber 60 list for 2026. Act says it was selected from over 300 cybersecurity startups, and describes itself as the action-centric cloud security company recognized for eliminating cloud risk at the source. Act Security posted a news item dated 1 November 2026 titled Act Security is on the Fortune Cyber 60 list for 2026. The company says it was selected from over 300 cybersecurity startups and describes itself as the action-centric cloud security company recognized for eliminating cloud risk at the source. The saved page carries only this summary line and the date, with no further text about the ranking or how it was compiled. A list placement is a recognition claim from the vendor, and the page does not describe the selection criteria, so it says little about how the product performs in a given cloud account. For a buyer comparing least privilege platforms, it is a data point about market attention to Act, and should be weighed after product evidence such as documentation and trials. ## Sources - https://act.security/resources/act-security-is-on-the-fortune-cyber-60-list-for-2026 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/act-fortune-cyber-60-2026/ --- # Google Cloud IAM Admin, Writer and Reader basic roles reach GA News, 29 Oct 2026 **In short.** Google Cloud made the Admin, Writer and Reader basic roles generally available on 29 October 2026. Google recommends them over the legacy Owner, Editor and Viewer roles when a basic role is needed, because the newer roles support IAM Conditions, while the legacy roles remain available. Google Cloud's IAM release notes record on 29 October 2026 that the Admin (roles/admin), Writer (roles/writer) and Reader (roles/reader) basic roles are generally available. The legacy basic roles, Owner, Editor and Viewer, are still available and actively maintained, according to the note, with no retirement date given in that entry. Google presents the new roles as the better starting choice for new grants of basic access. Google adds that if you need to grant a basic role, it recommends Admin, Writer or Reader over a legacy basic role, because the newer roles support additional features such as IAM Conditions. Basic roles remain broad, so granting one is rarely a least privilege choice. The change gives teams that still need them a way to add conditions, such as time limits, to those grants. ## Sources - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/release-notes (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/google-iam-admin-writer-reader-basic-roles-ga/ --- # Act publishes The CISO's Guide to Cloud Security Intent Enforcement News, 28 Oct 2026 **In short.** Act Security posted a news item dated 28 October 2026 titled The CISO's Guide to Cloud Security Intent Enforcement. It describes Cloud Security Intent Enforcement as addressing the gap between knowing what should be secure and ensuring it stays that way, moving from reactive remediation to proactive control. Act Security's resources page lists The CISO's Guide to Cloud Security Intent Enforcement as a news item dated 28 October 2026. Its subtitle reads From Reactive Remediation to Proactive Control. Act says Cloud Security Intent Enforcement, or CSIE, addresses the gap between knowing what should be secure and ensuring it stays that way. The saved copy of the page holds this summary and the date only. The saved page does not name an author or a report publisher, so it reads as Act's own description. For readers, CSIE is the label Act uses for enforcing intended access boundaries up front instead of remediating findings afterward, which is the general idea behind least privilege tooling. ## Sources - https://act.security/resources/the-cisos-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/act-csie-ciso-guide-software-analyst/ --- # Apono adds just-in-time access for AWS IAM Account Access Manager News, 14 Oct 2026 **In short.** Apono said on 14 October 2026 that it supports AWS IAM Account Access Manager from day one. Apono provides just-in-time provisioning for existing IAM roles bound through IAM Identity Center, works binding-only without authoring or cloning permission policies, and leaves SCP, RCP and trust-policy references stable. Apono's blog post, dated 14 October 2026 and written by Elad Plachzinsky, says AWS shipped AWS IAM Account Access Manager, or AAM, a way to grant AWS access through IAM Identity Center using IAM roles. Apono says it supports AAM from day one and brings just-in-time provisioning to the IAM roles teams already use, instead of permission sets, which have policy size limits and per-organization caps. Apono states that it is binding-only: it discovers which roles are AAM-eligible, handles the trust policy work and adds just-in-time access, but never authors or clones the permission policy. It also notes that SCP, RCP and trust-policy references stay stable because role names and paths do not change. This is a vendor integration announcement, and the page does not give pricing or availability dates. ## Sources - https://www.apono.io/blog/apono-brings-just-in-time-access-to-aws-iam-account-access-manager/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/apono-just-in-time-aws-iam-account-access-manager/ --- # BeyondTrust and Forcepoint link identity risk to data exposure News, 8 Oct 2026 **In short.** BeyondTrust and Forcepoint announced an integration on 8 October 2026 that pairs Forcepoint data discovery and classification with BeyondTrust Identity Security Insights. When risky privilege is found on a user, service account or AI agent, customers can cut that one identity's access to the affected data. BeyondTrust published a press release dated 8 October 2026 saying it and Forcepoint have integrated Forcepoint's AI-native data discovery and classification with BeyondTrust Identity Security Insights. The companies say the integration is available now. When BeyondTrust detects risk across a human, machine or AI identity based on behavior, privilege or compromised credentials, Forcepoint shows the sensitive information that identity can reach. Customers can then use Forcepoint controls to cut off that identity's access to the specific records involved without affecting anyone else. The release says BeyondTrust maps the inherited entitlements and shadow paths behind each identity, and Forcepoint ranks identities by the value of the data they can touch. The release is a vendor announcement and does not give customer results or pricing. ## Sources - https://www.beyondtrust.com/press/beyondtrust-forcepoint-identity-risk-data-exposure (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/beyondtrust-forcepoint-revoke-risky-access/ --- # Apono partners with Databricks on just-in-time access to the lakehouse News, 30 Sep 2026 **In short.** Apono announced a partnership with Databricks on 30 September 2026. The integration brings just-in-time and just-enough-access provisioning to Databricks Groups, so engineers and AI agents can hold access only for a task, with requests through Slack, Teams, Jira or the CLI and automatic revocation. Apono's blog post, dated 30 September 2026, says the company is partnering with Databricks to bring just-in-time and just-enough-access provisioning to Databricks Groups. Apono says it discovers Groups as they are created, and that a data analyst can request access to a table with customer PII through Slack, Teams, Jira or the CLI, be placed in the right group automatically and lose access after an hour. The post also describes the same model for AI agents, scoping access to the agent's task and blocking or escalating actions that deviate from what it declared. It says Apono will be part of the 1Password Unified Access platform. These are Apono's own descriptions of a partnership, and the page does not report customer results or availability by region. ## Sources - https://www.apono.io/blog/apono-partners-with-databricks-to-govern-privileged-access-across-the-lakehouse/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/apono-databricks-just-in-time-access/ --- # Google Cloud adds Policy Assist API for IAM role suggestions News, 9 Sep 2026 **In short.** Google Cloud released the Policy Assist API in Preview on 9 September 2026. It returns IAM role suggestions from Gemini for individual principals, so teams can ask programmatically which predefined role fits a need instead of picking a broad role by hand. Google Cloud's IAM release notes, in an entry dated 9 September 2026, say you can get IAM role suggestions from Gemini programmatically by using the Policy Assist API, which is in Preview. The entry links to documentation on getting predefined role suggestions with Gemini assistance and to the Policy Assist REST reference, so the feature is documented for programmatic use. Policy Intelligence release notes of the same date add that Policy Assist lets you get IAM role suggestions for individual principals with AI assistance, and that a Policy Assist remote MCP server is also in Preview. For least privilege work, role suggestion is the step between a permission request and a grant, and Google marks it as Preview, so output should be reviewed by a person before it is applied. ## Sources - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/release-notes (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/google-policy-assist-api-iam-role-suggestions/ --- # IAM Policy Autopilot can generate policies from Terraform plan files News, 18 Aug 2026 **In short.** AWS announced on 18 August 2026 that IAM Policy Autopilot can generate baseline IAM policies directly from a Terraform plan file. The open source tool scopes policies to the resources in the plan, using specific ARNs instead of wildcards where possible, runs on your own machine and costs nothing. AWS announced on 18 August 2026 that IAM Policy Autopilot can now generate baseline IAM policies directly from a Terraform plan file. The open source tool, launched at re:Invent 2025, analyzes code to create scoped-down policies you can refine over time. Until now it analyzed application source code, but could not generate policies for deploying infrastructure defined as code, which left a gap for deployment roles. With a plan file as input, AWS says Autopilot applies a deterministic analysis and produces a policy scoped to the create, read, update and delete functions of the resources in that plan, referencing specific resource ARNs rather than wildcards when possible. AWS describes this as the most requested capability since launch, adding that the policies reference specific ARNs when possible. It runs locally at no additional cost, so teams can try it on a deployment role without sending code anywhere. ## Sources - https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2026/08/iam-policy-autopilot-now-supports-terraform-plan-files (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/iam-policy-autopilot-terraform-plan-files/ --- # AWS IAM role manager sets up service roles automatically News, 12 Aug 2026 **In short.** AWS announced on 12 August 2026 the general availability of role manager in IAM. It creates or reuses a default role when you set up a supported service in the console, supports 6 service consoles at launch, and points to IAM Access Analyzer for narrowing each role later. AWS announced general availability of role manager on 12 August 2026, a capability in IAM that automatically sets up the roles AWS services need. When you set up a supported service in the console, role manager creates a default role or reuses an existing one that matches the required permissions. It supports 6 service consoles at launch, including AWS Lambda and Amazon EventBridge, and is enabled by default for accounts created with the new AWS experience. Roles created by role manager show up as standard IAM roles you control. AWS says that when you are ready to tighten permissions, you can disable role manager and use IAM Access Analyzer to refine each role to only the permissions it needs. It is not available in GovCloud or China Regions. The starting point is a managed template, so reduction to least privilege remains a later step. ## Sources - https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2026/08/aws-iam-role-manager (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/news/aws-iam-role-manager-generally-available/ --- # 30 questions, answered from the data FAQ, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Thirty answers to the questions a head of cloud security asks about cloud least privilege: what CIEM is, why clean-up projects stall, how the index is scored, why Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2, and how just-in-time access differs from removing standing access. **What is CIEM?** CIEM, cloud infrastructure entitlement management, is the discipline and the tooling that finds which cloud identities hold which permissions, which of those permissions are used, and what each identity can reach. Most CIEM products end in a report of excess access. This index asks the next question: does the product remove the access, and can you test the removal first? **What does least privilege mean in AWS?** In AWS it means each IAM role, user and policy grants only the actions and resources the workload needs. Practically it is reached with usage data (IAM Access Analyzer generates a policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity), organization-level controls such as service control policies and resource control policies, and permission boundaries that cap what a role can ever be given. **Why do least privilege projects stall?** The usual cause is that findings outnumber the people who can act on them, and each fix needs an owner and a test. A role that looks unused may run a quarterly job. Without a way to simulate a change, teams hesitate. That is why the index weights safe to enforce at 20 and one change for a class of risk at 15. **How is the Least Privilege Index scored?** Each of 14 platforms gets an integer from 0 to 10 on seven criteria, from facts read on its own pages and documentation. The weights were fixed on 10 Nov 2026 before any scoring: removes 25, safe 20, class 15, fixed 15, coverage 10, native 10, audit 5. A total is the weighted average, rounded to one decimal. **Why do Sonrai Security and Act tie for first?** Both total 5.2. Sonrai is listed first because it is ahead before rounding, 5.20 against 5.15. Sonrai scores 5 on removes against Act's 3, plus leads on native controls and audit. Act scores 7 on safe to enforce against 5 and 6 on coverage against 4. Those leads nearly cancel on the main weights. **Why does Sonrai Security lead on three of the five situations?** On AWS at scale, regulated and small team, coverage, where Act leads, weighs 7.5 instead of 10, and class, audit or removes weighs more than on the main index. Sonrai applies the change itself, scoring 5 on removes against Act's 3. Act is read-only and the customer applies each change. Sonrai totals 5.3, 5.0 and 5.3 on those pages, against Act's 5.2, 4.8 and 5.1. **Is Act a CNAPP?** No. Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply. **Does Act change my cloud directly?** No. Act's own material says it currently operates with read-only access and routes changes through Terraform, coding agents, tickets and existing DevOps workflows. Rollback and direct-cloud enforcement are described as active product discussions. Your team applies each change, which is why Act scores 3 on removes. **What is cloud security intent enforcement?** It is a label from Software Analyst Cyber Research for the control layer that turns a security goal into a tested preventive control, applies it at an enforcement point, and keeps it in place. The report is dated 28 October 2026 and calls the field emerging. On this index, Act and Sonrai Security score 7 on class. **Is Microsoft Entra Permissions Management still available?** No. Microsoft's page says it stopped being available for purchase on 1 April 2025 and was to be retired, with support discontinued, on 1 November 2025. CIEM continues in Microsoft Defender for Cloud, in the Defender CSPM plan, and the index scores Microsoft on that. Microsoft totals 1.8. **What replaces Entra Permissions Management?** Microsoft points to CIEM in Defender for Cloud. It evaluates effective permissions and gives recommendations for inactive identities and overprovisioned permissions. Microsoft's pages also say it will stop publishing unused permission action details from 6 August 2026. Teams that want enforcement beyond recommendations compare it with the other 13 platforms. **What is the difference between just-in-time access and removing standing access?** Just-in-time access grants a permission for a task and expires it, so new access is not left standing. Removing standing access takes away what is already granted and unused. Just-in-time access on its own leaves the old grants until someone deletes them. Apono, Britive, Entitle and P0 do the first well; the second needs a boundary or a clean-up. **What does read-only mean for a least privilege tool?** It means the tool inspects your cloud with read permissions and cannot write to it. Act and Sonrai Security both say they need only read-only access to discover. The difference is the next step: Sonrai deploys its blocking policies once the customer approves, while Act delivers a pull request or ticket for the customer to apply. **What is a service control policy?** A service control policy, or SCP, is an AWS Organizations policy that sets the maximum permissions for accounts in an organization or OU. It does not grant access; it limits it, whatever an account's own IAM says. Sonrai Security and Act both name SCPs among the native controls they use. **What is a resource control policy?** A resource control policy, or RCP, is an AWS Organizations policy that sets the maximum permissions on resources in member accounts, for example to block third-party access to S3 buckets across an organization. Sonrai Security says it uses RCPs for one-click boundaries on third-party access, and Act names RCPs among its controls. **Why does the index weight removes highest?** Removes access carries 25 of 100 points because a finding that nobody acts on leaves the risk in place. The question is whether the product ends in an enforced change. The weight was fixed before any vendor was scored. Sonrai Security, Apono, Britive, Entitle, P0 and Tenable score 5, the top score in the index. **Which platform is best for a small cloud security team?** On the small-team weights, Sonrai Security leads at 5.3, Act is second at 5.1 and Apono is third at 3.8. Removes weighs 27.5 on that page, so the platform that applies the change itself gains most. Act's lead on safe to enforce is worth 0.35, which is less than Sonrai's 0.55 on removes. **Which platform is best for AI agents?** On the AI-agents weights, Act leads at 5.2, Sonrai Security is second at 5.0 and Google Cloud IAM recommender third at 4.0. Identity, network and AI coverage weighs 22.5 there, and Act scores 6 on it against Sonrai's 4. The analyst report read says Act's customer evidence for AI boundaries is less mature. **Can a free tool get an AWS estate to least privilege?** Part of the way. AWS IAM Access Analyzer finds unused roles, keys and passwords, recommends refined policies and checks new policies in CI/CD, and it scores 3.0 on the index. It does not apply a policy for you, and generated policies leave out action-level data events such as S3 data events. It is AWS only. **What does the Google Cloud IAM recommender do?** It suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Google's documentation says it does not apply recommendations automatically: a person reviews and applies or dismisses each. Policy Simulator shows how a change affects access before it is made. It totals 4.0, third in the index, and covers Google Cloud only. **Did Wiz acquire a least privilege capability?** Wiz includes CIEM in its Cloud and AI Security Platform and generates least privilege policies and pull requests. Wiz is now part of Google Cloud, which completed the acquisition on 11 March 2026 according to the source read. The analyst report says a generated fix is not an applied control until it reaches the customer's pipeline. Wiz totals 3.4. **What happened to Ermetic?** Tenable closed its acquisition of Ermetic in 2023. The product page at the Tenable Cloud Security address is now titled Tenable One Cloud Exposure, a CNAPP with CIEM and just-in-time access. The index lists it as Tenable Cloud Security, formerly Ermetic, and it totals 3.2, with 5 on removes and 0 on native. **Who owns Apono now?** Apono announced on 15 June 2026 that it joined 1Password, and its pages now read as part of 1Password. Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents and revokes it automatically. It totals 3.9, fourth in the index, with 5 on removes and 3 on safe. **Is Entitle part of BeyondTrust?** Yes. BeyondTrust announced a definitive agreement to acquire Entitle on 16 April 2024, and the product is sold as BeyondTrust Entitle as part of the BeyondTrust Pathfinder Platform. Entitle provides time-limited privileged access with approvals in Slack and Teams. It totals 2.8, with 5 on removes and 0 on safe. **What is Prisma Cloud's relationship to Cortex Cloud?** Palo Alto Networks markets Cortex Cloud as the next version of Prisma Cloud, bringing together cloud detection and response with Prisma Cloud's CNAPP. Prisma Cloud's pages and documentation were still live on 2026-11-10, so the index scores Prisma Cloud. It totals 2.6, and Prisma Cloud's documentation says automatic remediation for Google Cloud IAM alerts is not supported. **How do I test a permission change before enforcing it?** Use a simulator or a dry run that lists what would break. Google Cloud's Policy Simulator does this for allow, deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, one type at a time. Act says it simulates each change against a digital twin and runs audit mode on log data. The index gives safe to enforce 20 points. **What evidence do auditors want for access boundaries?** They want the boundary mapped to a named control (PCI DSS, HIPAA, NIST 800-53) and continuous evidence that it held. A vendor's own SOC 2 report covers the vendor, not your cloud. Sysdig, Wiz and CrowdStrike score 6 on audit, Sonrai Security 4 and Act 3. Audit weighs 5 on the main index and 15 on the regulated page. **Why is Microsoft ranked last?** Microsoft totals 1.8 because the product that was scored, CIEM in Defender for Cloud, gives recommendations and not an enforced change (2 on removes), and no pre-change simulation or native enforcement was found on 2026-11-10. It scores 6 on coverage. Facts from the retired Entra Permissions Management pages were not counted toward those scores. **How big is my access clean-up, in numbers?** Use the Access Debt Calculator. Enter identities, identities with unused permissions, reachable paths to sensitive resources and accounts. It returns the number of changes in a permission-by-permission plan and in a boundary plan, with the assumptions stated, so you can see how far hand edits are from a boundary approach for your estate. **Where can I get the data behind the scores?** The datasets page publishes the seven weights, every score, its public reason and the evidence: a quote, a source URL and the date it was read. You can recompute any total with the stated rule, sum of score times weight over sum of weights, rounded to one decimal, and send a correction to the editor with a source. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/faq/ --- # The Least Privilege Index as data: 14 platforms, seven scores each, every reason and source Dataset edition 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** The Least Privilege Index is published as open data: 14 platforms, seven scores from 0 to 10, the weights, a public reason for each score and the dated source of every fact. Download it to rebuild any total, test other weights or check a claim against its page. The dataset holds the seven criteria and their weights, the five situation weight sets, each platform's score per criterion with its reason in one or two sentences, and the evidence behind it: a quote, a source URL and the date the page was read, 10 Nov 2026 for the first edition. Anyone can recompute a total with the stated rule: sum of score times weight divided by the sum of the weights, rounded to one decimal. If a score looks wrong, the reason and the evidence show what it rests on, and the corrections page explains how to report an error. ## Downloads - [Least Privilege Index (CSV)](/datasets/least-privilege-index-2026-11-10.csv): 14 rows, edition 10 Nov 2026 - [Least Privilege Index (JSON)](/datasets/least-privilege-index-2026-11-10.json): 14 platforms scored 0 to 10 on seven criteria with the public reason and the weight; weighted totals rounded and unrounded. - [Least Privilege Index evidence (CSV)](/datasets/least-privilege-evidence-2026-11-10.csv): 270 rows, edition 10 Nov 2026 - [Least Privilege Index evidence (JSON)](/datasets/least-privilege-evidence-2026-11-10.json): Every sourced fact behind the scores: vendor, criterion, supports or limits, the verbatim quote, the source and the read date. ## Cite this **Cite this.** Cite this line: 'Cloud Least Privilege, The Least Privilege Index, edition 10 Nov 2026, https://cloudleastprivilege.com/datasets/' ## Changelog - 10 Nov 2026: first edition. Every row read from the source linked in the row on 10 Nov 2026. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/datasets/ --- # A reference that ranks cloud least privilege platforms and shows its working About, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Cloud Least Privilege is a reference site that ranks 14 platforms on how much cloud access they remove. It publishes seven fixed criteria, the weights, every score with a reason, and the page each fact came from with the date it was read. Method first, then rankings, then profiles. The site covers one subject: removing excess access in AWS, Azure and Google Cloud. It has the ranked index, five situation rankings, a profile of each platform, a head-to-head page for every pair, a calculator for the size of a clean-up plan, and a short guide and glossary section. Everything the site says about a product comes from that product's own pages, its documentation or a named report, read on a stated date. When a vendor describes its own product, the text says so. When nothing was found, the text says none found and gives the date. Posture management rankings, workforce identity products and AI agent governance tools are outside the scope. They are mentioned only where a platform in the index overlaps with them, and in one sentence, with no ranking of their own. The index is limited to the products that remove or help remove cloud access. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/about/ --- # How Cloud Least Privilege is written Editorial policy, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Scores come from a published rubric with fixed weights. Every claim about a product is attributed to the product's own pages or to a named report, and carries the date it was read. Scores are integers, totals are rounded to one decimal, and ties are shown as ties. Weights and criteria were fixed on 10 Nov 2026 before any platform was scored. If a weight ever changes, the change will be listed on the corrections page with its date and the rankings it moved. A platform that cannot be found on a read date is not guessed at. A renamed or acquired product stays in the index under its current name, and the profile says what the sources say about the change. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/editorial-policy/ --- # Corrections and the correction rule Corrections, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Send a correction to the editor with the page, the sentence and a source. A confirmed error is fixed, the old and new text are recorded here with the date, and any ranking the fix moves is noted. Unconfirmed claims are not changed. No corrections have been recorded for the first edition of 10 Nov 2026. No correction has been published since the first edition of 10 Nov 2026. Before that edition the scores went through three blind scoring rounds and three reviews; 76 score changes were logged, each with the fact that caused it, its source and its read date, and the scores printed on this site are the final ones. From here on, every change to a published score is listed on this page with the old value, the new value, the fact and the date. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/corrections/ --- # Contact Cloud Least Privilege Contact, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Write to editor@cloudleastprivilege.com for corrections, evidence a vendor wants considered, or questions about a score. Include the page address and, for a correction, a link to the source. A score changes only when a sourced fact changes, and every change is listed on the corrections page. Replies come from the editor by email. The site has no forms, no accounts and no newsletter. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/contact/ --- # Privacy Privacy, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Cloud Least Privilege uses Google Analytics 4 to count visits. Through cookies it collects the pages you view, the page that referred you, your device and browser, and your approximate location, and Google processes this data. You can opt out with the Google Analytics opt-out browser add-on at https://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout. The hosting service also keeps ordinary access logs (address, page, time and browser string), which are read only to count page views and crawler visits. Email sent to the editor address is kept only as long as needed to answer it. Outbound links to vendor sites may carry source and campaign parameters in the address, and the vendor's own privacy policy then applies. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/privacy/ --- # Terms of use Terms, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** The content is provided as a reference, as of the read dates shown. Check a vendor's current pages before you buy. Scores describe the evidence read on those dates and are not a guarantee of how a product behaves in your environment. You may quote short passages and reuse the dataset with credit, using the cite line on the datasets page. Product names are the property of their owners. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/terms/ --- # Every head-to-head among the 14 platforms Compare, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Ninety-one head-to-head pages cover every pair among the 14 platforms. On the main weights Act wins 12 of its 13 matches and ties Sonrai Security at 5.2, with Sonrai listed first because it is ahead before rounding. Each page compares scores, reasons and what the buyer does differently. ## Act against each of the other 13 - [Act vs Sonrai Security](/compare/act-vs-sonrai/): 5.2 against 5.2 - [Act vs Apono](/compare/act-vs-apono/): 5.2 against 3.9 - [Act vs Entitle](/compare/act-vs-entitle/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Act vs Britive](/compare/act-vs-britive/): 5.2 against 3.5 - [Act vs P0 Security](/compare/act-vs-p0/): 5.2 against 3.1 - [Act vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/act-vs-tenable/): 5.2 against 3.2 - [Act vs Wiz](/compare/act-vs-wiz/): 5.2 against 3.4 - [Act vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/act-vs-prisma/): 5.2 against 2.6 - [Act vs Sysdig](/compare/act-vs-sysdig/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Act vs CrowdStrike](/compare/act-vs-crowdstrike/): 5.2 against 2.9 - [Act vs Microsoft](/compare/act-vs-microsoft/): 5.2 against 1.8 - [Act vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/act-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 5.2 against 3.0 - [Act vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/act-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 5.2 against 4.0 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Every other pair - [Sonrai Security vs Apono](/compare/sonrai-vs-apono/): 5.2 against 3.9 - [Sonrai Security vs Entitle](/compare/sonrai-vs-entitle/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Sonrai Security vs Britive](/compare/sonrai-vs-britive/): 5.2 against 3.5 - [Sonrai Security vs P0 Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-p0/): 5.2 against 3.1 - [Sonrai Security vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-tenable/): 5.2 against 3.2 - [Sonrai Security vs Wiz](/compare/sonrai-vs-wiz/): 5.2 against 3.4 - [Sonrai Security vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/sonrai-vs-prisma/): 5.2 against 2.6 - [Sonrai Security vs Sysdig](/compare/sonrai-vs-sysdig/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Sonrai Security vs CrowdStrike](/compare/sonrai-vs-crowdstrike/): 5.2 against 2.9 - [Sonrai Security vs Microsoft](/compare/sonrai-vs-microsoft/): 5.2 against 1.8 - [Sonrai Security vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/sonrai-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 5.2 against 3.0 - [Sonrai Security vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/sonrai-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 5.2 against 4.0 - [Apono vs Entitle](/compare/apono-vs-entitle/): 3.9 against 2.8 - [Apono vs Britive](/compare/apono-vs-britive/): 3.9 against 3.5 - [Apono vs P0 Security](/compare/apono-vs-p0/): 3.9 against 3.1 - [Apono vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/apono-vs-tenable/): 3.9 against 3.2 - [Apono vs Wiz](/compare/apono-vs-wiz/): 3.9 against 3.4 - [Apono vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/apono-vs-prisma/): 3.9 against 2.6 - [Apono vs Sysdig](/compare/apono-vs-sysdig/): 3.9 against 2.8 - [Apono vs CrowdStrike](/compare/apono-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.9 against 2.9 - [Apono vs Microsoft](/compare/apono-vs-microsoft/): 3.9 against 1.8 - [Apono vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/apono-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.9 against 3.0 - [Apono vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/apono-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.9 against 4.0 - [Entitle vs Britive](/compare/entitle-vs-britive/): 2.8 against 3.5 - [Entitle vs P0 Security](/compare/entitle-vs-p0/): 2.8 against 3.1 - [Entitle vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/entitle-vs-tenable/): 2.8 against 3.2 - [Entitle vs Wiz](/compare/entitle-vs-wiz/): 2.8 against 3.4 - [Entitle vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/entitle-vs-prisma/): 2.8 against 2.6 - [Entitle vs Sysdig](/compare/entitle-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 2.8 - [Entitle vs CrowdStrike](/compare/entitle-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.8 against 2.9 - [Entitle vs Microsoft](/compare/entitle-vs-microsoft/): 2.8 against 1.8 - [Entitle vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/entitle-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.8 against 3.0 - [Entitle vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/entitle-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.8 against 4.0 - [Britive vs P0 Security](/compare/britive-vs-p0/): 3.5 against 3.1 - [Britive vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/britive-vs-tenable/): 3.5 against 3.2 - [Britive vs Wiz](/compare/britive-vs-wiz/): 3.5 against 3.4 - [Britive vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/britive-vs-prisma/): 3.5 against 2.6 - [Britive vs Sysdig](/compare/britive-vs-sysdig/): 3.5 against 2.8 - [Britive vs CrowdStrike](/compare/britive-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.5 against 2.9 - [Britive vs Microsoft](/compare/britive-vs-microsoft/): 3.5 against 1.8 - [Britive vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/britive-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.5 against 3.0 - [Britive vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/britive-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.5 against 4.0 - [P0 Security vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/p0-vs-tenable/): 3.1 against 3.2 - [P0 Security vs Wiz](/compare/p0-vs-wiz/): 3.1 against 3.4 - [P0 Security vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/p0-vs-prisma/): 3.1 against 2.6 - [P0 Security vs Sysdig](/compare/p0-vs-sysdig/): 3.1 against 2.8 - [P0 Security vs CrowdStrike](/compare/p0-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.1 against 2.9 - [P0 Security vs Microsoft](/compare/p0-vs-microsoft/): 3.1 against 1.8 - [P0 Security vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/p0-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.1 against 3.0 - [P0 Security vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/p0-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.1 against 4.0 - [Tenable Cloud Security vs Wiz](/compare/tenable-vs-wiz/): 3.2 against 3.4 - [Tenable Cloud Security vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/tenable-vs-prisma/): 3.2 against 2.6 - [Tenable Cloud Security vs Sysdig](/compare/tenable-vs-sysdig/): 3.2 against 2.8 - [Tenable Cloud Security vs CrowdStrike](/compare/tenable-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.2 against 2.9 - [Tenable Cloud Security vs Microsoft](/compare/tenable-vs-microsoft/): 3.2 against 1.8 - [Tenable Cloud Security vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/tenable-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.2 against 3.0 - [Tenable Cloud Security vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/tenable-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.2 against 4.0 - [Wiz vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/wiz-vs-prisma/): 3.4 against 2.6 - [Wiz vs Sysdig](/compare/wiz-vs-sysdig/): 3.4 against 2.8 - [Wiz vs CrowdStrike](/compare/wiz-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.4 against 2.9 - [Wiz vs Microsoft](/compare/wiz-vs-microsoft/): 3.4 against 1.8 - [Wiz vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/wiz-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.4 against 3.0 - [Wiz vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/wiz-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.4 against 4.0 - [Prisma Cloud vs Sysdig](/compare/prisma-vs-sysdig/): 2.6 against 2.8 - [Prisma Cloud vs CrowdStrike](/compare/prisma-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.6 against 2.9 - [Prisma Cloud vs Microsoft](/compare/prisma-vs-microsoft/): 2.6 against 1.8 - [Prisma Cloud vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/prisma-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.6 against 3.0 - [Prisma Cloud vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/prisma-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.6 against 4.0 - [Sysdig vs CrowdStrike](/compare/sysdig-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.8 against 2.9 - [Sysdig vs Microsoft](/compare/sysdig-vs-microsoft/): 2.8 against 1.8 - [Sysdig vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/sysdig-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.8 against 3.0 - [Sysdig vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/sysdig-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.8 against 4.0 - [CrowdStrike vs Microsoft](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-microsoft/): 2.9 against 1.8 - [CrowdStrike vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.9 against 3.0 - [CrowdStrike vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.9 against 4.0 - [Microsoft vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/microsoft-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 1.8 against 3.0 - [Microsoft vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/microsoft-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 1.8 against 4.0 - [AWS IAM Access Analyzer vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/aws-iam-access-analyzer-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.0 against 4.0 Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/ --- # Act Security vs Sonrai Security: level at 5.2, Sonrai Security ahead before rounding Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security and Sonrai Security tie at 5.2 on the Least Privilege Index; Sonrai Security is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). Across the five buyer situations Act wins 1, Sonrai wins 3 and 1 is a tie. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Level at one decimal: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Level at one decimal: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 3 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Act Security and Sonrai Security share first at 5.2 on the main weights. Sonrai is listed first because it is ahead before rounding, 5.20 against 5.15. The reason is who applies the change. Sonrai applies it: its policies block unused access once deployed, and it scores 5 on removes. Act is read-only and the customer applies each change, so Act scores 3. Act leads on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and on identity, network and AI coverage (6 against 4). ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Sonrai | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 5 | Sonrai | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 5 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 7 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 7 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 4 | Sonrai | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. Sonrai 5: Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. Sonrai 4: Identities, including AI agent identities, are enforced at the IAM layer. No network reachability model is described. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 5.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Level at 5.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 4.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 5.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 5.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-sonrai/ --- # Act Security vs Apono: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Apono on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.9. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Apono wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Apono is built to grant just-in-time access and revoke it, so it scores 5 on removes against Act's 3, and Apono, now part of 1Password, totals 3.9 against Act's 5.2. The practical difference is where each starts. Apono changes how access is requested; Act models the access that exists and proposes boundaries, tested first, that the customer applies. Apono previews access flows, and no simulation of remediation was found on 2026-11-10, so it scores 3 on safe against Act's 7. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Apono | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 5 | Apono | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 3 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 3 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 3 | Act | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 5 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 4 | Apono | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Apono 3.9 (3.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. Apono 5: Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. - **Stays fixed.** Act 4: Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. Apono 4: Identity and AI agents are governed together, with runtime intent checks. No network reachability model is described. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-apono/ --- # Act Security vs Entitle: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Entitle wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 1 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Entitle, sold as BeyondTrust Entitle, provides time-limited privileged access with approvals in Slack and Teams, and it scores 5 on removes against Act's 3 because grants expire. It totals 2.8 against Act's 5.2. A buyer choosing Entitle gets a request-and-approve workflow for access people ask for. Act addresses the access already standing, with changes the customer applies, and scores 7 on safe where no simulation of a proposed change was found for Entitle on 2026-11-10. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Entitle | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 5 | Entitle | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 0 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 2 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 3 | Act | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 2 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 3 | level | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Entitle 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. Entitle 5: Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. - **Stays fixed.** Act 4: Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. Entitle 4: Identity access is covered, along with a statement that AI agent functions need a human check for sensitive resources. No network model is described. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-entitle/ --- # Act Security vs Britive: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.5 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Britive on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.5. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Britive wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Britive creates privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, across AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and OCI, so it scores 5 on removes against Act's 3. It totals 3.5 against Act's 5.2. The practical difference is the target: Britive shrinks the privilege a person or agent holds at the moment of use, while Act, read-only, proposes tested boundaries that the customer applies to the access already in place. Britive scores 1 on safe, Act 7. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Britive | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 5 | Britive | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 1 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 3 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 3 | Act | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 5 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 4 | Britive | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Britive 3.5 (3.45) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. Britive 5: Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. - **Stays fixed.** Act 4: Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. Britive 4: Britive maps human, agentic AI and non-human identities and their privileges. No network reachability model is described. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-britive/ --- # Act Security vs P0 Security: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.1 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats P0 Security on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.1. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, P0 wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 1 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. P0 Security grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, the command line or the web, and scores 5 on removes against Act's 3. It totals 3.1 against Act's 5.2. P0 suits a team that wants production access to be requested, approved and expired, with enforcement inside AWS and Google Cloud. Act suits a team that needs standing access cut with changes tested first and applied through its own pipeline. No pre-change simulation was found for P0 on 2026-11-10, so it scores 0 on safe. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | P0 | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 5 | P0 | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 0 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 2 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 3 | Act | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 5 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 3 | level | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), P0 Security 3.1 (3.05) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. - **Stays fixed.** Act 4: Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. P0 4: Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-p0/ --- # Act Security vs Tenable Cloud Security: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.2 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Tenable Cloud Security on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.2. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Tenable wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Tenable One Cloud Exposure, the renamed Ermetic product page, is a CNAPP with CIEM and just-in-time access, and it scores 5 on removes against Act's 3. It totals 3.2 against Act's 5.2. A buyer who wants posture, infrastructure-as-code scanning and entitlement analysis in one platform gets that from Tenable. Act is not a CNAPP, but it scores 7 on class and 6 on native, where no boundary or native enforcement was found for Tenable on 2026-11-10. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Tenable | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 5 | Tenable | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 3 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 0 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 5 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 0 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Tenable | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. Tenable 5: Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-tenable/ --- # Act Security vs Wiz: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.4 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Wiz on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.4. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Wiz wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 3 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Wiz, now part of Google Cloud, is a CNAPP whose security graph connects code, cloud, identities and runtime, and it routes fixes to code owners as pull requests and tickets. It totals 3.4 against Act's 5.2. Wiz is stronger on audit (6 against 3) and matches Act on coverage (6). The analyst report read says a generated fix is not an applied control until it reaches the customer's pipeline, and Wiz scores 1 on class where Act scores 7. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Wiz | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 4 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 1 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 6 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 2 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | Wiz | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Wiz 3.4 (3.40) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-wiz/ --- # Act Security vs Prisma Cloud: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Prisma Cloud wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Prisma Cloud, whose next version Palo Alto Networks markets as Cortex Cloud, computes net effective permissions across clouds and sits inside a broad platform with code scanning, network path analysis and compliance standards. It totals 2.6 against Act's 5.2. Prisma Cloud's documentation tells users to copy the command line and run it to remove excess permissions, and says automatic remediation for Google Cloud IAM alerts is not supported. Prisma Cloud scores 0 on safe, Act 7. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Prisma Cloud | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 0 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 1 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 5 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 3 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-prisma/ --- # Act Security vs Sysdig: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Sysdig wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Sysdig Secure uses runtime data and audit logs to show which permissions are in use and generates policies limited to that use, with a policy path from alert mode to enforcement. It totals 2.8 against Act's 5.2 and is stronger on audit (6 against 3). Sysdig fits a team that already runs Sysdig for runtime and wants least privilege from the same data. Act fits a team that needs boundaries, and scores 7 on class where Sysdig scores 0. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 2 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 0 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 3 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | Sysdig | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. Sysdig 4: Identity usage comes from audit logs, and an AI agent inventory is included. Attack paths do not name network reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-sysdig/ --- # Act Security vs CrowdStrike: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, CrowdStrike wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. CrowdStrike's Falcon Cloud Security generates least-privilege policies and ties cloud findings to the adversary behavior CrowdStrike observes, so teams can rank which exposures to fix first. It totals 2.9 against Act's 5.2 and is stronger on audit (6 against 3). CrowdStrike offers a dry run of a remediation, which earns 4 on safe. Act scores 7, and it scores 6 on native where no native boundary enforcement was found for CrowdStrike on 2026-11-10. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 4 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 0 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 0 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | CrowdStrike | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. CrowdStrike 4: Identity entitlements and AI security posture management across named AI services are covered. Attack paths do not name network reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Act Security vs Microsoft: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 1 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Microsoft Entra Permissions Management was retired, so this page compares Act with CIEM in Microsoft Defender for Cloud. Microsoft totals 1.8 against Act's 5.2. A team already on Defender for Cloud gets effective-permission analysis and recommendations for overprovisioned identities in the console it uses. Microsoft ties Act on coverage (6) but scores 2 on removes, and no pre-change simulation was found for Microsoft on 2026-11-10, where Act scores 7. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 2 | Act | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 0 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 1 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Act | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 6 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 0 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Microsoft | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** Act 4: Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-microsoft/ --- # Act Security vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.0. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, Access Analyzer wins 0. What puts Act ahead: one change, a class of risk (7 against 1), safe to enforce (7 against 4) and identity, network and AI (6 against 2), worth 2.15 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 0 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. AWS IAM Access Analyzer is the free AWS-native service that finds unused access and generates a refined policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity. It totals 3.0 against Act's 5.2. A team on AWS only can start there at no extra cost. Both stop short of applying the change, and both score 3 on removes. Act adds coverage across clouds, network and AI (6 against 2), boundaries across the organization (class 7 against 1) and what Act says is a simulation of each change. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 4 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 1 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 2 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 2 | Act | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Act Security vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Act Security removes more access, 5.2 to 4.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Act Security beats Google Cloud IAM recommender on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 4.0. Across the five buyer situations Act wins 5, IAM recommender wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Act Security (5.2) Access hardening platform, ahead on 6 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.15 before rounding). [Act profile](/platforms/act/) ### Behind on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 1 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Google Cloud's IAM recommender suggests removing unused roles, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a change before it is made. It is the highest-scoring platform behind the two leaders, 4.0 against Act's 5.2. It works in Google Cloud only and clean-up is role by role (class 3). A person applies each recommendation, as the customer applies Act's. Act adds a cross-cloud model and boundaries, and scores 4 on fixed against Google's 2. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Act | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 4 | IAM recommender | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 7 | 6 | Act | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 3 | Act | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Act | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Act | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 6 | 5 | Act | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 2 | Act | Act Security 5.2 (5.15), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Act 3: Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Act 7: Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Act 7: Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** Act 4: Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Act 6: One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. IAM recommender 4: Identity role recommendations and a VPC Service Controls troubleshooter are provided. No AI workloads are covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Act 6: Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Act 3: Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Act leads, 5.2 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Act leads, 4.8 against 3.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Act leads, 5.2 against 4.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Act leads, 5.1 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Act Security:** Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain: https://act.security/resources/ai-agent-security-access-chain (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/act-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Apono: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Apono on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.9. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Apono wins 0. What puts Sonrai ahead: one change, a class of risk (7 against 3), safe to enforce (5 against 3) and cloud's own controls (7 against 5), worth 1.35 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Apono | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 3 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 3 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 3 | Sonrai | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 5 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 4 | level | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Apono 3.9 (3.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. - **Stays fixed.** Sonrai 4: Blocked attempts open Slack requests, and changes are recorded in ITSM. There is no pre-production check, and the workflow starts only after the restriction is applied. Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-apono/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Entitle: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Entitle wins 0. What puts Sonrai ahead: safe to enforce (5 against 0), one change, a class of risk (7 against 2) and cloud's own controls (7 against 2), worth 2.45 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Entitle | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 0 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 2 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 3 | Sonrai | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 2 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 3 | Sonrai | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Entitle 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. - **Stays fixed.** Sonrai 4: Blocked attempts open Slack requests, and changes are recorded in ITSM. There is no pre-production check, and the workflow starts only after the restriction is applied. Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-entitle/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Britive: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.5 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Britive on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.5. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Britive wins 0. What puts Sonrai ahead: safe to enforce (5 against 1), one change, a class of risk (7 against 3) and cloud's own controls (7 against 5), worth 1.75 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Britive | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 1 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 3 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 3 | Sonrai | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 5 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 4 | level | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Britive 3.5 (3.45) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. - **Stays fixed.** Sonrai 4: Blocked attempts open Slack requests, and changes are recorded in ITSM. There is no pre-production check, and the workflow starts only after the restriction is applied. Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-britive/ --- # Sonrai Security vs P0 Security: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.1 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats P0 Security on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.1. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, P0 wins 0. What puts Sonrai ahead: safe to enforce (5 against 0), one change, a class of risk (7 against 2) and cloud's own controls (7 against 5), worth 2.15 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | P0 | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 0 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 2 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 3 | Sonrai | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 5 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 3 | Sonrai | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), P0 Security 3.1 (3.05) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. - **Stays fixed.** Sonrai 4: Blocked attempts open Slack requests, and changes are recorded in ITSM. There is no pre-production check, and the workflow starts only after the restriction is applied. P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-p0/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Tenable Cloud Security: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.2 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Tenable Cloud Security on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.2. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Tenable wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 3 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Tenable | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 3 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 0 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 0 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Tenable | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Sonrai 4: Identities, including AI agent identities, are enforced at the IAM layer. No network reachability model is described. Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-tenable/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Wiz: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.4 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Wiz on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.4. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Wiz wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Wiz | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Sonrai | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 4 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 1 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 2 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | Wiz | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Wiz 3.4 (3.40) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sonrai 5: Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. Wiz 3: Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. - **Identity, network and AI.** Sonrai 4: Identities, including AI agent identities, are enforced at the IAM layer. No network reachability model is described. Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-wiz/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Prisma Cloud: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Prisma Cloud wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Prisma Cloud | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Sonrai | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 0 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 1 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 3 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sonrai 5: Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. Prisma Cloud 3: IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. - **Identity, network and AI.** Sonrai 4: Identities, including AI agent identities, are enforced at the IAM layer. No network reachability model is described. Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-prisma/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Sysdig: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Sysdig wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Sonrai | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 2 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 0 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 3 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | Sysdig | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sonrai 5: Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. Sysdig 3: Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-sysdig/ --- # Sonrai Security vs CrowdStrike: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, CrowdStrike wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Sonrai | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 4 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 0 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 0 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | CrowdStrike | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sonrai 5: Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. CrowdStrike 3: CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Microsoft: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 2 | Sonrai | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 0 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 1 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Sonrai | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 0 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Microsoft | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sonrai 5: Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** Sonrai 4: Blocked attempts open Slack requests, and changes are recorded in ITSM. There is no pre-production check, and the workflow starts only after the restriction is applied. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** Sonrai 4: Identities, including AI agent identities, are enforced at the IAM layer. No network reachability model is described. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-microsoft/ --- # Sonrai Security vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 3.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 3.0. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, Access Analyzer wins 0. What puts Sonrai ahead: one change, a class of risk (7 against 1), removes access (5 against 3) and cloud's own controls (7 against 4), worth 2.20 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 6 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 0 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Sonrai | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 4 | Sonrai | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 1 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 2 | Sonrai | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 4 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 2 | Sonrai | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sonrai 5: Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. Access Analyzer 3: Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Identity, network and AI.** Sonrai 4: Identities, including AI agent identities, are enforced at the IAM layer. No network reachability model is described. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Sonrai Security vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Sonrai Security removes more access, 5.2 to 4.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sonrai Security beats Google Cloud IAM recommender on the Least Privilege Index, 5.2 against 4.0. Across the five buyer situations Sonrai wins 5, IAM recommender wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Sonrai Security (5.2) Cloud permissions firewall, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 1st of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (5.20 before rounding). [Sonrai profile](/platforms/sonrai/) ### Behind on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 1 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sonrai | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 4 | Sonrai | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 5 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 7 | 3 | Sonrai | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Sonrai | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 7 | 5 | Sonrai | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 2 | Sonrai | Sonrai Security 5.2 (5.20), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sonrai 5: Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Sonrai 5: Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sonrai 7: Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** Sonrai 4: Blocked attempts open Slack requests, and changes are recorded in ITSM. There is no pre-production check, and the workflow starts only after the restriction is applied. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sonrai 7: Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sonrai 4: Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sonrai leads, 5.2 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 3.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sonrai leads, 5.0 against 4.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sonrai leads, 5.3 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sonrai Security:** Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/ai-agent-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sonrai-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Apono vs Entitle: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, Entitle wins 0. What puts Apono ahead: safe to enforce (3 against 0), cloud's own controls (5 against 2) and one change, a class of risk (3 against 2), worth 1.10 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 4 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | Entitle | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 0 | Apono | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 2 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 2 | Apono | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 3 | Apono | Apono 3.9 (3.85), Entitle 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. - **Cloud's own controls.** Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-entitle/ --- # Apono vs Britive: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 3.5 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats Britive on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 3.5. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, Britive wins 0. What puts Apono ahead: safe to enforce (3 against 1), worth 0.40 points on these weights. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 1 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | Britive | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 1 | Apono | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 5 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 4 | level | Apono 3.9 (3.85), Britive 3.5 (3.45) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-britive/ --- # Apono vs P0 Security: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 3.1 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats P0 Security on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 3.1. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, P0 wins 0. What puts Apono ahead: safe to enforce (3 against 0), one change, a class of risk (3 against 2) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.80 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | P0 | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 0 | Apono | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 2 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 5 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 3 | Apono | Apono 3.9 (3.85), P0 Security 3.1 (3.05) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-p0/ --- # Apono vs Tenable Cloud Security: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 3.2 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats Tenable Cloud Security on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 3.2. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, Tenable wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | Tenable | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 3 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 0 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Tenable | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | Apono | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Tenable | Apono 3.9 (3.85), Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Tenable 4: Infrastructure-as-code template scanning is offered, with tickets and approvals in Jira, Slack and Teams. No exception or drift handling is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** Apono 4: Identity and AI agents are governed together, with runtime intent checks. No network reachability model is described. Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. - **Cloud's own controls.** Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-tenable/ --- # Apono vs Wiz: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 3.4 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats Wiz on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 3.4. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, Wiz wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | Wiz | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Apono | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 4 | Wiz | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 1 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Wiz | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 2 | Apono | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | Wiz | Apono 3.9 (3.85), Wiz 3.4 (3.40) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Apono 5: Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. Wiz 3: Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. - **Stays fixed.** Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Wiz 4: Policies across the IDE, pull requests and CI/CD can block unsafe changes, and Jira tickets are created. Exceptions, drift and paths outside the pipeline lack evidence. - **Identity, network and AI.** Apono 4: Identity and AI agents are governed together, with runtime intent checks. No network reachability model is described. Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-wiz/ --- # Apono vs Prisma Cloud: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, Prisma Cloud wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 4 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | Prisma Cloud | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Apono | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 0 | Apono | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 1 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Prisma Cloud | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 3 | Apono | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | Apono 3.9 (3.85), Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Apono 5: Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. Prisma Cloud 3: IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. - **Stays fixed.** Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Prisma Cloud 4: Pull request scans fail at a threshold, alerts go to ServiceNow and Slack, and requests run through ServiceNow. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Apono 4: Identity and AI agents are governed together, with runtime intent checks. No network reachability model is described. Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. - **Cloud's own controls.** Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-prisma/ --- # Apono vs Sysdig: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, Sysdig wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 4 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Apono | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 2 | Apono | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 0 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Sysdig | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 3 | Apono | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | Sysdig | Apono 3.9 (3.85), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Apono 5: Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. Sysdig 3: Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Sysdig 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning at commit, pull request and CI/CD can fail builds. No exception handling in the team's tools and no drift handling were found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-sysdig/ --- # Apono vs CrowdStrike: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, CrowdStrike wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Apono | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 0 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | Apono | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | CrowdStrike | Apono 3.9 (3.85), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Apono 5: Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. CrowdStrike 3: CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. CrowdStrike 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning runs in CI/CD, the IDE and MCP, and Kubernetes admission can block. No exception or drift handling was found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Apono vs Microsoft: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 5 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 2 | Apono | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 0 | Apono | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 1 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 2 | Apono | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | Apono | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Microsoft | Apono 3.9 (3.85), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Apono 5: Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** Apono 4: Identity and AI agents are governed together, with runtime intent checks. No network reachability model is described. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. - **Cloud's own controls.** Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-microsoft/ --- # Apono vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: Apono removes more access, 3.9 to 3.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Apono beats AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index, 3.9 against 3.0. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 5, Access Analyzer wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 5 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Behind on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 2 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Apono | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 1 | Apono | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 2 | Apono | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 4 | Apono | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 2 | Apono | Apono 3.9 (3.85), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Apono 5: Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. Access Analyzer 3: Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **One change, a class of risk.** Apono 3: Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Stays fixed.** Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Access Analyzer 4: Custom policy checks run before deployment in CI/CD and can trigger approval workflows. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Apono 4: Identity and AI agents are governed together, with runtime intent checks. No network reachability model is described. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Apono 5: Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Apono leads, 3.9 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Apono vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 3.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats Apono on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 3.9. Across the five buyer situations Apono wins 1, IAM recommender wins 2 and 2 are ties. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Apono (3.9) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 4th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.85 before rounding). [Apono profile](/platforms/apono/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 1 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Apono | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 4 | Apono | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 2 | Apono | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 5 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 2 | Apono | Apono 3.9 (3.85), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Apono 5: Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Apono 3: A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **Stays fixed.** Apono 3: Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Evidence for auditors.** Apono 4: Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Level at 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Apono leads, 3.8 against 3.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 3.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Level at 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Apono:** Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/apono-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Entitle vs Britive: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 0, Britive wins 5. What puts Britive ahead: cloud's own controls (5 against 2), safe to enforce (1 against 0) and one change, a class of risk (3 against 2), worth 0.70 points on these weights. ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 4 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | Britive | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 1 | Britive | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 3 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 5 | Britive | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 4 | Britive | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), Britive 3.5 (3.45) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-britive/ --- # Entitle vs P0 Security: P0 Security removes more access, 3.1 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** P0 Security beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 3.1 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 0, P0 wins 5. What puts P0 ahead: cloud's own controls (5 against 2), worth 0.30 points on these weights. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Ahead on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 1 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | P0 | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 0 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 2 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 5 | P0 | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 3 | level | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), P0 Security 3.1 (3.05) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** P0 leads, 2.9 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** P0 leads, 3.0 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** P0 leads, 3.1 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-p0/ --- # Entitle vs Tenable Cloud Security: Tenable Cloud Security removes more access, 3.2 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Tenable Cloud Security beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 3.2 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 0, Tenable wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Ahead on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | Tenable | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 3 | Tenable | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 0 | Entitle | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Tenable | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 0 | Entitle | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Tenable | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Tenable 4: Infrastructure-as-code template scanning is offered, with tickets and approvals in Jira, Slack and Teams. No exception or drift handling is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** Entitle 4: Identity access is covered, along with a statement that AI agent functions need a human check for sensitive resources. No network model is described. Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-tenable/ --- # Entitle vs Wiz: Wiz removes more access, 3.4 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Wiz beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 3.4 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 0, Wiz wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Ahead on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | Wiz | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Entitle | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | Wiz | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 1 | Entitle | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Wiz | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 2 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | Wiz | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), Wiz 3.4 (3.40) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Entitle 5: Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. Wiz 3: Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. - **Safe to enforce.** Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. - **Stays fixed.** Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Wiz 4: Policies across the IDE, pull requests and CI/CD can block unsafe changes, and Jira tickets are created. Exceptions, drift and paths outside the pipeline lack evidence. - **Identity, network and AI.** Entitle 4: Identity access is covered, along with a statement that AI agent functions need a human check for sensitive resources. No network model is described. Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Wiz leads, 3.3 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Wiz leads, 3.4 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Wiz leads, 3.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-wiz/ --- # Entitle vs Prisma Cloud: Entitle removes more access, 2.8 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Entitle beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 2.8 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 4, Prisma Cloud wins 1. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | Prisma Cloud | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Entitle | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 0 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 1 | Entitle | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Prisma Cloud | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 3 | Prisma Cloud | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Entitle 5: Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. Prisma Cloud 3: IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. - **Stays fixed.** Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Prisma Cloud 4: Pull request scans fail at a threshold, alerts go to ServiceNow and Slack, and requests run through ServiceNow. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Entitle 4: Identity access is covered, along with a statement that AI agent functions need a human check for sensitive resources. No network model is described. Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Entitle leads, 2.7 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Entitle leads, 2.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Prisma Cloud leads, 2.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Entitle leads, 3.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Entitle leads, 2.8 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-prisma/ --- # Entitle vs Sysdig: level at 2.8, Sysdig ahead before rounding Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Entitle and Sysdig tie at 2.8 on the Least Privilege Index; Sysdig is ahead before rounding (2.75 against 2.75). Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 2, Sysdig wins 1 and 2 are ties. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Level at one decimal: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Level at one decimal: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Entitle | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 2 | Sysdig | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 0 | Entitle | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Sysdig | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 3 | Sysdig | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | Sysdig | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Entitle 5: Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. Sysdig 3: Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. - **Safe to enforce.** Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Sysdig 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning at commit, pull request and CI/CD can fail builds. No exception handling in the team's tools and no drift handling were found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Entitle leads, 2.7 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Level at 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sysdig leads, 3.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Level at 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Entitle leads, 2.8 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-sysdig/ --- # Entitle vs CrowdStrike: CrowdStrike removes more access, 2.9 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** CrowdStrike beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 2.9 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 2, CrowdStrike wins 3. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Ahead on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Entitle | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 0 | Entitle | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 0 | Entitle | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | CrowdStrike | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Entitle 5: Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. CrowdStrike 3: CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. - **Safe to enforce.** Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. CrowdStrike 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning runs in CI/CD, the IDE and MCP, and Kubernetes admission can block. No exception or drift handling was found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** CrowdStrike leads, 2.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Entitle leads, 2.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.3 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.1 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Entitle leads, 2.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Entitle vs Microsoft: Entitle removes more access, 2.8 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Entitle beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 2.8 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 2 | Entitle | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 0 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 1 | Entitle | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 2 | Entitle | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 0 | Entitle | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Microsoft | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Entitle 5: Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** Entitle 4: Identity access is covered, along with a statement that AI agent functions need a human check for sensitive resources. No network model is described. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Entitle leads, 2.7 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Entitle leads, 2.8 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Entitle leads, 2.8 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Entitle leads, 3.0 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Entitle leads, 2.8 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-microsoft/ --- # Entitle vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: AWS IAM Access Analyzer removes more access, 3.0 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** AWS IAM Access Analyzer beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 3.0 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 1, Access Analyzer wins 4. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 4 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Ahead on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 3 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Entitle | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 1 | Entitle | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 2 | Entitle | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 2 | Entitle | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Entitle 5: Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. Access Analyzer 3: Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. - **Safe to enforce.** Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Stays fixed.** Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Access Analyzer 4: Custom policy checks run before deployment in CI/CD and can trigger approval workflows. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Entitle 4: Identity access is covered, along with a statement that AI agent functions need a human check for sensitive resources. No network model is described. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Access Analyzer leads, 3.0 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Access Analyzer leads, 3.0 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Entitle leads, 3.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Entitle vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats Entitle on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Entitle wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Entitle (2.8) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Entitle profile](/platforms/entitle/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 3 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Entitle | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 4 | Entitle | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 2 | Entitle | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 5 | IAM recommender | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 2 | Entitle | Entitle 2.8 (2.75), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Entitle 5: Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Entitle 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Entitle 2: Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** Entitle 3: Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Entitle 2: Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Entitle 3: Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Entitle:** Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - entitle.io/security: https://www.entitle.io/security (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/entitle-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Britive vs P0 Security: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 3.1 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats P0 Security on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 3.1. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 5, P0 wins 0. What puts Britive ahead: safe to enforce (1 against 0), one change, a class of risk (3 against 2) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.40 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Behind on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 0 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | P0 | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 0 | Britive | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 2 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 5 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 3 | Britive | Britive 3.5 (3.45), P0 Security 3.1 (3.05) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-p0/ --- # Britive vs Tenable Cloud Security: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 3.2 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats Tenable Cloud Security on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 3.2. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 3, Tenable wins 0 and 2 are ties. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Behind on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | Tenable | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 3 | Tenable | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 0 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Tenable | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | Britive | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Tenable | Britive 3.5 (3.45), Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. Tenable 4: Infrastructure-as-code template scanning is offered, with tickets and approvals in Jira, Slack and Teams. No exception or drift handling is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** Britive 4: Britive maps human, agentic AI and non-human identities and their privileges. No network reachability model is described. Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. - **Cloud's own controls.** Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Level at 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Level at 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-tenable/ --- # Britive vs Wiz: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 3.4 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats Wiz on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 3.4. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 3, Wiz wins 2. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Behind on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | Wiz | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Britive | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 4 | Wiz | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 1 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Wiz | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 2 | Britive | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | Wiz | Britive 3.5 (3.45), Wiz 3.4 (3.40) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Britive 5: Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. Wiz 3: Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. - **One change, a class of risk.** Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. - **Stays fixed.** Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. Wiz 4: Policies across the IDE, pull requests and CI/CD can block unsafe changes, and Jira tickets are created. Exceptions, drift and paths outside the pipeline lack evidence. - **Identity, network and AI.** Britive 4: Britive maps human, agentic AI and non-human identities and their privileges. No network reachability model is described. Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-wiz/ --- # Britive vs Prisma Cloud: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 5, Prisma Cloud wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 4 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | Prisma Cloud | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Britive | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 0 | Britive | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 1 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Prisma Cloud | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 3 | Britive | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | Britive 3.5 (3.45), Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Britive 5: Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. Prisma Cloud 3: IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. - **Stays fixed.** Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. Prisma Cloud 4: Pull request scans fail at a threshold, alerts go to ServiceNow and Slack, and requests run through ServiceNow. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Britive 4: Britive maps human, agentic AI and non-human identities and their privileges. No network reachability model is described. Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. - **Cloud's own controls.** Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-prisma/ --- # Britive vs Sysdig: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 5, Sysdig wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Britive | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 2 | Sysdig | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 0 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Sysdig | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 3 | Britive | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | Sysdig | Britive 3.5 (3.45), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Britive 5: Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. Sysdig 3: Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. Sysdig 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning at commit, pull request and CI/CD can fail builds. No exception handling in the team's tools and no drift handling were found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-sysdig/ --- # Britive vs CrowdStrike: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 5, CrowdStrike wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Britive | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 0 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | Britive | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 6 | CrowdStrike | Britive 3.5 (3.45), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Britive 5: Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. CrowdStrike 3: CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **One change, a class of risk.** Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. - **Stays fixed.** Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. CrowdStrike 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning runs in CI/CD, the IDE and MCP, and Kubernetes admission can block. No exception or drift handling was found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Britive vs Microsoft: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 5 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 2 | Britive | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 0 | Britive | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 1 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 2 | Britive | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | Britive | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 5 | Microsoft | Britive 3.5 (3.45), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Britive 5: Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** Britive 4: Britive maps human, agentic AI and non-human identities and their privileges. No network reachability model is described. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. - **Cloud's own controls.** Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-microsoft/ --- # Britive vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: Britive removes more access, 3.5 to 3.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Britive beats AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index, 3.5 against 3.0. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 5, Access Analyzer wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 5 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Behind on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 2 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Britive | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 1 | Britive | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 2 | Britive | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 4 | Britive | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 2 | Britive | Britive 3.5 (3.45), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Britive 5: Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. Access Analyzer 3: Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **One change, a class of risk.** Britive 3: A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Stays fixed.** Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. Access Analyzer 4: Custom policy checks run before deployment in CI/CD and can trigger approval workflows. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Britive 4: Britive maps human, agentic AI and non-human identities and their privileges. No network reachability model is described. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Britive 5: The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Britive leads, 3.4 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Britive leads, 3.5 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Britive vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 3.5 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats Britive on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 3.5. Across the five buyer situations Britive wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Britive (3.5) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 5th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.45 before rounding). [Britive profile](/platforms/britive/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 1 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Britive | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 4 | Britive | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 1 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 3 | 3 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 2 | Britive | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 5 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 4 | 2 | Britive | Britive 3.5 (3.45), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Britive 5: Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Britive 1: Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **Stays fixed.** Britive 3: Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Evidence for auditors.** Britive 4: Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Britive:** Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com: https://docs.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/britive-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # P0 Security vs Tenable Cloud Security: Tenable Cloud Security removes more access, 3.2 to 3.1 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Tenable Cloud Security beats P0 Security on the Least Privilege Index, 3.2 against 3.1. Across the five buyer situations P0 wins 1, Tenable wins 3 and 1 is a tie. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 2 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) ### Ahead on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | P0 | Tenable | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 5 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 3 | Tenable | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 0 | P0 | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Tenable | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | P0 | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Tenable | P0 Security 3.1 (3.05), Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Stays fixed.** P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Tenable 4: Infrastructure-as-code template scanning is offered, with tickets and approvals in Jira, Slack and Teams. No exception or drift handling is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** P0 4: Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed. Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. - **Cloud's own controls.** P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Level at 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/p0-vs-tenable/ --- # P0 Security vs Wiz: Wiz removes more access, 3.4 to 3.1 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Wiz beats P0 Security on the Least Privilege Index, 3.4 against 3.1. Across the five buyer situations P0 wins 0, Wiz wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) ### Ahead on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | P0 | Wiz | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | P0 | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | Wiz | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 1 | P0 | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Wiz | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 2 | P0 | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | Wiz | P0 Security 3.1 (3.05), Wiz 3.4 (3.40) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. Wiz 3: Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. - **Safe to enforce.** P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. - **One change, a class of risk.** P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. - **Stays fixed.** P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Wiz 4: Policies across the IDE, pull requests and CI/CD can block unsafe changes, and Jira tickets are created. Exceptions, drift and paths outside the pipeline lack evidence. - **Identity, network and AI.** P0 4: Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed. Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. - **Evidence for auditors.** P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Wiz leads, 3.3 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Wiz leads, 3.4 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Wiz leads, 3.2 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/p0-vs-wiz/ --- # P0 Security vs Prisma Cloud: P0 Security removes more access, 3.1 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** P0 Security beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 3.1 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations P0 wins 5, Prisma Cloud wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | P0 | Prisma Cloud | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | P0 | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 0 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 1 | P0 | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Prisma Cloud | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 3 | P0 | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Prisma Cloud | P0 Security 3.1 (3.05), Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. Prisma Cloud 3: IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. - **One change, a class of risk.** P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. - **Stays fixed.** P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Prisma Cloud 4: Pull request scans fail at a threshold, alerts go to ServiceNow and Slack, and requests run through ServiceNow. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** P0 4: Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed. Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. - **Cloud's own controls.** P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. - **Evidence for auditors.** P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** P0 leads, 2.9 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** P0 leads, 3.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** P0 leads, 3.1 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/p0-vs-prisma/ --- # P0 Security vs Sysdig: P0 Security removes more access, 3.1 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** P0 Security beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 3.1 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations P0 wins 4, Sysdig wins 1. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | P0 | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | P0 | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 2 | Sysdig | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 0 | P0 | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Sysdig | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 3 | P0 | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | Sysdig | P0 Security 3.1 (3.05), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. Sysdig 3: Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. - **Safe to enforce.** P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Stays fixed.** P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Sysdig 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning at commit, pull request and CI/CD can fail builds. No exception handling in the team's tools and no drift handling were found. - **Cloud's own controls.** P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. - **Evidence for auditors.** P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** P0 leads, 2.9 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sysdig leads, 3.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** P0 leads, 3.1 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/p0-vs-sysdig/ --- # P0 Security vs CrowdStrike: P0 Security removes more access, 3.1 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** P0 Security beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 3.1 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations P0 wins 4, CrowdStrike wins 1. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | P0 | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | P0 | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 0 | P0 | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | P0 | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 6 | CrowdStrike | P0 Security 3.1 (3.05), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. CrowdStrike 3: CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. - **Safe to enforce.** P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **One change, a class of risk.** P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. - **Stays fixed.** P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. CrowdStrike 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning runs in CI/CD, the IDE and MCP, and Kubernetes admission can block. No exception or drift handling was found. - **Cloud's own controls.** P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** P0 leads, 2.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.3 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** P0 leads, 3.1 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/p0-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # P0 Security vs Microsoft: P0 Security removes more access, 3.1 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** P0 Security beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 3.1 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations P0 wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 4 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | P0 | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 2 | P0 | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 0 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 1 | P0 | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 2 | P0 | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 0 | P0 | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 5 | Microsoft | P0 Security 3.1 (3.05), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **One change, a class of risk.** P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** P0 4: Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. - **Cloud's own controls.** P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Evidence for auditors.** P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** P0 leads, 2.9 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** P0 leads, 3.0 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** P0 leads, 3.1 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/p0-vs-microsoft/ --- # P0 Security vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: P0 Security removes more access, 3.1 to 3.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** P0 Security beats AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index, 3.1 against 3.0. Across the five buyer situations P0 wins 3, Access Analyzer wins 0 and 2 are ties. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 5 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) ### Behind on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 2 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | P0 | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | P0 | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 1 | P0 | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 2 | P0 | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 4 | P0 | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 2 | P0 | P0 Security 3.1 (3.05), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. Access Analyzer 3: Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. - **Safe to enforce.** P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **One change, a class of risk.** P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Stays fixed.** P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. Access Analyzer 4: Custom policy checks run before deployment in CI/CD and can trigger approval workflows. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** P0 4: Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** P0 5: Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Level at 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Level at 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** P0 leads, 3.2 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** P0 leads, 3.1 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/p0-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # P0 Security vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 3.1 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats P0 Security on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 3.1. Across the five buyer situations P0 wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: P0 Security (3.1) Just-in-time access, ahead on 3 of 7 8th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.05 before rounding). [P0 profile](/platforms/p0/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 2 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | P0 | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 4 | P0 | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 2 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 3 | 2 | P0 | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 5 | 5 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 3 | 2 | P0 | P0 Security 3.1 (3.05), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** P0 5: Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** P0 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** P0 2: A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** P0 3: Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Evidence for auditors.** P0 3: P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **P0 Security:** Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/llms.txt: https://docs.p0.dev/llms.txt (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/p0-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security vs Wiz: Wiz removes more access, 3.4 to 3.2 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Wiz beats Tenable Cloud Security on the Least Privilege Index, 3.4 against 3.2. Across the five buyer situations Tenable wins 0, Wiz wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) ### Ahead on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 5 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Tenable | Wiz | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Tenable | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 4 | Wiz | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 1 | Wiz | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 6 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 2 | Wiz | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 6 | Wiz | Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20), Wiz 3.4 (3.40) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Tenable 5: Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. Wiz 3: Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. - **Safe to enforce.** Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. - **One change, a class of risk.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. - **Identity, network and AI.** Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. - **Evidence for auditors.** Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Wiz leads, 3.3 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Wiz leads, 3.4 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Wiz leads, 3.2 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/tenable-vs-wiz/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security vs Prisma Cloud: Tenable Cloud Security removes more access, 3.2 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Tenable Cloud Security beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 3.2 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Tenable wins 5, Prisma Cloud wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Tenable | Prisma Cloud | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Tenable | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 0 | Tenable | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 1 | Prisma Cloud | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 5 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 3 | Prisma Cloud | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 5 | level | Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20), Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Tenable 5: Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. Prisma Cloud 3: IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. - **Safe to enforce.** Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **One change, a class of risk.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. - **Cloud's own controls.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/tenable-vs-prisma/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security vs Sysdig: Tenable Cloud Security removes more access, 3.2 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Tenable Cloud Security beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 3.2 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Tenable wins 5, Sysdig wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Tenable | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Tenable | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 2 | Tenable | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 0 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 4 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 3 | Sysdig | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 6 | Sysdig | Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Tenable 5: Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. Sysdig 3: Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. - **Safe to enforce.** Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **Identity, network and AI.** Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. Sysdig 4: Identity usage comes from audit logs, and an AI agent inventory is included. Attack paths do not name network reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. - **Evidence for auditors.** Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/tenable-vs-sysdig/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security vs CrowdStrike: Tenable Cloud Security removes more access, 3.2 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Tenable Cloud Security beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 3.2 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations Tenable wins 5, CrowdStrike wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Tenable | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Tenable | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 0 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 4 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 0 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 6 | CrowdStrike | Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Tenable 5: Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. CrowdStrike 3: CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. - **Safe to enforce.** Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **Identity, network and AI.** Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. CrowdStrike 4: Identity entitlements and AI security posture management across named AI services are covered. Attack paths do not name network reachability. - **Evidence for auditors.** Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/tenable-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security vs Microsoft: Tenable Cloud Security removes more access, 3.2 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Tenable Cloud Security beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 3.2 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Tenable wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Tenable | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 2 | Tenable | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 0 | Tenable | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 1 | Microsoft | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Tenable | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 0 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 5 | level | Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Tenable 5: Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Safe to enforce.** Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** Tenable 4: Infrastructure-as-code template scanning is offered, with tickets and approvals in Jira, Slack and Teams. No exception or drift handling is described. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/tenable-vs-microsoft/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: Tenable Cloud Security removes more access, 3.2 to 3.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Tenable Cloud Security beats AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index, 3.2 against 3.0. Across the five buyer situations Tenable wins 5, Access Analyzer wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) ### Behind on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 3 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Tenable | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 3 | Tenable | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 1 | Access Analyzer | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 2 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 2 | Tenable | Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Tenable 5: Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. Access Analyzer 3: Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. - **Safe to enforce.** Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **One change, a class of risk.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Identity, network and AI.** Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Tenable leads, 3.5 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Tenable leads, 3.1 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/tenable-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 3.2 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats Tenable Cloud Security on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 3.2. Across the five buyer situations Tenable wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Tenable Cloud Security (3.2) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 7th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.20 before rounding). [Tenable profile](/platforms/tenable/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 3 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Tenable | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 5 | 4 | Tenable | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 3 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Tenable | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 4 | Tenable | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 5 | IAM recommender | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 2 | Tenable | Tenable Cloud Security 3.2 (3.20), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Tenable 5: Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Tenable 3: The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** Tenable 4: Infrastructure-as-code template scanning is offered, with tickets and approvals in Jira, Slack and Teams. No exception or drift handling is described. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Tenable 5: Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. IAM recommender 4: Identity role recommendations and a VPC Service Controls troubleshooter are provided. No AI workloads are covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Tenable 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Tenable 5: Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 3.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Tenable Cloud Security:** Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-securit: https://www.tenable.com/blog/the-future-of-cloud-access-management-how-tenable-cloud-security-redefines-just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/tenable-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Wiz vs Prisma Cloud: Wiz removes more access, 3.4 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Wiz beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 3.4 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Wiz wins 5, Prisma Cloud wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Wiz | Prisma Cloud | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 0 | Wiz | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 1 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 5 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 3 | Prisma Cloud | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 5 | Wiz | Wiz 3.4 (3.40), Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. - **Cloud's own controls.** Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. - **Evidence for auditors.** Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Wiz leads, 3.3 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Wiz leads, 3.4 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Wiz leads, 3.2 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. ## Sources - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/wiz-vs-prisma/ --- # Wiz vs Sysdig: Wiz removes more access, 3.4 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Wiz beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 3.4 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Wiz wins 5, Sysdig wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Wiz | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 2 | Wiz | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 0 | Wiz | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 3 | Sysdig | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 6 | level | Wiz 3.4 (3.40), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. Sysdig 4: Identity usage comes from audit logs, and an AI agent inventory is included. Attack paths do not name network reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Wiz leads, 3.3 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Wiz leads, 3.4 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Wiz leads, 3.2 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/wiz-vs-sysdig/ --- # Wiz vs CrowdStrike: Wiz removes more access, 3.4 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Wiz beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 3.4 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations Wiz wins 5, CrowdStrike wins 0. What puts Wiz ahead: identity, network and AI (6 against 4), cloud's own controls (2 against 0) and one change, a class of risk (1 against 0), worth 0.55 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 0 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Wiz | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 4 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 0 | Wiz | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 0 | Wiz | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 6 | level | Wiz 3.4 (3.40), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **One change, a class of risk.** Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. CrowdStrike 4: Identity entitlements and AI security posture management across named AI services are covered. Attack paths do not name network reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Wiz leads, 3.3 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Wiz leads, 3.4 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Wiz leads, 3.2 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/wiz-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Wiz vs Microsoft: Wiz removes more access, 3.4 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Wiz beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 3.4 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Wiz wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. What puts Wiz ahead: safe to enforce (4 against 0), stays fixed (4 against 2) and removes access (3 against 2), worth 1.60 points on these weights. ### Ahead on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 5 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 0 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Wiz | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 2 | Wiz | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 0 | Wiz | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 1 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Wiz | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 6 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 0 | Wiz | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 5 | Wiz | Wiz 3.4 (3.40), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Wiz 3: Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Safe to enforce.** Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Stays fixed.** Wiz 4: Policies across the IDE, pull requests and CI/CD can block unsafe changes, and Jira tickets are created. Exceptions, drift and paths outside the pipeline lack evidence. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Cloud's own controls.** Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Evidence for auditors.** Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Wiz leads, 3.3 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Wiz leads, 3.4 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Wiz leads, 3.2 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/wiz-vs-microsoft/ --- # Wiz vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: Wiz removes more access, 3.4 to 3.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Wiz beats AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index, 3.4 against 3.0. Across the five buyer situations Wiz wins 5, Access Analyzer wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) ### Behind on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 1 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Wiz | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 4 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 1 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 2 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 2 | Wiz | Wiz 3.4 (3.40), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Identity, network and AI.** Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Wiz leads, 3.3 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Wiz leads, 3.4 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Wiz leads, 3.7 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Wiz leads, 3.8 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Wiz leads, 3.2 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/wiz-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Wiz vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 3.4 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats Wiz on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 3.4. Across the five buyer situations Wiz wins 0, IAM recommender wins 4 and 1 is a tie. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Wiz (3.4) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 6th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.40 before rounding). [Wiz profile](/platforms/wiz/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 4 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Wiz | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 4 | IAM recommender | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Wiz | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Wiz | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 2 | 5 | IAM recommender | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 2 | Wiz | Wiz 3.4 (3.40), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Wiz 3: Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Wiz 4: Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Wiz 1: Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** Wiz 4: Policies across the IDE, pull requests and CI/CD can block unsafe changes, and Jira tickets are created. Exceptions, drift and paths outside the pipeline lack evidence. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Wiz 6: A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. IAM recommender 4: Identity role recommendations and a VPC Service Controls troubleshooter are provided. No AI workloads are covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Wiz 2: Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Wiz 6: Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Level at 3.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 3.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Wiz:** Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform/wiz-code: https://www.wiz.io/platform/wiz-code (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/wiz-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Prisma Cloud vs Sysdig: Sysdig removes more access, 2.8 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sysdig beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 2.8 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Prisma Cloud wins 0, Sysdig wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) ### Ahead on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Prisma Cloud | Sysdig | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 2 | Sysdig | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 0 | Prisma Cloud | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 4 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 3 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 6 | Sysdig | Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55), Sysdig 2.8 (2.75) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. - **One change, a class of risk.** Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. Sysdig 4: Identity usage comes from audit logs, and an AI agent inventory is included. Attack paths do not name network reachability. - **Evidence for auditors.** Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sysdig leads, 2.6 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sysdig leads, 2.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sysdig leads, 3.2 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sysdig leads, 3.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sysdig leads, 2.6 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. ## Sources - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/prisma-vs-sysdig/ --- # Prisma Cloud vs CrowdStrike: CrowdStrike removes more access, 2.9 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** CrowdStrike beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 2.9 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Prisma Cloud wins 0, CrowdStrike wins 4 and 1 is a tie. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) ### Ahead on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Prisma Cloud | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 0 | Prisma Cloud | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 4 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 0 | Prisma Cloud | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 6 | CrowdStrike | Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **One change, a class of risk.** Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. - **Identity, network and AI.** Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. CrowdStrike 4: Identity entitlements and AI security posture management across named AI services are covered. Attack paths do not name network reachability. - **Cloud's own controls.** Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. - **Evidence for auditors.** Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** CrowdStrike leads, 2.8 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Level at 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.3 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.1 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** CrowdStrike leads, 2.7 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/prisma-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Prisma Cloud vs Microsoft: Prisma Cloud removes more access, 2.6 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Prisma Cloud beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 2.6 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Prisma Cloud wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 1 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Prisma Cloud | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 2 | Prisma Cloud | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 0 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 1 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Prisma Cloud | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 0 | Prisma Cloud | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 5 | level | Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Prisma Cloud 3: IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Stays fixed.** Prisma Cloud 4: Pull request scans fail at a threshold, alerts go to ServiceNow and Slack, and requests run through ServiceNow. No drift or exception handling was found. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. - **Cloud's own controls.** Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Prisma Cloud leads, 2.4 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Prisma Cloud leads, 2.7 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Prisma Cloud leads, 2.9 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Prisma Cloud leads, 2.9 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Prisma Cloud leads, 2.5 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/prisma-vs-microsoft/ --- # Prisma Cloud vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: AWS IAM Access Analyzer removes more access, 3.0 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** AWS IAM Access Analyzer beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 3.0 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Prisma Cloud wins 0, Access Analyzer wins 4 and 1 is a tie. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) ### Ahead on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 2 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Prisma Cloud | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 1 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 2 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 2 | Prisma Cloud | Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **Identity, network and AI.** Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Access Analyzer leads, 3.0 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Access Analyzer leads, 3.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Level at 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/prisma-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Prisma Cloud vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 2.6 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 2.6. Across the five buyer situations Prisma Cloud wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Prisma Cloud (2.6) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 3 of 7 13th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.55 before rounding). [Prisma Cloud profile](/platforms/prisma/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 4 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Prisma Cloud | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 4 | IAM recommender | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Prisma Cloud | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 5 | 4 | Prisma Cloud | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 5 | IAM recommender | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 2 | Prisma Cloud | Prisma Cloud 2.6 (2.55), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Prisma Cloud 3: IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Prisma Cloud 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Prisma Cloud 1: Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** Prisma Cloud 4: Pull request scans fail at a threshold, alerts go to ServiceNow and Slack, and requests run through ServiceNow. No drift or exception handling was found. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Prisma Cloud 5: Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. IAM recommender 4: Identity role recommendations and a VPC Service Controls troubleshooter are provided. No AI workloads are covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Prisma Cloud 3: Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Prisma Cloud 5: Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 2.5. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Prisma Cloud:** Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/mon: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/application-security/risk-management/monitor-and-manage-code-build/pull-request-scan.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/prisma-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Sysdig vs CrowdStrike: CrowdStrike removes more access, 2.9 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** CrowdStrike beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 2.9 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Sysdig wins 1, CrowdStrike wins 4. What puts CrowdStrike ahead: safe to enforce (4 against 2), worth 0.40 points on these weights, against Sysdig's lead on cloud's own controls (3 against 0), worth 0.30. ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) ### Ahead on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 1 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sysdig | CrowdStrike | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 2 | 4 | CrowdStrike | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 0 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 0 | Sysdig | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 6 | level | Sysdig 2.8 (2.75), CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** CrowdStrike leads, 2.8 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sysdig leads, 2.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.3 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.1 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** CrowdStrike leads, 2.7 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. ## Sources - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sysdig-vs-crowdstrike/ --- # Sysdig vs Microsoft: Sysdig removes more access, 2.8 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Sysdig beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 2.8 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Sysdig wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 5 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sysdig | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 2 | Sysdig | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 2 | 0 | Sysdig | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 1 | Microsoft | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Sysdig | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 0 | Sysdig | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 5 | Sysdig | Sysdig 2.8 (2.75), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sysdig 3: Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Safe to enforce.** Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** Sysdig 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning at commit, pull request and CI/CD can fail builds. No exception handling in the team's tools and no drift handling were found. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** Sysdig 4: Identity usage comes from audit logs, and an AI agent inventory is included. Attack paths do not name network reachability. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Sysdig leads, 2.6 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Sysdig leads, 2.8 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sysdig leads, 3.2 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sysdig leads, 3.0 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Sysdig leads, 2.6 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sysdig-vs-microsoft/ --- # Sysdig vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: AWS IAM Access Analyzer removes more access, 3.0 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** AWS IAM Access Analyzer beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 3.0 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Sysdig wins 2, Access Analyzer wins 3. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) ### Ahead on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 3 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sysdig | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 2 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 1 | Access Analyzer | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 2 | Sysdig | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 2 | Sysdig | Sysdig 2.8 (2.75), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Safe to enforce.** Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Identity, network and AI.** Sysdig 4: Identity usage comes from audit logs, and an AI agent inventory is included. Attack paths do not name network reachability. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Access Analyzer leads, 3.0 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Sysdig leads, 3.2 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Sysdig leads, 3.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sysdig-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Sysdig vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 2.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 2.8. Across the five buyer situations Sysdig wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Sysdig (2.8) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 Joint 11th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.75 before rounding). [Sysdig profile](/platforms/sysdig/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 4 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Sysdig | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 4 | IAM recommender | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 2 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Sysdig | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 3 | 5 | IAM recommender | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 2 | Sysdig | Sysdig 2.8 (2.75), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Sysdig 3: Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Sysdig 2: Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Sysdig 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** Sysdig 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning at commit, pull request and CI/CD can fail builds. No exception handling in the team's tools and no drift handling were found. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Cloud's own controls.** Sysdig 3: For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Sysdig 6: Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 3.2. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 2.6. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Sysdig:** Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/infrastructure-as-code-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/sysdig-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # CrowdStrike vs Microsoft: CrowdStrike removes more access, 2.9 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** CrowdStrike beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 2.9 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations CrowdStrike wins 5, Microsoft wins 0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Ahead on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 4 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | CrowdStrike | Microsoft | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 2 | CrowdStrike | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 0 | CrowdStrike | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 1 | Microsoft | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | CrowdStrike | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 6 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 0 | level | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 5 | CrowdStrike | CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85), Microsoft 1.8 (1.80) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** CrowdStrike 3: CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. - **Safe to enforce.** CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. - **Stays fixed.** CrowdStrike 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning runs in CI/CD, the IDE and MCP, and Kubernetes admission can block. No exception or drift handling was found. Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. - **Identity, network and AI.** CrowdStrike 4: Identity entitlements and AI security posture management across named AI services are covered. Attack paths do not name network reachability. Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. - **Evidence for auditors.** CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** CrowdStrike leads, 2.8 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** CrowdStrike leads, 2.7 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.3 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.1 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** CrowdStrike leads, 2.7 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. ## Sources - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/crowdstrike-vs-microsoft/ --- # CrowdStrike vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: AWS IAM Access Analyzer removes more access, 3.0 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** AWS IAM Access Analyzer beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 3.0 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations CrowdStrike wins 2, Access Analyzer wins 3. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) ### Ahead on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 2 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | CrowdStrike | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 3 | level | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 4 | level | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 1 | Access Analyzer | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 4 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 2 | CrowdStrike | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 2 | CrowdStrike | CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **One change, a class of risk.** CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. - **Identity, network and AI.** CrowdStrike 4: Identity entitlements and AI security posture management across named AI services are covered. Attack paths do not name network reachability. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Access Analyzer leads, 3.0 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.3 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** CrowdStrike leads, 3.1 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/crowdstrike-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # CrowdStrike vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 2.9 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 2.9. Across the five buyer situations CrowdStrike wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: CrowdStrike (2.9) CNAPP with entitlement management, ahead on 2 of 7 10th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (2.85 before rounding). [CrowdStrike profile](/platforms/crowdstrike/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 4 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | CrowdStrike | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 4 | IAM recommender | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 0 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | CrowdStrike | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 4 | 4 | level | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 5 | IAM recommender | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 6 | 2 | CrowdStrike | CrowdStrike 2.9 (2.85), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** CrowdStrike 3: CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** CrowdStrike 4: CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** CrowdStrike 4: Infrastructure-as-code scanning runs in CI/CD, the IDE and MCP, and Kubernetes admission can block. No exception or drift handling was found. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Cloud's own controls.** CrowdStrike 0: None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** CrowdStrike 6: CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 3.3. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 3.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 2.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **CrowdStrike:** CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cspm/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/crowdstrike-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # Microsoft vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer: AWS IAM Access Analyzer removes more access, 3.0 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** AWS IAM Access Analyzer beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 3.0 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Microsoft wins 0, Access Analyzer wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) ### Ahead on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 4 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Microsoft | Access Analyzer | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 2 | 3 | Access Analyzer | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 1 | level | | Stays fixed | 15 | 2 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 2 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 4 | Access Analyzer | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 2 | Microsoft | Microsoft 1.8 (1.80), AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. Access Analyzer 3: Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. - **Safe to enforce.** Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. - **Stays fixed.** Microsoft 2: Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. Access Analyzer 4: Custom policy checks run before deployment in CI/CD and can trigger approval workflows. No drift or exception handling was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. - **Evidence for auditors.** Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. Access Analyzer 2: A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** Access Analyzer leads, 3.0 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** Access Analyzer leads, 3.0 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** Access Analyzer leads, 2.9 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. ## Sources - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/microsoft-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # Microsoft vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 1.8 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 1.8. Across the five buyer situations Microsoft wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: Microsoft (1.8) Provider tool (Defender for Cloud), ahead on 2 of 7 14th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (1.80 before rounding). [Microsoft profile](/platforms/microsoft/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 4 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Microsoft | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 2 | 4 | IAM recommender | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 0 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 2 | 2 | level | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 6 | 4 | Microsoft | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 0 | 5 | IAM recommender | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 5 | 2 | Microsoft | Microsoft 1.8 (1.80), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Microsoft 2: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Microsoft 1: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Identity, network and AI.** Microsoft 6: Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. IAM recommender 4: Identity role recommendations and a VPC Service Controls troubleshooter are provided. No AI workloads are covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Microsoft 0: Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. - **Evidence for auditors.** Microsoft 5: Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. IAM recommender 2: Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 1.7. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 2.1. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 2.4. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 1.8. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **Microsoft:** Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/microsoft-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # AWS IAM Access Analyzer vs Google Cloud IAM recommender: Google Cloud IAM recommender removes more access, 4.0 to 3.0 Head-to-head, read 10 Nov 2026 **The verdict in short.** Google Cloud IAM recommender beats AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index, 4.0 against 3.0. Across the five buyer situations Access Analyzer wins 0, IAM recommender wins 5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. ### Behind on the index: AWS IAM Access Analyzer (3.0) Provider tool, ahead on 1 of 7 9th of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.00 before rounding). [Access Analyzer profile](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) ### Ahead on the index: Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) Provider tool, ahead on 5 of 7 3rd of 14 on the Least Privilege Index (3.95 before rounding). [IAM recommender profile](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## The seven criteria side by side | Criterion | Weight | Access Analyzer | IAM recommender | Ahead | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Removes access, not only reports it | 25 | 3 | 4 | IAM recommender | | Safe to enforce | 20 | 4 | 6 | IAM recommender | | One change, a class of risk | 15 | 1 | 3 | IAM recommender | | Stays fixed | 15 | 4 | 2 | Access Analyzer | | Identity, network and AI access together | 10 | 2 | 4 | IAM recommender | | Uses the cloud's own controls | 10 | 4 | 5 | IAM recommender | | Evidence for auditors | 5 | 2 | 2 | level | AWS IAM Access Analyzer 3.0 (3.00), Google Cloud IAM recommender 4.0 (3.95) on the index weights. ## Why each scores what it scores - **Removes access.** Access Analyzer 3: Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. IAM recommender 4: A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. - **Safe to enforce.** Access Analyzer 4: The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. IAM recommender 6: Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. - **One change, a class of risk.** Access Analyzer 1: Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. IAM recommender 3: Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. - **Stays fixed.** Access Analyzer 4: Custom policy checks run before deployment in CI/CD and can trigger approval workflows. No drift or exception handling was found. IAM recommender 2: Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. - **Identity, network and AI.** Access Analyzer 2: Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. IAM recommender 4: Identity role recommendations and a VPC Service Controls troubleshooter are provided. No AI workloads are covered. - **Cloud's own controls.** Access Analyzer 4: It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. IAM recommender 5: A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. ## Verdict by situation - **An AWS-heavy organization with hundreds of accounts and years of accumulated access.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/aws-scale/). - **A multi-cloud enterprise with separate teams per cloud.** IAM recommender leads, 3.9 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/multi-cloud/). - **A regulated company that must prove access boundaries for PCI DSS, HIPAA or NIST 800-53.** IAM recommender leads, 3.7 against 3.0. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/regulated/). - **A company putting AI agents into production this year.** IAM recommender leads, 4.0 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/ai-agents/). - **A small cloud security team buried under posture findings it cannot clear.** IAM recommender leads, 3.8 against 2.9. [The full ranking for this situation](/best-for/small-team/). ## Strongest, in one sentence each - **AWS IAM Access Analyzer:** IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. - **Google Cloud IAM recommender:** The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. ## Sources - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-generation.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/aws-iam-access-analyzer-vs-google-iam-recommender/ --- # The 14 platforms compared on each of the seven criteria Compare by criterion, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Seven criteria carry fixed weights: removes access 25, safe to enforce 20, one change for a class of risk 15, stays fixed 15, identity, network and AI coverage 10, native controls 10, evidence for auditors 5. Each criterion page shows who scores highest and why. - [Removes access, not only reports it (weight 25)](/compare/criteria/removes/): Does the product end with an enforced change that takes access away, or with a finding for someone else to act on - [Safe to enforce (weight 20)](/compare/criteria/safe/): Is each change simulated against the real environment before it ships, with the impact shown - [One change, a class of risk (weight 15)](/compare/criteria/class/): Boundaries and guardrails that remove many paths at once, as opposed to permission-by-permission clean-up - [Stays fixed (weight 15)](/compare/criteria/fixed/): Prevents drift: violations checked before production, exceptions handled in the team's own tools, with proof - [Identity, network and AI access together (weight 10)](/compare/criteria/coverage/): Does the model of reachability cover all three, including AI workloads and agents - [Uses the cloud's own controls (weight 10)](/compare/criteria/native/): Enforcement through native mechanisms the customer already owns, with nothing new in the request path - [Evidence for auditors (weight 5)](/compare/criteria/audit/): Mapped controls and continuous evidence for the named frameworks **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/criteria/ --- # Removes access, not only reports it: 25 of 100 points Criterion, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Removes access, not only reports it weighs 25 of 100 on the Least Privilege Index. Sonrai Security, Apono, Britive, Tenable Cloud Security, P0 Security, Entitle score 5, the highest of the 14; Act scores 3. The table keeps the index order, so it compares the field on one criterion without re-ranking it. Does the product end with an enforced change that takes access away, or with a finding for someone else to act on. This criterion asks whether the product ends with an enforced change that takes access away, or with a finding for someone else to act on. A list of identities with unused permissions scores low. A policy that blocks unused privileges once deployed, or a revoke that happens on its own, scores high. Good evidence names who applies the change. Sonrai Security, Apono, Britive, Entitle, P0 Security and Tenable score 5. Act scores 3 because it is read-only and the customer applies each change. Google Cloud IAM recommender scores 4, and Microsoft 2. | Index rank | Platform | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5 | Once the customer deploys it, organization-level policies block unused privileges and quarantine dormant identities automatically. Removal of unused permissions is only suggested. | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 3 | Changes are delivered as infrastructure-as-code pull requests that the customer applies. The product is read-only, and direct enforcement is still under discussion. | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4 | A person checks and applies role recommendations in the product. Organization policy recommendations are suggestions only. | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 5 | Just-in-time access is created at request time and revoked automatically. Fixes for standing access (delete or right-size) are code that the user runs. | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 5 | Just-in-time privilege is created and removed automatically when the task ends, named for AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3 | Wiz generates plans, policies and pull requests sent to code owners. A generated fix is not an applied control. | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 5 | Time-limited just-in-time permissions replace standing privilege. Right-sizing policies are applied by the user, and remediation workflows do not say who applies them. | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 5 | Just-in-time access is provisioned and revoked automatically, with history. Posture findings get suggested shell commands only. | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3 | Refined policies and delete links are generated, and the user attaches or deletes them. | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 3 | CrowdStrike generates least-privilege and resource-based policies and says it removes unwanted access, but recommendations are what is described as output. | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 5 | Elevated access is revoked automatically after a set duration, a ticket or a rotation, and approvers can take bulk actions on identities. | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 3 | Sysdig generates least-privilege policies and infrastructure-as-code fix pull requests. The user validates and applies them. | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 3 | IAM fixes are CLI commands the user runs, or a script the user configures. There is no GCP auto-remediation. | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 2 | Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. Defender for Cloud CIEM gives recommendations described as guidance for remediating, and from 2026-08-06 no longer publishes unused-action details for AWS. | Index order, not re-ranked by this criterion; weight 25 of 100. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/criteria/removes/ --- # Safe to enforce: each change is tested against the real environment first (20 points) Criterion, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Safe to enforce weighs 20 of 100 on the Least Privilege Index. Act Security scores 7, the highest of the 14. The table keeps the index order, so it compares the field on one criterion without re-ranking it. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Is each change simulated against the real environment before it ships, with the impact shown. This criterion asks whether each change is simulated against the real environment before it ships, with the impact shown. A usage report that says a permission looks unused is a hint, not a test. A digital twin, a dry run or a policy simulator that lists what would break counts. Good evidence shows the impact for a specific change. Act scores 7, the only 7 in the index, and Google Cloud IAM recommender scores 6 for its policy simulators. Several products score 0 because no simulation was found on 2026-11-10. | Index rank | Platform | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5 | Policies are built from observed usage, in-use permissions are exempted, and the exemption list is shown before deployment. The change is reversible, but it is not described as a simulation of the change. | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 7 | Each change is tested against a digital twin built from cloud configuration data and run in audit mode against audit-log events before enforcement. This is on the vendor's own material only, and rare dependencies may go untested. | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 6 | Simulators show how an allow-policy change affects principals' access, and list resources that would violate a proposed organization policy before enforcement. Each simulator covers one policy type, and only Google Cloud. | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3 | A preview of who gets what access is shown before access-flow changes are saved, which is a narrow slice. Remediation actions have no simulation, and some fixes are code the user runs. | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 1 | Only a policy Validate button and profile-data validation exist. No impact simulation is described. | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 4 | Wiz evaluates historical activity to judge disruption before remediation. This is not a simulation of control changes, and infrequent dependencies are not covered. | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3 | The product shows the diff between a generated policy and the current one. No simulation against the environment is described. | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 20 pages. | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 4 | The tool previews a policy's effect on public and cross-account access and checks new access against the existing version. It does not simulate the impact of removal, and generated policies omit data events and PassRole. | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 4 | CrowdStrike states a dry-run simulation of remediation before deployment, without saying what it runs against. | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 15 pages. | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2 | Recommendations are claimed to be non-disruptive, and AI agent policies start in alert mode. No simulation step is described. | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 0 | Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. | Index order, not re-ranked by this criterion; weight 20 of 100. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md: https://docs.apono.io/docs/audits-and-reports/apono-admin-mcp-server.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com/docs/profilemgmt-managing-profiles.md: https://docs.britive.com/docs/profilemgmt-managing-profiles.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/criteria/safe/ --- # One change, a class of risk: boundaries beat permission-by-permission clean-up (15 points) Criterion, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** One change, a class of risk weighs 15 of 100 on the Least Privilege Index. Sonrai Security, Act Security score 7, the highest of the 14. The table keeps the index order, so it compares the field on one criterion without re-ranking it. Boundaries and guardrails that remove many paths at once, as opposed to permission-by-permission clean-up. This criterion asks whether the product uses boundaries and guardrails that remove many paths at once, such as service control policies, resource control policies and permission boundaries, instead of editing one permission at a time. A single organization-level control can remove a class of access that would take thousands of edits. Good evidence names the control type and the level it applies at, such as the organization or an OU. Act and Sonrai Security score 7. Google Cloud IAM recommender scores 3 because clean-up is done role by role. | Index rank | Platform | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 7 | Sonrai offers a global default deny in one action, AWS resource control policy (RCP) third-party boundaries at any level, service and region blocks, and organization-level just-in-time access across AWS, GCP and Azure. The RCP feature is AWS only, on the vendor's own material only. | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 7 | Act runs broad explicit-deny guardrail campaigns for whole attack categories and explicit-allow ring-fencing, applied at the AWS Organizations and SCP level. This is on the vendor's own material only. | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 3 | Simulators exist for deny and Principal Access Boundary policies, and organization policies are recommended, but clean-up is done role by role. | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3 | Apono can quarantine a single principal with an AWS permission boundary. Deny policies for overprivileged policies are created by the user, and right-sizing is done per flow. | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3 | A profile can be associated with OUs or accounts, which scopes just-in-time grants, but there is no deny or boundary and each profile holds one role. | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 1 | Only a limit is documented: translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 2 | A deny-all policy blocks access requests made through the product for an account. It is not a cloud boundary. | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 1 | Access Analyzer only reads RCPs. No boundary generation is listed. | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 16 pages. | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2 | Birthright policies and access policies apply request settings across many resources. There is no deny or boundary. | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 1 | Prisma Cloud only reads SCPs as input. It does not create organization-level guardrails. | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1 | Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. What remains is Azure Policy, a separate Azure service assigned to management groups and not described as acting on CIEM findings. | Index order, not re-ranked by this criterion; weight 15 of 100. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery/investigate-and-resolve-over: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started/access-discovery/investigate-and-resolve-overprivileged-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.britive.com/docs/britive-profile-management-for-aws.md: https://docs.britive.com/docs/britive-profile-management-for-aws.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/policy-studio/policy-studio/configure-your-first-access-policy.md: https://docs.p0.dev/policy-studio/policy-studio/configure-your-first-access-policy.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/criteria/class/ --- # Stays fixed: violations are caught before production and exceptions run in your tools (15 points) Criterion, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Stays fixed weighs 15 of 100 on the Least Privilege Index. Sonrai Security, Act Security, Wiz, Tenable Cloud Security, AWS IAM Access Analyzer, CrowdStrike, Sysdig, Prisma Cloud score 4, the highest of the 14. The table keeps the index order, so it compares the field on one criterion without re-ranking it. Prevents drift: violations checked before production, exceptions handled in the team's own tools, with proof. This criterion asks whether the product prevents drift. Good evidence covers three things: violations checked before production (for example in CI/CD), exceptions and requests handled in the team's own chat or ticket tools, and proof attached to each decision. Scores run from 2 to 4 in this index. Sonrai Security and Act score 4 each. Act's pages present handling of violations and time-bound waivers as roadmap, and Sonrai Security's request workflow starts only after a restriction is applied. Google Cloud IAM recommender scores 2. | Index rank | Platform | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 4 | Blocked attempts open Slack requests, and changes are recorded in ITSM. There is no pre-production check, and the workflow starts only after the restriction is applied. | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 4 | Act documents drift detection with a diff against cloud versions, a one-line CI/CD blocking claim that does not say what is checked, and a Terraform provider for its own configuration. Exception handling in the customer's tools and rollback are credited only as roadmap or open discussion. Wiz and Sonrai also score 4. | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 2 | Recommendation states are tracked inside the product. The pre-deploy Terraform check is a separate tool, and no ticketing or chat integration was found. | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3 | Requests and approvals run in Slack, Teams, the CLI and Terraform-defined flows. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3 | Requests run in Slack and Teams, with generic CI/CD and ITSM integrations. No pre-production policy check or drift handling is described. | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 4 | Policies across the IDE, pull requests and CI/CD can block unsafe changes, and Jira tickets are created. Exceptions, drift and paths outside the pipeline lack evidence. | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 4 | Infrastructure-as-code template scanning is offered, with tickets and approvals in Jira, Slack and Teams. No exception or drift handling is described. | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3 | Requests arrive through Slack, findings go to Jira, and a Terraform provider exists. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 4 | Custom policy checks run before deployment in CI/CD and can trigger approval workflows. No drift or exception handling was found. | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 4 | Infrastructure-as-code scanning runs in CI/CD, the IDE and MCP, and Kubernetes admission can block. No exception or drift handling was found. | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 3 | Ticketing fulfilment, a Terraform provider and REST APIs are offered. No pre-production check or drift handling is described. | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 4 | Infrastructure-as-code scanning at commit, pull request and CI/CD can fail builds. No exception handling in the team's tools and no drift handling were found. | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 4 | Pull request scans fail at a threshold, alerts go to ServiceNow and Slack, and requests run through ServiceNow. No drift or exception handling was found. | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 2 | Only IaC misconfiguration correlation is documented, and ITSM integration was presented as roadmap. | Index order, not re-ranked by this criterion; weight 15 of 100. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/docs/terraform/policy-validation/validate-policies: https://cloud.google.com/docs/terraform/policy-validation/validate-policies (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/criteria/fixed/ --- # Identity, network and AI access together: one model of reachability (10 points) Criterion, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Identity, network and AI access together weighs 10 of 100 on the Least Privilege Index. Act Security, Wiz, Microsoft score 6, the highest of the 14. The table keeps the index order, so it compares the field on one criterion without re-ranking it. Does the model of reachability cover all three, including AI workloads and agents. This criterion asks whether the model of what can reach what covers identity, network and AI workloads and agents together. An identity-only view misses a path that runs through a network rule, and a network-only view misses a role that grants access. Agents combine both. Good evidence describes one model, not three products. Act, Wiz and Microsoft score 6. Sonrai Security scores 4 because it enforces at the IAM layer and no network reachability model was found on 2026-11-10. | Index rank | Platform | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 4 | Identities, including AI agent identities, are enforced at the IAM layer. No network reachability model is described. | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 6 | One model combines identity, network, resource and organization controls with configured, effective and observed access, plus endpoint and cloud AI agents. Customer evidence for AI is less mature. | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4 | Identity role recommendations and a VPC Service Controls troubleshooter are provided. No AI workloads are covered. | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 4 | Identity and AI agents are governed together, with runtime intent checks. No network reachability model is described. | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 4 | Britive maps human, agentic AI and non-human identities and their privileges. No network reachability model is described. | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 6 | A graph connects identities, permissions, network exposure, workloads and data into reachable attack paths, plus AI model and agent discovery. AI coverage is inventory rather than reachability. | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 5 | Identity across AWS, Azure and GCP and overprivileged AI identities are covered. Network coverage is limited to public-accessibility context. | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 4 | Identities across several clouds and MCP agent calls are covered. The documentation states that network reachability is not addressed. | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 2 | Only identity unused access and resource-based policies are covered. No network or AI model is covered. | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 4 | Identity entitlements and AI security posture management across named AI services are covered. Attack paths do not name network reachability. | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 4 | Identity access is covered, along with a statement that AI agent functions need a human check for sensitive resources. No network model is described. | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 4 | Identity usage comes from audit logs, and an AI agent inventory is included. Attack paths do not name network reachability. | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 5 | Effective permissions across clouds are covered, with a separate network path analyzer. AI agents are covered only by a general statement. | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 6 | Identity across three clouds, network connections and internet exposure in the security graph, and AI agents in attack paths are covered. AI coverage is stated only briefly. | Index order, not re-ranked by this criterion; weight 10 of 100. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/access-inventory.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/access-inventory.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/criteria/coverage/ --- # Uses the cloud's own controls, with nothing new in the request path (10 points) Criterion, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Uses the cloud's own controls weighs 10 of 100 on the Least Privilege Index. Sonrai Security scores 7, the highest of the 14; Act scores 6. The table keeps the index order, so it compares the field on one criterion without re-ranking it. Enforcement through native mechanisms the customer already owns, with nothing new in the request path. This criterion asks whether enforcement runs through mechanisms the customer already owns, such as SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC, Google Cloud deny policies and security groups, with no proxy, broker or bastion that access must route through. A native control keeps working if the vendor does. Sonrai Security scores 7 and says it uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and Google Cloud deny policies with no proxy. Act scores 6 and delivers native controls through infrastructure as code. Tenable and CrowdStrike score 0, as no native enforcement was found on 2026-11-10. | Index rank | Platform | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 7 | Enforcement uses SCPs, RCPs, Azure RBAC and GCP deny policies, with no proxy, broker or connector. This rests on the vendor's own material only. | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 6 | Act enforces through named native controls (security groups, NSGs, SCPs, RCPs, private endpoints) delivered via infrastructure as code, with no new infrastructure. For AI agents it also enforces on the agent and the gateway. | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 5 | A recommendation is an operation that removes a member from native IAM policy bindings. It works in one cloud only. | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 5 | Permissions are written in the native policy languages of AWS, Azure and GCP. A connector mediates grants, and whether a gateway sits in the request path is not established. | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 5 | The decision is enforced natively at the resource, agentless and proxyless, but the MCP gateway sits in the path of agent calls. | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 2 | Wiz abstracts requirements from provider technology. Whether its output is a native preventive control is left open. | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 19 pages. | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 5 | Default paths are agentless on native IAM, with session-bound roles in AWS and GCP. The AI Gateway sits in the agent data path, and connectors broker just-in-time access. | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 4 | It generates native IAM policies from CloudTrail and is not in the request path. It works in one cloud only, and the user applies the result. | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 0 | None found on 2026-11-10 after checking 17 pages. | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2 | Access is provisioned through the vendor's own VPC agent, which has outbound access, and an API sidecar. | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 3 | For cloud, the output is a generated IAM policy that the user applies. Agent enforcement uses the product's own kernel-level host software. | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 3 | Remediation runs as native CLI commands that the user executes, with no proxy. It is manual. | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 0 | Microsoft is scored on cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) in Defender for Cloud, because Entra Permissions Management was retired on 2025-11-01 and has not been sold since 2025-04-01. None found on 2026-11-10 for Defender for Cloud. | Index order, not re-ranked by this criterion; weight 10 of 100. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/connectors.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/connectors.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/criteria/native/ --- # Evidence for auditors: mapped controls and continuous proof (5 points) Criterion, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Evidence for auditors weighs 5 of 100 on the Least Privilege Index. Wiz, CrowdStrike, Sysdig score 6, the highest of the 14; Act scores 3. The table keeps the index order, so it compares the field on one criterion without re-ranking it. Mapped controls and continuous evidence for the named frameworks. This criterion asks whether the product maps controls to named frameworks, such as PCI DSS, HIPAA, NIST 800-53 and SOC 2, and produces continuous evidence that the boundary held. A statement that the vendor itself is SOC 2 compliant is not evidence about the customer's cloud. Sysdig, Wiz and CrowdStrike score 6. Sonrai Security scores 4 and Act scores 3, because Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA but describes no mapped controls or continuous evidence. | Index rank | Platform | Score | Why | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 4 | Session logs support audit, and an ISO 27002 mapping page exists. The SOC 2 report covers the company itself, and framework support is otherwise generic. | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 3 | Act names NIST 800-53, PCI DSS and HIPAA as boundaries it enforces. No mapped controls or continuous evidence are described. | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 2 | Apply and dismiss actions are logged, and Policy Analyzer serves audit tasks. No compliance framework is named. | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 4 | Requests, grants and revocations are logged with context, and programs such as SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR and PCI DSS are named. No control mapping is shown. | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 4 | Britive names SOC 2, PCI DSS v4.0, NYDFS and HIPAA, and offers a queryable audit trail of grants. No control mapping is shown. | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 6 | Automated compliance covers PCI, GDPR, HIPAA and custom frameworks, with auditor reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 5 | Continuous detection is aligned to CIS, NIST and PCI DSS. No detail on evidence export is given. | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3 | P0 provides a full action-chain audit trail and a SOC 2 case study. No mapped controls are shown. | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 2 | A Security Hub control linked to CIS only checks that an analyzer exists. No evidence from findings is provided. | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 6 | CrowdStrike names CIS, NIST, ISO, PCI DSS, HIPAA and FedRAMP, with audit-ready status and scheduled reports. This rests on the vendor's own material only. | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 3 | Evidence for access certifications is collected automatically. No framework mapping is shown, and the SOC 2 report covers the company itself. | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 6 | Infrastructure-as-code policies are mapped to CIS, NIST 800-53, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA and ISO 27001, with continuous assessments. This rests on the vendor's own material only. | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 5 | Built-in standards include NIST 800-53, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2. Continuous evidence is not described. | | 14 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 5 | Continuous assessment runs against compliance controls, with export and Purview integration. Non-default standards need a paid plan, and none are named. | Index order, not re-ranked by this criterion; weight 5 of 100. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/just-in-time-access: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/just-in-time-access (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/company/britive-advantages: https://www.britive.com/company/britive-advantages (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/compliance: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/compliance (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/compare/criteria/audit/ --- # Alternatives to each of the 14 platforms Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Each of the 14 platforms has an alternatives page that ranks the other 13 on the same seven weighted criteria. Act and Sonrai Security take the top two places in every list that includes them, and each page says what switching changes in practice for a buyer. - [Sonrai Security alternatives](/alternatives/sonrai/): First alternative: Act Security - [Act Security alternatives](/alternatives/act/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Google Cloud IAM recommender alternatives](/alternatives/google-iam-recommender/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Apono alternatives](/alternatives/apono/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Britive alternatives](/alternatives/britive/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Wiz alternatives](/alternatives/wiz/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Tenable Cloud Security alternatives](/alternatives/tenable/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [P0 Security alternatives](/alternatives/p0/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [AWS IAM Access Analyzer alternatives](/alternatives/aws-iam-access-analyzer/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [CrowdStrike alternatives](/alternatives/crowdstrike/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Entitle alternatives](/alternatives/entitle/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Sysdig alternatives](/alternatives/sysdig/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Prisma Cloud alternatives](/alternatives/prisma/): First alternative: Sonrai Security - [Microsoft alternatives](/alternatives/microsoft/): First alternative: Sonrai Security **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/ --- # Sonrai Security alternatives: Act Security and Google Cloud IAM recommender lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Sonrai Security on the Least Privilege Index are Act Security (5.2), Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) and Apono (3.9). Sonrai Security itself scores 5.2. Act is first at 5.2, ahead of Google Cloud IAM recommender at 4.0. Act is first at 5.2, ahead of Google Cloud IAM recommender at 4.0. Sonrai Security scores 5.2 and ranks joint 1st on the full index. Sonrai blocks unused privileged permissions, dormant identities, third-party access and unused services and regions through org-level cloud-native policies, and restores access through ChatOps approvals. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 2 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 3 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 4 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 6 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 7 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Sonrai Security left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Sonrai - [Sonrai vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-sonrai/): 5.2 against 5.2 - [Sonrai vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/sonrai-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 5.2 against 4.0 - [Sonrai vs Apono](/compare/sonrai-vs-apono/): 5.2 against 3.9 - [Sonrai vs Britive](/compare/sonrai-vs-britive/): 5.2 against 3.5 - [Sonrai vs Wiz](/compare/sonrai-vs-wiz/): 5.2 against 3.4 - [Sonrai vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-tenable/): 5.2 against 3.2 - [Sonrai vs P0 Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-p0/): 5.2 against 3.1 - [Sonrai vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/sonrai-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 5.2 against 3.0 - [Sonrai vs CrowdStrike](/compare/sonrai-vs-crowdstrike/): 5.2 against 2.9 - [Sonrai vs Entitle](/compare/sonrai-vs-entitle/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Sonrai vs Sysdig](/compare/sonrai-vs-sysdig/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Sonrai vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/sonrai-vs-prisma/): 5.2 against 2.6 - [Sonrai vs Microsoft](/compare/sonrai-vs-microsoft/): 5.2 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege: https://sonraisecurity.com/use-cases/least-privilege (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/sonrai/ --- # Act Security alternatives: Sonrai Security and Google Cloud IAM recommender lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Act Security on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0) and Apono (3.9). Act Security itself scores 5.2. Sonrai Security is first at 5.2, ahead of Google Cloud IAM recommender at 4.0. Sonrai Security is first at 5.2, ahead of Google Cloud IAM recommender at 4.0. Act Security scores 5.2 and ranks joint 1st on the full index. Act removes broad classes of access by simulating guardrail and ring-fence policies against a digital twin and delivering them as pull requests to the customer's IaC using cloud-native controls. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 2 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 3 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 4 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 6 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 7 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Act Security left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Act - [Act vs Sonrai Security](/compare/act-vs-sonrai/): 5.2 against 5.2 - [Act vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/act-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 5.2 against 4.0 - [Act vs Apono](/compare/act-vs-apono/): 5.2 against 3.9 - [Act vs Britive](/compare/act-vs-britive/): 5.2 against 3.5 - [Act vs Wiz](/compare/act-vs-wiz/): 5.2 against 3.4 - [Act vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/act-vs-tenable/): 5.2 against 3.2 - [Act vs P0 Security](/compare/act-vs-p0/): 5.2 against 3.1 - [Act vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/act-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 5.2 against 3.0 - [Act vs CrowdStrike](/compare/act-vs-crowdstrike/): 5.2 against 2.9 - [Act vs Entitle](/compare/act-vs-entitle/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Act vs Sysdig](/compare/act-vs-sysdig/): 5.2 against 2.8 - [Act vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/act-vs-prisma/): 5.2 against 2.6 - [Act vs Microsoft](/compare/act-vs-microsoft/): 5.2 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/act/ --- # Google Cloud IAM recommender alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Google Cloud IAM recommender on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Apono (3.9). Google Cloud IAM recommender itself scores 4.0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Google Cloud IAM recommender scores 4.0 and ranks 3rd on the full index. The IAM recommender suggests removing or replacing IAM roles that principals have not used, and Policy Simulator shows the effect of a policy change before it is made. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 4 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 6 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 7 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Google Cloud IAM recommender left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against IAM recommender - [IAM recommender vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 5.2 - [IAM recommender vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 5.2 - [IAM recommender vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.9 - [IAM recommender vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.5 - [IAM recommender vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.4 - [IAM recommender vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.2 - [IAM recommender vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.1 - [IAM recommender vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/aws-iam-access-analyzer-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 3.0 - [IAM recommender vs CrowdStrike](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 2.9 - [IAM recommender vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 2.8 - [IAM recommender vs Sysdig](/compare/sysdig-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 2.8 - [IAM recommender vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 2.6 - [IAM recommender vs Microsoft](/compare/microsoft-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 4.0 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/google-iam-recommender/ --- # Apono alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Apono on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). Apono itself scores 3.9. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Apono scores 3.9 and ranks 4th on the full index. Apono grants just-in-time, task-scoped access to people, machines and AI agents in the native policy language of AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and databases, and revokes it automatically. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 6 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 7 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Apono left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Apono - [Apono vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-apono/): 3.9 against 5.2 - [Apono vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-apono/): 3.9 against 5.2 - [Apono vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/apono-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.9 against 4.0 - [Apono vs Britive](/compare/apono-vs-britive/): 3.9 against 3.5 - [Apono vs Wiz](/compare/apono-vs-wiz/): 3.9 against 3.4 - [Apono vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/apono-vs-tenable/): 3.9 against 3.2 - [Apono vs P0 Security](/compare/apono-vs-p0/): 3.9 against 3.1 - [Apono vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/apono-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.9 against 3.0 - [Apono vs CrowdStrike](/compare/apono-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.9 against 2.9 - [Apono vs Entitle](/compare/apono-vs-entitle/): 3.9 against 2.8 - [Apono vs Sysdig](/compare/apono-vs-sysdig/): 3.9 against 2.8 - [Apono vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/apono-vs-prisma/): 3.9 against 2.6 - [Apono vs Microsoft](/compare/apono-vs-microsoft/): 3.9 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono: https://docs.apono.io/docs/why-choose-apono (read 10 Nov 2026) - apono.io: https://www.apono.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started: https://docs.apono.io/docs/getting-started (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/apono/ --- # Britive alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Britive on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). Britive itself scores 3.5. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Britive scores 3.5 and ranks 5th on the full index. Britive creates task-scoped privileged access at runtime and removes it when the task ends, for humans, non-human identities and AI agents across AWS, Azure, GCP and OCI. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 6 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 7 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Britive left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Britive - [Britive vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-britive/): 3.5 against 5.2 - [Britive vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-britive/): 3.5 against 5.2 - [Britive vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/britive-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.5 against 4.0 - [Britive vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-britive/): 3.5 against 3.9 - [Britive vs Wiz](/compare/britive-vs-wiz/): 3.5 against 3.4 - [Britive vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/britive-vs-tenable/): 3.5 against 3.2 - [Britive vs P0 Security](/compare/britive-vs-p0/): 3.5 against 3.1 - [Britive vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/britive-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.5 against 3.0 - [Britive vs CrowdStrike](/compare/britive-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.5 against 2.9 - [Britive vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-britive/): 3.5 against 2.8 - [Britive vs Sysdig](/compare/britive-vs-sysdig/): 3.5 against 2.8 - [Britive vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/britive-vs-prisma/): 3.5 against 2.6 - [Britive vs Microsoft](/compare/britive-vs-microsoft/): 3.5 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - britive.com: https://www.britive.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/use-cases: https://www.britive.com/use-cases (read 10 Nov 2026) - britive.com/platform: https://www.britive.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/britive/ --- # Wiz alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Wiz on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). Wiz itself scores 3.4. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Wiz scores 3.4 and ranks 6th on the full index. Connects code, cloud, identities, network and runtime in one security graph to prioritize exploitable risk and route fixes to code owners. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 7 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Wiz left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Wiz - [Wiz vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 5.2 - [Wiz vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 5.2 - [Wiz vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/wiz-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.4 against 4.0 - [Wiz vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 3.9 - [Wiz vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 3.5 - [Wiz vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 3.2 - [Wiz vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 3.1 - [Wiz vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/wiz-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.4 against 3.0 - [Wiz vs CrowdStrike](/compare/wiz-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.4 against 2.9 - [Wiz vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-wiz/): 3.4 against 2.8 - [Wiz vs Sysdig](/compare/wiz-vs-sysdig/): 3.4 against 2.8 - [Wiz vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/wiz-vs-prisma/): 3.4 against 2.6 - [Wiz vs Microsoft](/compare/wiz-vs-microsoft/): 3.4 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - wiz.io: https://www.wiz.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/solutions/ciem: https://www.wiz.io/solutions/ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - wiz.io/platform: https://www.wiz.io/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/wiz/ --- # Tenable Cloud Security alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Tenable Cloud Security on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). Tenable Cloud Security itself scores 3.2. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Tenable Cloud Security scores 3.2 and ranks 7th on the full index. Combines CIEM entitlement analysis and JIT access with posture management, IaC scanning and attack paths in one cloud platform. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 8 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Tenable Cloud Security left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Tenable - [Tenable vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 5.2 - [Tenable vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 5.2 - [Tenable vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/tenable-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.2 against 4.0 - [Tenable vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 3.9 - [Tenable vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 3.5 - [Tenable vs Wiz](/compare/tenable-vs-wiz/): 3.2 against 3.4 - [Tenable vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 3.1 - [Tenable vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/tenable-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.2 against 3.0 - [Tenable vs CrowdStrike](/compare/tenable-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.2 against 2.9 - [Tenable vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-tenable/): 3.2 against 2.8 - [Tenable vs Sysdig](/compare/tenable-vs-sysdig/): 3.2 against 2.8 - [Tenable vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/tenable-vs-prisma/): 3.2 against 2.6 - [Tenable vs Microsoft](/compare/tenable-vs-microsoft/): 3.2 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/cloud-security: https://www.tenable.com/cloud-security (read 10 Nov 2026) - tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-too: https://www.tenable.com/blog/least-privilege-policy-automated-analysis-trumps-native-aws-tools (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/tenable/ --- # P0 Security alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to P0 Security on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). P0 Security itself scores 3.1. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. P0 Security scores 3.1 and ranks 8th on the full index. Grants short-lived, scoped access on request through Slack, CLI or web with approvals, and applies the same runtime authorization to AI agents. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, P0 Security left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against P0 - [P0 vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 5.2 - [P0 vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 5.2 - [P0 vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/p0-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.1 against 4.0 - [P0 vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 3.9 - [P0 vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 3.5 - [P0 vs Wiz](/compare/p0-vs-wiz/): 3.1 against 3.4 - [P0 vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/p0-vs-tenable/): 3.1 against 3.2 - [P0 vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/p0-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.1 against 3.0 - [P0 vs CrowdStrike](/compare/p0-vs-crowdstrike/): 3.1 against 2.9 - [P0 vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-p0/): 3.1 against 2.8 - [P0 vs Sysdig](/compare/p0-vs-sysdig/): 3.1 against 2.8 - [P0 vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/p0-vs-prisma/): 3.1 against 2.6 - [P0 vs Microsoft](/compare/p0-vs-microsoft/): 3.1 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - p0.dev/platform: https://www.p0.dev/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/just-in-time-access.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md: https://docs.p0.dev/readme/posture.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/p0/ --- # AWS IAM Access Analyzer alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to AWS IAM Access Analyzer on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). AWS IAM Access Analyzer itself scores 3.0. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. AWS IAM Access Analyzer scores 3.0 and ranks 9th on the full index. IAM Access Analyzer generates an IAM policy from up to 90 days of CloudTrail activity and recommends refined policies for unused permissions. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, AWS IAM Access Analyzer left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Access Analyzer - [Access Analyzer vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 5.2 - [Access Analyzer vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 5.2 - [Access Analyzer vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/aws-iam-access-analyzer-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 3.0 against 4.0 - [Access Analyzer vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.9 - [Access Analyzer vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.5 - [Access Analyzer vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.4 - [Access Analyzer vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.2 - [Access Analyzer vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 3.1 - [Access Analyzer vs CrowdStrike](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 2.9 - [Access Analyzer vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 2.8 - [Access Analyzer vs Sysdig](/compare/sysdig-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 2.8 - [Access Analyzer vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 2.6 - [Access Analyzer vs Microsoft](/compare/microsoft-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 3.0 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.ht: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/aws-iam-access-analyzer/ --- # CrowdStrike alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to CrowdStrike on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). CrowdStrike itself scores 2.9. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. CrowdStrike scores 2.9 and ranks 10th on the full index. CrowdStrike ties cloud findings to adversary tradecraft it has observed to rank which exposures to fix first. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 10= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, CrowdStrike left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against CrowdStrike - [CrowdStrike vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 5.2 - [CrowdStrike vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 5.2 - [CrowdStrike vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.9 against 4.0 - [CrowdStrike vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.9 - [CrowdStrike vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.5 - [CrowdStrike vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.4 - [CrowdStrike vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.2 - [CrowdStrike vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 3.1 - [CrowdStrike vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.9 against 3.0 - [CrowdStrike vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 2.8 - [CrowdStrike vs Sysdig](/compare/sysdig-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 2.8 - [CrowdStrike vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.9 against 2.6 - [CrowdStrike vs Microsoft](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-microsoft/): 2.9 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/cnapp/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-enti: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/cloud-security/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/cloud-security/ciem/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/crowdstrike/ --- # Entitle alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Entitle on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). Entitle itself scores 2.8. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Entitle scores 2.8 and ranks joint 11th on the full index. Entitle provides just-in-time cloud and SaaS access that auto-revokes, with approval workflows in Slack and Teams, access reviews and audit logs. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 11 | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Entitle left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Entitle - [Entitle vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-entitle/): 2.8 against 5.2 - [Entitle vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-entitle/): 2.8 against 5.2 - [Entitle vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/entitle-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.8 against 4.0 - [Entitle vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-entitle/): 2.8 against 3.9 - [Entitle vs Britive](/compare/entitle-vs-britive/): 2.8 against 3.5 - [Entitle vs Wiz](/compare/entitle-vs-wiz/): 2.8 against 3.4 - [Entitle vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/entitle-vs-tenable/): 2.8 against 3.2 - [Entitle vs P0 Security](/compare/entitle-vs-p0/): 2.8 against 3.1 - [Entitle vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/entitle-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.8 against 3.0 - [Entitle vs CrowdStrike](/compare/entitle-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.8 against 2.9 - [Entitle vs Sysdig](/compare/entitle-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 2.8 - [Entitle vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/entitle-vs-prisma/): 2.8 against 2.6 - [Entitle vs Microsoft](/compare/entitle-vs-microsoft/): 2.8 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - entitle.io: https://www.entitle.io (read 10 Nov 2026) - beyondtrust.com/products/entitle: https://www.beyondtrust.com/products/entitle (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements: https://docs.beyondtrust.com/entitle/docs/entitle-agent-network-access-requirements (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/entitle/ --- # Sysdig alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Sysdig on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). Sysdig itself scores 2.8. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Sysdig scores 2.8 and ranks joint 11th on the full index. Sysdig uses runtime data to show which permissions are in use and generates access policies limited to that use. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 11 | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 12 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Sysdig left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Sysdig - [Sysdig vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 5.2 - [Sysdig vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 5.2 - [Sysdig vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/sysdig-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.8 against 4.0 - [Sysdig vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.9 - [Sysdig vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.5 - [Sysdig vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.4 - [Sysdig vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.2 - [Sysdig vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 3.1 - [Sysdig vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/sysdig-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.8 against 3.0 - [Sysdig vs CrowdStrike](/compare/sysdig-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.8 against 2.9 - [Sysdig vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 2.8 - [Sysdig vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-sysdig/): 2.8 against 2.6 - [Sysdig vs Microsoft](/compare/sysdig-vs-microsoft/): 2.8 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem: https://www.sysdig.com/solutions/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management-ciem (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/about: https://www.sysdig.com/about (read 10 Nov 2026) - sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-sec: https://www.sysdig.com/press-releases/sysdig-launches-sysdig-ai-defense-bringing-runtime-security-to-every-action-ai-agents-take (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/sysdig/ --- # Prisma Cloud alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead the rest Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Prisma Cloud on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). Prisma Cloud itself scores 2.6. Every score on this page was read from the evidence on 10 Nov 2026 and links to its source. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Prisma Cloud scores 2.6 and ranks 13th on the full index. Calculates net effective permissions across clouds, including SCPs as input, and ties them to a broad platform with code scanning, network analysis and a large library of compliance standards. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 13 | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 1.8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Prisma Cloud left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Prisma Cloud - [Prisma Cloud vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 5.2 - [Prisma Cloud vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 5.2 - [Prisma Cloud vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/prisma-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 2.6 against 4.0 - [Prisma Cloud vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.9 - [Prisma Cloud vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.5 - [Prisma Cloud vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.4 - [Prisma Cloud vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.2 - [Prisma Cloud vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 3.1 - [Prisma Cloud vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/prisma-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 2.6 against 3.0 - [Prisma Cloud vs CrowdStrike](/compare/prisma-vs-crowdstrike/): 2.6 against 2.9 - [Prisma Cloud vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-prisma/): 2.6 against 2.8 - [Prisma Cloud vs Sysdig](/compare/prisma-vs-sysdig/): 2.6 against 2.8 - [Prisma Cloud vs Microsoft](/compare/prisma-vs-microsoft/): 2.6 against 1.8 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/re: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/remediate-alerts-for-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cloud/cloud-infrastructure-entitlement-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/wh: https://docs.prismacloud.io/content-collections/administration/configure-iam-security/what-is-prisma-cloud-iam-security.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/prisma/ --- # Entra Permissions Management alternatives: Sonrai Security and Act Security lead Alternatives, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The strongest alternatives to Microsoft on the Least Privilege Index are Sonrai Security (5.2), Act Security (5.2) and Google Cloud IAM recommender (4.0). Microsoft itself scores 1.8. Microsoft retired Entra Permissions Management on 1 November 2025, so this list is also the list of replacements, scored on the same weights. Sonrai Security and Act share first at 5.2; Sonrai Security is listed first because it is ahead before rounding (5.20 against 5.15). What puts Sonrai ahead: removes access (5 against 3), cloud's own controls (7 against 6) and evidence for auditors (4 against 3), worth 0.65 points on these weights, against Act's lead on safe to enforce (7 against 5) and identity, network and AI (6 against 4), worth 0.60. Microsoft scores 1.8 and ranks 14th on the full index. Defender for Cloud evaluates effective permissions to identify which identities can reach sensitive or business-critical resources. | Rank | Platform | Total | Removes (25) | Safe (20) | Class (15) | Fixed (15) | Id+Net+AI (10) | Native (10) | Audit (5) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1= | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5.2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | | 1= | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 5.2 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | 3 | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4.0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | | 4 | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 3.9 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 5 | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 3.5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | | 6 | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3.4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | | 7 | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 3.2 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | | 8 | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 3.1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3.0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | 10 | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 2.9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 6 | | 11= | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 2.8 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | | 11= | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 2.8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | | 13 | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 2.6 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | The other 13 platforms on the index weights, Microsoft left out. "=" marks a joint rank. ## Each alternative against Microsoft - [Microsoft vs Sonrai Security](/compare/sonrai-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 5.2 - [Microsoft vs Act Security](/compare/act-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 5.2 - [Microsoft vs Google Cloud IAM recommender](/compare/microsoft-vs-google-iam-recommender/): 1.8 against 4.0 - [Microsoft vs Apono](/compare/apono-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.9 - [Microsoft vs Britive](/compare/britive-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.5 - [Microsoft vs Wiz](/compare/wiz-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.4 - [Microsoft vs Tenable Cloud Security](/compare/tenable-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.2 - [Microsoft vs P0 Security](/compare/p0-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 3.1 - [Microsoft vs AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/compare/microsoft-vs-aws-iam-access-analyzer/): 1.8 against 3.0 - [Microsoft vs CrowdStrike](/compare/crowdstrike-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 2.9 - [Microsoft vs Entitle](/compare/entitle-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 2.8 - [Microsoft vs Sysdig](/compare/sysdig-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 2.8 - [Microsoft vs Prisma Cloud](/compare/prisma-vs-microsoft/): 1.8 against 2.6 **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/permissions-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/permissions-management/faqs (read 10 Nov 2026) - learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introducti: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-cloud-introduction (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com/platform: https://sonraisecurity.com/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) - sonraisecurity.com: https://sonraisecurity.com (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security: https://act.security (read 10 Nov 2026) - act.security/platform: https://act.security/platform (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/alternatives/microsoft/ --- # The Access Debt Calculator: how big your hardening plan is Calculator, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** The Access Debt Calculator turns four numbers from your estate (identities, identities with unused permissions, reachable paths to sensitive resources and accounts) into the size of two plans: a permission-by-permission clean-up and a boundary plan. It states each assumption and shows the arithmetic. The calculator takes six inputs: the number of identities, the number of identities with unused permissions, the number of reachable paths to sensitive resources, the number of accounts, the policy changes your team can review and ship in a week, and the number of risk classes a boundary plan should cover. You can read most of them from a CIEM report or an attack path view. It outputs the size of two plans. The permission-by-permission plan assumes one reviewed change per identity with unused permissions, since each identity has its own policy, owner and test, and divides that by your weekly rate. The boundary plan assumes one boundary per risk class, attached high in the hierarchy and rolled out in stages over your accounts. The stage count is an assumption, stated under the calculator, and you can change every input. Read the result as a ratio. If the permission plan is a hundred times the boundary plan, hand edits will not finish before the estate changes again. The calculator does not account for how long a change takes to test, how many owners must approve, or whether a boundary breaks a rare dependency. Those costs are why the safe to enforce criterion is weighted 20. Interactive calculator: inputs are identities, identities with unused permissions, reachable paths, accounts, the changes your team can ship per week and the risk classes a boundary plan covers. The permission-by-permission plan is one change per identity with unused permissions, divided by your weekly rate. The boundary plan is one boundary per risk class, each rolled out in stages over your accounts. ## The arithmetic, stated - Permission-by-permission plan: one reviewed policy change per identity that has unused permissions, because each identity has its own policy to edit. Weeks equal those changes divided by the changes your team ships per week. - Boundary plan: one boundary per risk class (for example, deny leaving the organization, deny disabling logs, deny public sharing), attached once high in the hierarchy so it applies to every account below it. AWS documents that an SCP attached to an organizational unit applies to every account in it. - Each boundary is rolled out in stages: a test unit first, then wider groups. The calculator assumes each stage covers four times as many accounts as the one before, so the number of stages is one plus the base-4 logarithm of your account count, rounded up. - Reachable paths are shown for scale only. A boundary removes every path in its risk class at once; a permission edit removes the paths that run through one identity. The calculator does not claim a number of paths removed, because that depends on your environment. - Nothing here estimates cost or time to write a boundary. Every number is an input you supply or a count derived from it. ## Where the inputs come from Identities with unused permissions: AWS IAM Access Analyzer unused access findings, the Google Cloud IAM recommender, or your platform's report. Reachable paths: your attack path or reachability tool. Accounts: AWS Organizations, Azure management groups or Google Cloud folders. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - AWS Organizations: service control policies: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer: https://aws.amazon.com/iam/access-analyzer/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/role-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) - cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-ov: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/organization-policy-recommendations-overview (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/access-debt-calculator/ --- # Cloud security intent enforcement: what the term means and who fits Category, read 10 Nov 2026 **In short.** Cloud security intent enforcement is a label for products that turn a stated security goal into a tested preventive control, apply it where the cloud enforces it, and keep it in place. On this index, Act and Sonrai Security score 7 on class and fit best; Act leads on safe to enforce. ## The term describes a control loop, not a feature Software Analyst Cyber Research (SACR) defines cloud security intent enforcement, abbreviated CSIE, as the control layer that takes cloud context and a declared or derived security intent, translates it into enforceable controls, evaluates the likely impact, applies the control at an appropriate enforcement point, and maintains the intended state over time. Its test is the outcome. In SACR's wording, a qualifying product must materially participate in creating and operationalizing a control that prevents a prohibited cloud state before it becomes active. SACR says the product does not need to write directly into production, provided the control reaches an authoritative enforcement point and its effect can be verified. ## The term comes from a 28 October 2026 guide listed on Act's site Act's site lists [The CISO's Guide to Cloud Security Intent Enforcement](https://act.security/blog/the-cisos-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement?utm_source=cloudleastprivilege.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=category), dated 28 October 2026, and the full report is on [the SACR site](https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement) (authors Jamie Feder and Paul Webber, updated 3 November 2026). Act's listing summarizes the idea as the gap between knowing what should be secure and ensuring it stays that way. The report names Act, Native and Aryon Security as specialists approaching the problem, and says Wiz is extending its cloud context into preventive enforcement. The report calls the field emerging and asks whether it will become a separate layer or part of existing platforms. Treat the term as an analyst's label, not a settled market category. ## It differs from CIEM and posture management in where the work ends Posture management finds misconfigurations, and CIEM finds excess entitlements. Both end, in most products, with a finding. The report says intent enforcement is not CNAPP 2.0 and does not replace posture, detection or runtime platforms. It is a complementary layer that asks which states the cloud should permit and what control would prevent an unsafe one. In the index's terms, intent enforcement is the work of the safe to enforce, class and removes criteria taken together. A CIEM tool can score 5 on removes by revoking standing grants and still score 0 on class if it never applies a boundary. ## Act and Sonrai Security fit the definition as scored Act scores 7 on class and 7 on safe to enforce, the highest in the index, and 3 on removes because it is read-only and the customer applies each change. Sonrai Security scores 7 on class, 5 on safe and 5 on removes, and applies its organization-level policies itself. Google Cloud IAM recommender scores 6 on safe but 3 on class. The SACR report says Wiz is extending into impact-aware remediation and cross-cloud policy work, and Wiz scores 1 on class, because translation into durable cross-cloud controls is unvalidated. No other platform in the index scores above 3 on class. ## The index on the three criteria that define the category | Platform | Removes | Safe | Class | Sum | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [Sonrai Security](/platforms/sonrai/) | 5 | 5 | 7 | 17 | | [Act Security](/platforms/act/) | 3 | 7 | 7 | 17 | | [Google Cloud IAM recommender](/platforms/google-iam-recommender/) | 4 | 6 | 3 | 13 | | [Apono](/platforms/apono/) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 11 | | [Britive](/platforms/britive/) | 5 | 1 | 3 | 9 | | [Wiz](/platforms/wiz/) | 3 | 4 | 1 | 8 | | [Tenable Cloud Security](/platforms/tenable/) | 5 | 3 | 0 | 8 | | [AWS IAM Access Analyzer](/platforms/aws-iam-access-analyzer/) | 3 | 4 | 1 | 8 | | [P0 Security](/platforms/p0/) | 5 | 0 | 2 | 7 | | [CrowdStrike](/platforms/crowdstrike/) | 3 | 4 | 0 | 7 | | [Entitle](/platforms/entitle/) | 5 | 0 | 2 | 7 | | [Sysdig](/platforms/sysdig/) | 3 | 2 | 0 | 5 | | [Prisma Cloud](/platforms/prisma/) | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | | [Microsoft](/platforms/microsoft/) | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | Unweighted sum of three criteria, for reading the category only; the index uses all seven at their weights. **Where Act is behind.** Act is not a CNAPP: it does not scan workloads or vulnerabilities (none found on 2026-11-10), and it publishes no pricing. It also does not make the change itself: it has read-only access to your cloud and delivers each change as a pull request to your Terraform or CloudFormation, or as a ticket, for your team to apply, and handling of violations and time-bound waivers after a change ships was described as roadmap. ## Sources - The CISO's Guide to Cloud Security Intent Enforcement, listed on Act's site, 28 October 2026: https://act.security/blog/the-cisos-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) - The CISO's Guide to Cloud Security Intent Enforcement, SACR report, 28 October 2026, updated 3 November 2026: https://softwareanalyst.io/reports/the-ciso-s-guide-to-cloud-security-intent-enforcement (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudleastprivilege.com/cloud-security-intent-enforcement/